Two tweets from Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi provide evidence of the Indian government’s clear desire to deepen the United States (US)-India relationship on top of and beyond an architecture for diplomacy that was reframed in February 2020, during then-President Donald Trump’s State visit to India. Between a “Namaste Trump” rally in Ahmedabad, where the 45th US President stated that America “should be India’s premier defence partner(s),” and formal engagements in New Delhi, negotiators from both sides placed the substance that drives this crucial relationship under a new syntax — the Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership (CGSP).
The CGSP was emphasised in Modi’s tweet congratulating Trump on winning the US election to become the 47th American President. PM Modi was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the President-elect, beaten only by French President Emmanuel Macron by a mere four minutes. PM Modi’s tweet went out with a set of four photos of the two leaders sharing moments in merriment. Similar tweets in the past congratulating world leaders on winning elections are text-based. These signals may seem trivial, but they are not. Seemingly, the PM has sent a clear message: the Indian government is more than ready to work with the new American administration.
The second tweet, following a telephone conversation with Trump — only a few hours after he had declared himself the winner, underlined the significance of intensifying collaborations “across technology, defence, energy, space,” and other sectors. In 2020, when the CGSP was announced, “longstanding and practical collaboration” in technology occupied a few lines in a joint statement.
Fast forward to September 2024, when PM Modi and President Joe Biden met in Delaware. The language underlying the ambition in technology and defence cooperation occupies the largest part of the outcome document. To be sure, these lines of cooperation are placed under a relatively new and innovative tech-first diplomatic structure called the India-US Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), inaugurated in January 2023.
The message, again, seems clear. To me, it goes something like this: 2020 has set a frame for reference to further deepen ties. Much has happened since then. The ambition for critical technology cooperation has grown deeper. But there is much to be realised. In sum, Trump’s victory provides a timely and much-needed opportunity to recall the verve that led to the articulation of the CGSP — for two democracies to work towards “strategic convergence” in the Indo-Pacific and beyond; and at the same time, the need to build on top of new initiatives in critical technologies.
Much has been written about the expected difficulties of Trump’s fixation with tariffs and its potential effects on trade with India; the instability that can be expected from unwinding multilateralism, if the 45th presidency was anything to go by; and the potentialities of ending the war in Europe, leaving Russia with a chunk of Ukrainian territory. For now, there is not much more that can be said on these matters. Based on the two tweets by PM Modi, there are, as I see it, two sets of issues of bilateral importance that will and should drive the imperative for change and action under the Trump presidency.
The first has to do with the question of strategic convergence. To this end, there is a gap in the strategic dialogue currently in the US-India relationship. Much of this has to do with fast-evolving strategic and operational advances with intended and unintended geopolitical ramifications.
Think of all that is currently at play that clearly shapes different aspects of the India-US relationship — America’s “strategic channel” with China; India’s cautious re-engagement with China, following the announcement of an “agreement” on “patrolling arrangements” along the Line-of-Actual-Control on the India-China boundary areas; PM Modi’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Kazan during the recently concluded Brics summit — the first in over five years; the US department of treasury sanctioning “individuals” and “entities” engaged in “supplying Russia with advanced technology,” including 19 Indian companies; the grinding war in Ukraine; and the lingering effects of an alleged assassination plot on American soil.
These strategic movements, if they can be called that, are by nature contradictory and interrelated at the same time. At some level, these advances are shaped by silos in both countries, which is the nature of bureaucratic politics. For a US official sitting in the Treasury Building on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington DC, sanctioning Indian entities as a part of an effort that involves hundreds of others across the world is a mere administrative exercise. For those in India, these formula-like decisions are understood to further constrain India’s age-old relationship with Russia.
For those in America determined to challenge Chinese technological hegemony, clamours within India to increase Chinese investments and entertain different cooperative relations with Russia might still seem at odds with the verve behind the determination to co-innovate and co-develop strategic technologies — one of the drivers of the iCET. How both countries deal with China, as they open strategic space for each other, is another area of much-needed discussion. In sum, there is an urgent need for a serious and honest dialogue.
Lastly, as far as the iCET is concerned, there is clear evidence of measurable impact across lines of efforts identified by the Biden administration and the Indian government. Importantly, the basis of a decentralised innovation ecosystem has been deepened in areas such as space, semiconductors, defence, and increasingly in biotechnologies.
This needs to persist. Separately, there will need to be a clear discussion on how the Trump administration wants to deal with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the newly created AI Safety Institutes. Trump’s appointees may wish to bin the term “iCET”, which is expected. It is on India and those in the Biden administration committed to what the iCET encompasses across technology verticals, to make sure that the transition team is versed with the upsides to both countries.
The lines of cooperation and strategic discord, outlined above, provide the basis for renewing the CGSP, whilst doing more to stay ahead of the curve on strategic technology cooperation, which, for India, remains another way to realise self-reliance.
Rudra Chaudhuri is director, Carnegie India. The views expressed are personal
