The J20 is touted as the stealth counter to the US F22, with its internal carriage capability of long-range air-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
The recent satellite image of China’s fifth generation stealth fighters, the J20 Mighty Dragon, parked on the main tarmac of Shigatse air base in Tibet, along with J10 Vigorous Dragon fighters at an altitude of 12,408 feet, has set off a flurry of speculation and raised concerns. This has led to comparisons between the J20 and the 4.5 generation Indian Rafale and triggered a bean count of platforms as a measure of the two Air Forces. Number crunching, however, does not reflect the true military measure of air power, which includes weapons capability and roles, employment tactics and concepts of operation, and most importantly, skill sets, experience and combat readiness status of the aircrew.
The J20 is touted as the stealth counter to the US F22, with its internal carriage capability of long-range air-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions. Their presence showcases the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) high-end platforms, its ability to use its high-altitude air bases for fighter operations, and its growing ability to project air power in the region to counter the Indian Air Force’s forward deployment of Sukhois and Rafales. It is also a political signal that the border dispute with India is no longer a territorial issue, but one of sovereign airspace. More regular activation of its bases in the future will see increased air activity across our borders close to disputed spaces, and more frequent air violations to test India’s response.
What is also clear is that all the aircraft are lined up on the open tarmac, with the absence of any blast-protected airfield infrastructure and dispersed hardened aircraft shelters and no efforts at camouflage. The visible absence of supporting ground equipment necessary for extended fighter operations, on and around the tarmac, indicates the high probability of a temporary deployment. The mix of platforms and the presence of the KJ 500 underscores PLAAF’s increasing conduct of complex large missions and growing capabilities in projecting air power over long distances.
Beijing has steadily built a robust border infrastructure to sustain its mobility and logistics support, increased its army deployments to improve the force ratios, and has continued to sustain its political stand with military presence, despite 29 sessions of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on the India-China Border. Ceding to the strident demands for the creation of buffer zones in disputed areas, ostensibly as a precursor to disengagement, could set a dangerous precedent for demands of aerial buffer zones in future — this suits the Chinese to strategically restrict the IAF presence and operations in the region. Forward airstrips close to the border and sovereign air spaces over the disputed areas could become “no-fly zones”, inaccessible to the IAF aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, AD combat air patrols, as well as air mobility and air logistics, if the current situation is not carefully addressed.
For now, the IAF’s mainstay fleet of fourth-gen fighters comprising Su30s, MiG29, and M2000, supplemented by two squadrons of the 4.5 Gen Rafale provides an asymmetric advantage, which China is working to neutralise on priority. The government is seized of the declining combat air power inventory of the IAF, but it is the absence of urgency to address this strategic criticality in India’s continental threat that is of serious concern. Two squadrons of 4.5 generation Rafales are nowhere near enough to meet our current and future security requirements, given the over 7,000 km of hostile borders, and the immense volume of sovereign air spaces to be defended. To keep China at bay militarily, the urgent fulfilment of the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) gap to bolster the 4.5-generation inventory, is not just an IAF requirement but a national security imperative for several reasons.
India’s already delayed fifth-generation multirole fighter jet, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), is expected to take a decade before it can be inducted into service. By then, China would have already developed its sixth-gen fighter to keep pace with the US. The next problem is that the upgraded MiG29, Mirage 2000 and Jaguar fleets would reach obsolescence before the AMCA squadrons become operational. This will deplete the high-end platform inventory of the IAF and skew the force ratio further, both in quantum and quality. Finally, even with the optimal bolstering of the indigenous production capacity which will take over a decade, it will be too late to arrest the further decline in India’s combat air power. By the time the Tejas Mk 1A, the Mk 2 and the AMCA go into full-scale production over the coming years, China would have altered the air power and military balance in the region irretrievably in its favour. Thus, the urgent fulfilment of the long-pending 114 medium multi-role fighter aircraft requirement is a critical national security requirement.
Given the large numbers, a bilateral partnership with France for additional jointly-produced Rafales in India, with an attendant long-term agreement for joint upgrades and technology transfer access on future 4.5 generation-plus variants of the platform and its weapons suite, makes strategic sense. It will enable a steady and stable induction from a reliable partner, ensure greater platform commonality, assure future platform and weapons upgrades, and future engine development for the AMCA. It will also balance the inventory, reduce dependence on Russia and prevent the reliance on a temperamental US military industry, while fostering indigenous defence production.
As China seeks to offset or at the least balance the IAF’s air power advantage, its greatest adverse impact will be on India’s deterrence posture and military capability. It will be a mistake to cede India’s current advantage.
The writer is a retired air marshal
