Why Hamas survives the deaths of its leaders

In Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organisations, academic Jenna Jordan explains Hamas’s resilience to the decapitation of leadership with three variables — organisation, community support, and ideology. Hamas is sufficiently bureaucratised at the upper levels of the organisation. This has facilitated a clear succession process and has increased its organisational stability and efficiency. Palestinian support for Hamas has increased over time, which has enabled the organisation to withstand leadership attacks. As per the Washington, DC-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Palestinian support for Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza remains high. It cannot be denied that the humanitarian toll and devastation Gaza has suffered since last year could be a factor behind the support.

Sinwar’s so-called martyrdom is likely to galvanise ordinary Palestinians and consolidate support for Hamas, quite like the support that saw Hamas get the veneer of political legitimacy in 2004-06. The killing of Hamas co-founders, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 2004 and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi in 2006, triggered massive local and international outrage. The outcome post-2006 was more — and not fewer — attacks.

Hamas’s ideology is drawn from both separatist and Islamist movements, with Israel seen as the political and religious enemy. This explains why the group is able to garner significant community support, which is not contingent upon leadership and decapitation. Hamas’s origin is traced to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), a socio-political Islamic movement founded in 1928 in Egypt. The eruption of the first intifada in 1987 provided an opportunity for mass mobilisation and the Palestinian chapter of MB under Yassin adopted a violent proactive policy, out of which Hamas was born. Hamas termed waging war to wrest control of Palestine a religious duty for Palestinian Muslims in its 1988 charter. There is enough empirical evidence to suggest that the outfit has grown in tandem with the killings of its leaders. The fact that decapitation has not weakened Hamas suggests the need for Israel to rethink policies. Operations such as the killings of Sinwar and Haniyeh do have tactical advantages but can only be converted into strategic victories if the follow-up is solely political. It is essential to consider the long-term consequences when assessing the advantages of leadership targeting as a counterterrorism policy.

Hamas has demonstrated enough flexibility to survive and function in the wake of slain leadership. It should not be forgotten that Hamas is a quasi-State actor with functional political and military wings and administers the Gaza Strip with the people’s mandate. Hamas is presently run by a five-person committee based in Doha that has reiterated the organisation’s maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage agreement with Israel.

Several fast-paced developments after Sinwar’s death indicate it is business as usual in the West Asia conflict. First, as reported by Palestinian authorities, on October 19, at least 87 people were killed following an Israeli air strike in northern Gaza. Second, again on October 19, Netanyahu was allegedly subjected to an assassination attempt by the Hezbollah when a drone was directed at his holiday home. Third, in Beirut, the Israeli air force carried out attacks on Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters and an underground weapons workshop. Last but not least, in the early hours of October 26, Israel carried out attacks on Iran’s air defence facilities and missile factories. There has been no retaliation from Tehran since, but Tel Aviv has continued its war on both Gaza and Lebanon.

Shashank Ranjan, a retired colonel, teaches at OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana.The views expressed are personal

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