Despite the large number of surrenders, the Maoist insurgency has continued to fester. This clearly points to the gaps in the existing policy. (Express Photo)
Shashank Ranjan
Nov 28, 2024 13:04 IST First published on: Nov 28, 2024 at 13:04 IST
Ten Maoists were shot dead by security forces in Bastar’s Sukma on November 23. As per the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the Maoist death toll this year so far has been 278 — the third highest since 2001, with the highest being in the year 2006 when 343 Maoists were killed, closely followed by 2009 accounting for 314 deaths. The most crucial aspect this year is the relatively lower number of casualties of security personnel. The figures as per SATP, with regard to security personnel killed in the year(s) 2006, 2009 and 2014 are 128, 319 and 23 respectively. These figures establish that security forces have noticeably gained the upper hand in the ongoing counter-insurgency battles.
The efforts of security forces have facilitated the opportunity to graduate from transactional pay-offs to long-term transformation. The counter-insurgency campaign being a whole-of-the-nation approach, the need of the hour is to raise the level of policy interventions by the government. The significant headway achieved by the security forces, if not complemented by policy initiatives, may fritter away the gains made.
The Chhattisgarh government has often suggested initiatives in tandem with the ongoing military campaign. Some of these include peace talks with Maoists, justice delivery to the victims of long-drawn insurgency and revamping the state’s surrender and rehabilitation policies. Encouragingly, all these suggestions have been recent developments, largely surfacing after March this year. The Maoist leadership too, has shown an inclination to respond to the suggestions made by the state government, especially in the context of initiating a dialogue process. The CPI (Maoist) released a press note in March, indicating their interest in proposed talks with some pre-conditions. These can always be negotiated for the larger good.
It is argued that since the Maoists are now on the backfoot, there is no point in talking to them since they can be eliminated militarily. Past precedence in this regard, however, has not been so straightforward. The Maoists have often demonstrated their resilience to strike at will, even in the face of adversities and the dispensation would be better off drawing them to the table to talk. Notwithstanding the mixed outcomes from similar initiatives in the past, the major advantage likely to accrue by initiating talks will be in the form of demonstrating sincerity on the part of the government. This could go a long way in positive perception-building to boost the government’s image amongst the support base of Maoists and is in accordance with established policy.
In October, as a final offer to Maoists to shun violence and join the mainstream, the Chhattisgarh Chief Minister said his government “will soon come up with a surrender policy by incorporating best practices implemented by different states”. As per the SATP, in the current year so far, 446 Maoist cadres have surrendered and over the last two decades, the number of surrenders stands at more than 17,000.
Despite the large number of surrenders, the Maoist insurgency has continued to fester. This clearly points to the gaps in the existing policy. The state government’s commitment to come up with a more effective and revised surrender policy bodes well. It is hoped that the proposed policy is declared sooner than later and bridges the gaps in the current policy.
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The noticed gaps, in general, relate to non-fulfilment of promises, poor integration of the surrendered cadres in the society, the challenge of recidivism, stigmatisation etc. Also, the rehabilitation of surrendered cadres as special police officers (SPOs) is better avoided as a general policy. Employing SPOs as part of the counter-insurgency campaign often proves detrimental to the societal fabric after a certain threshold, especially when the insurgency indices show a downward trend. The aforesaid is notwithstanding the instrumental role played by the SPOs in the fight against Maoists.
Lastly, as the canvas of combat with insurgents gets confined, it is time to reach out to the victims in a non-partisan manner. The state approach in reaching out to sufferers on either side of the divide, that is, victims of violence perpetrated by both parties to the conflict ought to be characterised by magnanimity and the spirit of “truth and reconciliation”. In several countries in Latin America and Africa, victims’ registries have been used as traditional instruments to deliver transitional justice. These successful models, adopted after due deliberations and adaptations, could serve as a guideline to formulate our policies. The purpose of the registries shall be to document the magnitude of human rights violations in a specific context and to determine and specify the list of beneficiaries of the reparation programmes.
As the counter-insurgency against Maoism reaches a decisive stage with Maoists suffering repeated setbacks, it is time to convert battlefield successes into a victorious campaign. It is also added that the policy initiatives discussed in the article are over and above the structural approach by the government towards conflict resolution, for larger and long-lasting good.
The author is an Army veteran with substantial experience in serving in counter-insurgencies. He currently teaches at OP Jindal Global University, Sonepat, Haryana
