The agreement offers New Delhi an opportunity to collaborate with Mauritius on maritime security, enabling Indian presence in the Western Indian Ocean. (File Photo)
The UK’s decision to transfer sovereignty of the strategically significant Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius marks a watershed moment in international relations and maritime geopolitics. This long-standing issue, once deemed unresolvable, had simmered for decades until London, in a pragmatic move, settled it earlier this week to the apparent satisfaction of key stakeholders while securing its own strategic interests. The transfer not only addresses the colonial legacies of the past but also reshapes power dynamics in the Indian Ocean, with significant implications for maritime strategy and regional security.
In many ways, this outcome was inevitable, given the mounting pressure on the UK from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN General Assembly, and several regional states, including India, which has consistently backed Mauritius’ claim. India, in particular, has been a vocal advocate for the decolonisation agenda, reinforcing the Mauritian cause and asserting its leadership role in the Global South. With its diplomatic stance under increasing scrutiny, the UK likely saw this handover as a necessary move to align with the international consensus in favour of Port Louis.
Strategically, the deal holds substantial significance for all stakeholders. While it grants Mauritius full sovereignty over the Chagos Islands, it ensures US-UK control of the military base at Diego Garcia for the next ninety-nine years. For India, the principal security provider in the Eastern Indian Ocean, the implications extend far beyond potential access to Diego Garcia’s military facilities, touching on broader themes of strategic autonomy, regional alliances, and the evolving balance of power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Given India’s close military ties with the US and UK, Diego Garcia could provide the Indian Navy with a valuable forward base for maritime patrolling, anti-piracy operations, and intelligence gathering. With increasing Chinese naval activity in the IOR, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean, India could leverage closer logistical and military cooperation with the US to counterbalance China’s maritime expansion.
Yet, there are deeper nuances to consider. While enhanced access to Diego Garcia offers tactical advantages, India’s proximity to the US military’s prime Indian Ocean facility could complicate its broader strategic calculus. Diego Garcia is not just any American base; it is a hub for US nuclear submarines (albeit for logistics and resupply purposes) and a key staging ground for US naval operations in the Western Indian Ocean — a theatre where India-US cooperation has traditionally been constrained. Using this facility raises larger questions about India’s strategic autonomy, especially as the Indian Ocean becomes more contested amid rising tensions in the Red Sea and the escalating Iran-Israel conflict.
India has long adhered to a policy of strategic autonomy, carefully balancing relationships with global powers to maintain independence in its foreign policy. Deeper military cooperation with the US through enhanced access to Diego Garcia could be seen as a shift toward alignment with Western powers, potentially undermining India’s efforts to remain an independent player capable of engaging with a diverse range of partners, including non-Western actors like Russia, Iran, and other Middle Eastern powers. While Diego Garcia is pivotal to US operations in the Middle East, India knows growing tensions between Israel and Iran — an important economic and strategic partner for India — complicate its options. While India leans more toward Tel Aviv, overt cooperation with the US, Israel’s main ally against Iran, could strain India’s ties with Tehran and other non-Western partners.
To be sure, Chagos’ handover to Mauritius is exactly the outcome India had long hoped for. New Delhi even played a behind-the-scenes role to encourage both sides to reach such an agreement. But while it sees the continuation of the Diego Garcia base under US control as a positive — given close military ties with Washington — New Delhi is likely to temper its responses to project a balanced stance, avoiding the perception of excessive alignment with the US-UK axis.
Even so, India’s strategic community will likely view this development through the lens of China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean. With a naval base in Djibouti and likely future bases in Pakistan, China is positioning itself as a significant Indian Ocean power. Despite having to manage the expectations of other regional states — many of whom have close ties with China — India’s main imperative will be to counterbalance Beijing’s influence in the Western Indian Ocean.
India is also mindful of Mauritius’ security needs. Port Louis will likely seek New Delhi’s assistance in capacity-building, particularly in monitoring its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and safeguarding its maritime assets from illegal fishing and other threats. Given its own concerns over Chinese intrusions, India has a vested interest in strengthening Mauritius’ security capabilities. China’s illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing has been a significant issue in the Western Indian Ocean, and enhancing Mauritian capacity helps mitigate this threat without requiring direct Indian intervention.
There are larger geopolitical calculations. The agreement offers New Delhi an opportunity to collaborate with Mauritius on maritime security, enabling Indian presence in the Western Indian Ocean. This could serve as a counterweight to China’s expanding influence. The key for India would be to protect its interests without appearing too close to the Western political agenda in the Middle East, maintaining its image as an independent regional power.
The writer is Head of the Maritime Policy Initiative at ORF, New Delhi
