India’s reluctance to criticise the Russian aggression against Ukraine — that has generated so much criticism in Europe — is rooted in Delhi’s long and productive relationship with Moscow.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Kyiv on Friday must be seen as a major step towards disentangling Delhi’s engagement with Central Europe from the conflict between Russia and its western periphery. This involves shedding the ideological burdens of Indian foreign policy inherited from the 20th century that prevented India from establishing a solid strategic presence in the heart of Europe in the 21st century. Russia’s war on Ukraine, now in its third year, looms large over the first ever Indian prime ministerial visit to Kyiv. Given the tragedy of the South Asian Partition, Delhi has no difficulty in understanding the bitter and competing narratives deeply held in Kyiv and Moscow. Structuring a sensible relationship between the two after the separation in 1991 was complicated by a fundamental tension. Moscow has strong claims for primacy in Ukraine and has demanded limits to Kyiv’s relations with the West. Kyiv, in contrast, sought greater strategic autonomy from Russia and tried to diversify ties with Europe and America. The tensions boiled over in 2014 with a major internal change triggered by the Maidan Revolution and Russian occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula. The conflict escalated into a full-blown war in February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine.
India’s reluctance to criticise the Russian aggression against Ukraine — that has generated so much criticism in Europe — is rooted in Delhi’s long and productive relationship with Moscow. If the Soviet Union was seen as a positive force in India’s quest for liberation from colonialism and for greater strategic autonomy in the Cold War, Delhi has had problems appreciating Russia’s imperial history in Europe. Despite its entrenched commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations, India was reluctant to condemn repeated Soviet and Russian interventions in Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). It held its peace at the Soviet Union’s brazen theory of “limited sovereignty” for its communist allies during the Cold War. The Russian invasion of Crimea (2014) and Eastern Ukraine (2024) underlines Moscow’s effort to reconstitute what it sees as its legitimate sphere of influence in the former Soviet space. Nationalism is a force and unsurprisingly there is deep resistance against Moscow’s ambitions on the western periphery of Russia.
There may have been good geopolitical reasons for Delhi’s silence on Russian actions. As a rising power, though, India cannot forever view Central Europe through the Russian prism; after all, Moscow does not view the Indo-Pacific through Delhi’s eyes. Russia is deepening its strategic ties with China even as it maintains a cordial relationship with India. Delhi, too, should de-hyphenate its ties with Russia and Central Europe. Contrary to the widespread view, the PM’s Ukraine visit is not a “compensation” for his recent Russia trip. It is about India pursuing good relations with both Russia and Ukraine. Modi’s travel to Kyiv comes after continuous high-level exchanges between Delhi and Kyiv over the last couple of years. On the question of peace, there are unrealistic expectations of a major Indian initiative for ceasefire between Kyiv and Moscow; PM Modi is aware of Delhi’s possibilities and limitations. As he put it in his departure statement, the focus is on “strengthening bilateral cooperation” and sharing “perspectives on the peaceful resolution” of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
