Last week, the war in Ukraine marked 1,000 days of the bloodiest conflict that Europe has witnessed since the end of the World War II. Nearly three years into the war, Russia has the upper hand while Ukraine is undoubtedly on the defensive — this state of play is unlikely to shift anytime soon. Over the past year, Russia’s battlefield dominance has been on the ascendance, fuelled by enhanced Russian defence production, Europe’s hesitant support for Ukraine and Washington’s cautious approach to prevent the conflict from escalating beyond the Ukrainian theatre. While it is true that Western aid allowed Ukraine to hold its ground, it was clearly insufficient for victory. The United States (US) and Europe provided just enough support to help Kyiv continue its war efforts but not enough to win the war (not that winning a war against Russia would have been easy).
This is a textbook example of flawed wartime support: The support should either be adequate to ensure victory or be calibrated in such a way as to achieve a negotiated settlement at the earliest available opportunity. The US and Europe did neither. Such opportunities indeed existed in the conflict — either at the start of the war during the Istanbul negotiations, or last year when Russian military performance looked subpar. Now, with diminishing European aid, a potential shift in US policy, and Russia consolidating gains on the battlefield, Ukraine finds itself increasingly struggling to keep pace. While Ukraine’s Western friends were well meaning, they were primarily looking after their own interests, not Ukraine’s.
What might prove to be decisive going forward is the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House. With a Trump administration in Washington, Kyiv may have little chance of winning the war. The outgoing Biden administration has finally given the green signal to use its ATACMS rockets for long-range attacks inside Russia, but it has come far too late to be effective, except perhaps Kyiv might be able to use it for gaining some advantage before talks begin. But even that is doubtful.
While Russia’s declared war aims have not been met and are unlikely to be met, it must be kept in mind that States often declare maximalist war aims at the outset of conflicts. If so, Ukraine’s territorial losses are a victory for Moscow: Gaining control of over 20% of Ukraine’s vast landmass is not to be underestimated. More so, Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine’s eastern provinces might provide it with a land bridge to Crimea.
The war has not been entirely a lost cause for Ukraine. While Ukraine has certainly lost a considerable amount of territory to Russia, today it is a much more determined and cohesive nation with a far more consolidated non-Russian identity than ever before in its history. Its military has become battle-hardened and is today adept at using a range of weapon systems produced by a thriving modern defence industry across Europe and the US. Having strengthened its relations with the European Union (EU) and United States, Ukraine views itself as a European country, not a peripheral state of Russia. In the years to come, Kyiv is set to become an important geopolitical power in Europe.
Europe has long been the grand chessboard of geopolitics, with its dynamics shaping the global balance of power. Over the past eight decades, since the onset of the World War II, the continent has witnessed dramatic shifts. During World War II, the erstwhile USSR (with Russia and Ukraine as part of it) and the US fought together against Germany and the Axis powers. In the Cold War era, the USSR and the US became the principal adversaries, with Germany split between two opposing blocs. The end of the Cold War brought about German reunification and the breakup of the USSR, thereby rearranging the pieces on Europe’s geopolitical board once again.
Today, a former Soviet republic, Ukraine, seeks membership in the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato), with Russia fiercely opposing the move. This has led to a new alignment, with Germany, Nato, the EU, and the US united in supporting Ukraine. Russia is struggling to remain as a player in the European theatre, and is turning eastwards to China, Iran and North Korea.
Europe, which enjoyed relative peace since the end of the Cold War, is today witnessing the return of classical geopolitics. The war in Ukraine has once again reignited old rivalries and contestation for primacy and spheres of influence, a trend that is likely to persist even after the Ukraine war ends. How much of Europe’s future will resemble its past remains an interesting question.
For India, the ongoing war, now heavily tilted in Russia’s favour, presents a complex yet positive scenario. While it is disturbing to see a strong power invade a weaker one, India has no reason to worry about its broader geopolitical implications.
While Russia may not immediately return to global great power discussions due to abiding antipathy in Europe and its own struggling economy, Moscow is poised for a resurgence in its broader regional space, particularly in Central Asia, thereby potentially curtailing Beijing’s unchallenged and growing influence in Russia’s periphery. More so, the end of the Ukraine war will lead to a renewed American focus on China and the Indo-Pacific, both of which could potentially help India’s broader strategic interests.
Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at JNU, and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research. The views expressed are personal
