Feb 02, 2025 09:05 PM IST
Delhi may need to recalibrate its balancing of power equations in the event of a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing
Donald Trump, who has just assumed office as United States (US) president, appears to have changed his stance on China opting to engage with the country instead of, as he had claimed, imposing 60% tariffs on Chinese exports to the US: On Saturday, Washington ordered 25% tariffs on exports from Canadian and Mexico, but kept tariffs on Chinese goods at 10%. A peaceful relationship between the US and China benefits the international order, and a stable international order is beneficial for everyone, theoretically speaking. However, for India, a rapprochement between Beijing and Washington creates two specific challenges, despite the broader benefits of a stable international order. One, such a rapprochement or a global G2 between the US and China will reduce India’s strategic options in the region in general and vis-à-vis China in particular. Two, Trump’s outreach to China will complicate India’s ability to cultivate the American desire to use India as a proxy against China without actually ever becoming one.
Trump 2.0 has significantly reshaped India’s regional balancing options. India’s dilemma, for instance, during the Joe Biden presidency involved the challenge of maintaining its relationship with Russia while enhancing its strategic partnership with the US and European countries, both of whom wanted India to abandon Russia. This meant that India had to signal its displeasure over Russia’s Ukraine war (to placate the Europeans and Americans) without outrightly condemning Russia (to not offend Moscow), and buy oil from Russia while increasing defence imports from Russia’s adversaries, and engaging Russia geopolitically while deepening strategic partnerships with the US and Europe. India managed this dilemma with great aplomb.
However, Trump’s arrival in the White House and the subsequent US decisions are shifting the fundamentals of India’s geopolitical balancing act. Delhi’s relations with Moscow are not under American scrutiny, and finding excuses to convince the US and Europe that its relationship with Moscow is not a big deal in the grand scheme of things is no longer required. Eventually, even European nations will have to engage with Russia, thanks to Trump.
However, a potential rapprochement between Beijing and Washington will pose a new dilemma to New Delhi. Trump’s invitation for President Xi Jinping to attend his inauguration, his phone call with Xi on the eve of the start of his second term, and a potential visit by Trump to Beijing within the first 100 days of his second presidency indicate that Trump is not only reluctant to confront China but may also be interested in fostering a peaceful coexistence with it. This could turn Wall Street bullish, Europeans relieved, Russia delighted; but India would be concerned.
The traditional Indian unwillingness not to openly align with the US against China or appease China are both reflective of a deeply entrenched desire in Delhi to carefully manage the US-China equation, rather than take sides only to regret this later. In fact, the Indian outreach to China began even before the re-election of Trump, as if on cue, even as the Indian proximity to the US has been on a steady ascent. And yet, the next four years will test the Indian ability to balance the relationship between two of the world’s most consequential powers. Neither an open rivalry nor a great power rapprochement between the US and China serves Indian interests: The former constricts India’s strategy of multi-alignment and strategic autonomy, while the latter diminishes their relevance.
Broadly put, there are at least four reasons why a China-US bonhomie will worry India. One, Trump’s outreach to China will once again rekindle New Delhi’s worries about the possibility of a G2 between the US and China. If the cordial relationship between the US and China persists at the summit level and they establish a G2 to manage global order, such an arrangement will significantly undermine India’s pursuit of multipolarity and multi-alignment. Second, simmering (but not boiling over) tensions between the two great powers will enhance the prominence of other aspiring great powers like India with the logic being that global instability is conducive for the rise of aspiring great powers. But a G2 between the primary powers will prevent secondary powers from benefitting from such a competition.
Three, if the logic behind American strategic leadership in the Indo-Pacific is China’s ascent, making up with Beijing would, by definition, diminish Washington’s commitment to the region. Finally, G2s, such as the US-Soviet one during the Cold War, tend to define and respect each other’s spheres of influence. While India may be a believer in the inherent utility of great powers maintaining spheres of influence, it certainly does not desire an arrangement that places it within China’s sphere of influence.
Going by such reasoning, while Delhi may never become Washington’s regional proxy against Beijing, if Trump’s outreach to China diminishes this motivation in America’s Asia strategy, it could adversely impact the Indo-US strategic partnership. Put differently, it benefits India if the US believes in India’s value as a counterbalance to China, even if it remains merely an American fantasy.
It is this line of Indian strategic reasoning that Trump could disrupt if he seeks to establish a great power rapprochement with China.
Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at JNU and is editor, INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal
Recommended Topics
