India is arguably better placed than most of America’s partners to deal with the incipient political change of guard in Washington. Whether it is the Republican candidate, former President Donald Trump, or the Democratic nominee, Vice President Kamala Harris, who wins the November election, India’s relations are unlikely to face any disruption.
Unlike America’s allies in Europe and Asia who worry about the return of Trump, India has strengthened its relationship with the US under both the Trump and Biden administrations. Delhi, therefore, has reasons to be confident about continuity in its ties with the US. Yet, change is the only enduring law of the universe, and Delhi must be prepared to deal with either incremental or radical changes within domestic US politics that could affect relations.
India’s relations with the US have been on an upward arc since President Bill Clinton visited India in March 2000. Presidents George W Bush (Republican), Barack Obama (Democratic), Trump (Republican), and Joe Biden (Democratic) pushed the relationship forward. In India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (BJP), Manmohan Singh (Congress), and Narendra Modi (BJP) have also been as committed to the deepening of the partnership.
The US is now the most comprehensive and consequential partner for India. China is a large trading partner but it is also the biggest contributor to India’s trade deficit. Delhi is also locked in a semi-permanent military confrontation with Beijing on its long and contested border. Russia is a major military partner, but the relationship does not have the economic or technological weight of Delhi’s relationship with Washington. Europe is a major source of trade, technology and capital, but does not have America’s geopolitical heft that can contribute to India’s national security objectives. Cutting across all this is the hugely successful five million-strong Indian diaspora in the US.
Despite the expansive growth of the bilateral partnership over the last two-and-a-half decades, pessimism hangs like a pall over the discourse on the prospects for the bilateral relationship in think tanks, media, and academia. Every dispute between Delhi and Washington is viewed as a deal-breaker even as scepticism greets every breakthrough in the relationship. The gap between the public discourse and the strategic evolution of India-US relations is real, but may be inconsequential as we look ahead to the next administration.
The Indian establishment’s intensive engagement with successive administrations means there is great familiarity with the Republican and Democratic policy establishments that populate the large number of important, politically-appointed administrative positions. This, in turn, is reinforced by the expansive “Track 2” engagements between the Indian and American strategic communities. Over the last few decades, Delhi has also engaged with the US Congress and built solid foundations of support on both sides of the aisle.
The US corporate sector plays a major role in America’s engagement with the world. Thanks to the growing volumes of trade and deepening links between the tech sectors of the two countries, Delhi can count on backing from American businesses for the US partnership with India.
While Trump’s positions on global issues are well known, many critics see Harris as a “mystery” when it comes to foreign policy. But her international record as Biden’s Vice President, the policy platform adopted at the convention last week and her speech accepting the Democratic nomination do give some clues. Four issues are of special interest to India — immigration, trade, technology, and Eurasian security. Unlike Trump, who talks of drastic approaches to curbing immigration, Harris advocates an overhaul of the system to promote legal immigration and deter illegal flows in partnership with the Republicans in the US Congress. So long as the US needs to import global talent and the immigration reform focuses on a merit-based system, Delhi will have little reason for worry. Immigration is now a toxic issue in US politics and Delhi must recognise that there is growing illegal Indian migration into the US and work with Washington to address the issue.
On trade, Harris has attacked Trump’s plan to impose a 10 per cent tariff on all imports as a “national sales tax” that will impose a massive burden on American consumers. That should bring some relief to Indian exporters. Harris is likely to persist with the Biden approach, which has much resonance in India, on building a “durable global economic order” centred around “resilient supply chains” and “deeper trade with trusted partners”. On technology, Harris is likely to continue with the Biden policy of building advanced technology coalitions with key partners like the EU, India, Singapore, and South Korea. For India, Harris’s political roots in California, the world’s leading technological hub, her record in the Biden Administration as the chair of the US National Space Council, and her leadership on the national and global governance of AI are likely to be of great value in deepening the tech partnership with the US in a potential US administration under her.
On issues relating to Eurasian security, Harris attacked Trump for wanting to abandon America’s European allies and reiterated her commitment to NATO and the defence of Ukraine. The Russian question will continue to be a complicating factor in India’s relations with the US. PM Modi’s visit to Kyiv last week underlines Delhi’s commitment and capacity to carefully traverse the Ukraine minefield between Russia, Europe, and America.
China’s challenge to Asian security has been a major source of strategic convergence between Delhi and Washington in recent years. The shared interest in building a multipolar Asia became explicit under Trump and acquired greater traction under Biden. There is nothing to suggest that this will change under a Harris administration. Harris, who visited Asia four times in the last four years, has been at the forefront of building a “latticework” of US alliances aimed at limiting potential Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.
No partnership can endure without sustained political and bureaucratic tending. India must be prepared to prevent natural differences from becoming disputes. Delhi must also accelerate the effort to build on the solid foundation that exists today for building a more consequential global partnership with Washington under the next administration.
The writer is a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore and a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express
