Thinking of West Bengal (WB), I have yet to find an analysis of a possible correlation between violence in electoral time and the electoral participation of common people. Also, there is hardly any statistical exercise on the correlation of violence in “normal” time and in electoral time, or say a correlation, if any, between violence around social issues, such as caste violence, gender violence, or street violence, and on the other hand political violence, that is violence during moments of intense politics including in the run-up and during elections.
This time the first five phases of the seven-phase general elections in WB went peacefully as the Election Commission (ECI) noted with satisfaction. Newspapers, news agencies, and news portals concurred. Then two persons lost their lives in the sixth phase. In the seventh, the last phase, there were a few incidents of stone pelting, demonstrations in front of police stations, skirmishes, a few injuries, and complaints by opposition parties of the passivity of central forces.
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This was intriguing as it was expected that the ruling party of WB, the Trinamool Congress (TMC), would complain of the highhandedness of central forces.
Instead, complaints came thick and fast from the opposition – BJP, Congress, and Left. It is difficult to say if complaints of violence were false flag tactics of the opposition.
However, it is clear that allegations of violence, incidences of actual violence, violent memories, and responses by the judiciary and the Union government – all become normalised in literally no time. They form along with others the chiaroscuro of quotidian politics.
If violence points to passion and the deep stake of politics in an extractive economy, that is resource extraction, control, and utilisation, consider these: The national average polling percentage in the sixth phase was 61.20%, and, in WB from where some incidents of violence were reported, it was 79.47 %, the highest polling percentage in the country.
To further understand the intensity: Before the last phase, the corresponding figures – adding all six phases – were 70% (national) and 81% (West Bengal).
The ECI said that the election campaign was most intense in WB. The total number of meetings, processions, and rallies, was around 95,000, and the total number of applications was 119,276. This figure was much higher than those in other states.
In fact, the TMC started their poll campaign in all 42 seats before the elections were announced and the BJP did likewise in 20 seats. The 75 days began on March 16 when the elections were announced, then through extreme heat and the disaster of Cyclone Remal to May 29, leaders and cadres campaigned.
In this churning, women involved themselves most noticeably. They faced the heat and dust, trod waterlogged roads and grounds, and crossed small rivers and canals, to reach rallies and meetings.
According to the Association of Democratic Reforms, female candidates constituted 9.6% of total Lok Sabha candidates in 2024, and of the total candidates of the BJP and the TMC in Bengal, the respective percentages of female candidates were 16% and 25%. Out of the 42 candidates of TMC 12 were women. The proportion was higher than the case with other parties.
Women labour more in an extractive economy. They suffer more. Consider therefore these relevant figures for WB. News agencies reported on the basis of ECI data that female voter turnout was consistently higher than male counterparts across phases and constituencies.
There was a remarkable case of the Tamluk seat which recorded 82.1% male voter turnout against the female voter turnout of 87.6%. This was in the sixth phase, marked by some violence in Tamluk when women voters voted in massive numbers in the adjoining four seats of Tamluk, Contai, Ghatal and Medinipur.
Overall, as in the previous election, female voters outnumbered male voters by 3%. The situation was the same in the fifth phase when more women had turned up at polling stations compared to men.
Women, we must not be surprised, started mobilising in a militant mode – in Sandeshkhali and elsewhere, be they as BJP cadres or as TMC cadres and grassroots organisers. The picture in preceding panchayat elections, municipality elections, and state assembly elections had been the same. In fact, participation in these elections and the running of self-governance bodies laid the foundation for a state-wide mobilisation of women for votes.
Add to this, the welfare programmes for women and girls, a woman chief minister, and the general tone of the government in the state, namely – “we care for you, for your sons and daughters. We shall protect you. We are here for you. Now, you have to support and protect us.”
Yet it is not only a case of women’s enthusiastic response to affirmative schemes. As earlier indicated, in an extractive economy women bear the brunt of agrarian distress, including the labour of looking after the families of migrant workers.
West Bengal accounts for 15.2% of countrywide illegal marriages, meaning mostly child marriages. A government survey shows that 49.9% of girls in West Bengal between the ages of 15 and 24 stay at home and do not attend school, the national figure being 43.8%.
Even the much-appreciated “Kanyashree” scheme to encourage the education of young girls has failed in this respect. According to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) report of 2022, about 51,000 women and girls went missing that year. Some were tracked down later; nonetheless, it was one of the highest numbers among the states in the country.
Hence, we should not be surprised when we see that while in phase I male turnout in the country was 66.22% and female turnout was 66.07%, in Bengal corresponding figures were 81.25% and 82.59%.
More women than men turned out to vote in West Bengal through the seven phases of the election.
Thus, in phase III, male turnout in the country was 66.89% and female turnout was 64.41%, while in Bengal corresponding figures were 72.21% and 83.01%. In phase IV national figures were 69.58% and 68.73%, and in Bengal, figures were 79% and 81.49%. In phase VI, national figures were 61.95% and 64.95%, in Bengal, there were 81.62% and 83.83.%.
At the same time, we must not forget, that total voter turnout in West Bengal remained consistently higher than the national average. As if, the entire population was immersed in politics.
It is difficult to gauge or find a single explanation for the high turnout. Maybe, the lower classes thought that their lives were at stake. One thing, however, is clear, high popular participation in elections meant physical involvement, embroiled bodies in millions, with politics extracting in the process some physical cost. Millions upon millions of millions voted.
One thing, however, is clear, high popular participation in elections meant physical involvement, embroiled bodies in millions, with politics extracting in the process some physical cost. Maybe, the higher the turnout, the greater the chance of violence, though we must be cautious with this argument. Because in West Bengal, in absolute numbers or magnitude, the incidence of violence was low. The aftermath of the election can, however, trigger post-poll violence. All these do not of course mean that politics cannot be conducted in a peaceful way.
Given that this time the ruling party at the Centre put sharp focus on capturing West Bengal and carried out aggressive campaigning, often talking about minority appeasement and saying that wealth distribution was part of an “urban Naxal” ideology, the electoral stakes became unusually high. And, in such times, politics is bound to be intense.
This is what is happening in Bengal: Politics in war mode is being fought in cities, towns, and villages. Surprising then that the level of violence is not that high. Yet politics in the state must return to civil mode even if it remains contentious.
The 2024 Lok Sabha verdict from West Bengal has made it clear that it does not want a repeat of the infamous riots of 1946. What the state needs include more education and health provisions in particular for women and girls, more social support for the families of migrant workers, more social security for labour, and greater encouragement and livelihood protection for care workers who have proved time and again the backbone of the society of Bengal.
All of these call for dialogue and not violence.
Ranabir Samaddar holds the Distinguished Chair in Migration and Forced Migration Studies, Calcutta Research Group. The views expressed are personal
