Defence Minister Rajnath Singh should be commended for instituting a Joint Commanders’ Conference (JCC) that brings together all the top commanders of the Indian military for extended deliberations on matters pertaining to national security. Presiding over the maiden conference in Lucknow on September 5, Rajnath Singh highlighted the fact that “India is a peace-loving nation and the Armed Forces need to be prepared for war in order to preserve peace.” This exhortation is par for the course and underlines the raison d’etre of the military — to prepare for war.
The JCC is chaired by the Defence Minister and will complement the Combined Commanders’ Conference (CCC) that is presided over by the Prime Minister. Until recently, the CCC was an annual event and the Defence Minister addressed the commanders only for one session. The primary focus was on higher-level global, regional and strategic matters dealt with by the Prime Minister. Since PM Narendra Modi assumed office in 2014, the CCC has been transformed with a visible degree of political overhang. It is instructive that the 2023 CCC was held in Bhopal, where the valedictory session was held in an international convention centre and not at a military venue.
The fact that the CCC was held in May and that Madhya Pradesh went to elections in November could not be ignored — the venue had huge posters of PM Modi, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and then-CM Shivraj Singh Chouhan. This was a case of drawing the military into the electoral framework and it was avoidable. There was no CCC convened in 2019, 2020 and 2022, and while the Covid pandemic may have been a reason in the first two years, the 2022 void is inexplicable. The fact that PM Modi spends more time with the top police officers of the country than with the military commanders has not gone unnoticed.
Thus, the JCC is a welcome forum for the political leadership, in this case, the Defence Minister, to meet with the military commanders and review professional matters in an informed and unhurried manner. The theme of the inaugural JCC ‘Transforming the Armed Forces’ has been a Modi priority since 2014. Various major policy initiatives have been launched to this effect — the appointment of a CDS (Chief of Defence Staff) being one of them. However, appointing a retired three-star officer to this post in a four-star rank was unprecedented and has introduced an undesirable precedent. Political preferences trumped institutional norms.
An objective review of the kind of transformation that has taken place over the last decade (Modi 1.0 and 2.0) may offer some useful insights into the Indian military, civil-military relations, and the long-term consequences of the institutional transmutation. Cumulatively, these will be the issues that the next CCC/JCC would have to grapple with to safeguard national security.
PM Modi came to office in 2014 pledging to redress the shortcomings in the national security edifice and improve the welfare of military personnel. His track record over the last decade is mixed. To his credit, he took the decision to award the long pending One Rank, One Pension (OROP) proposal and though it has some strands that need to be resolved, it has been implemented.
Concurrently, PM Modi has highlighted the indigenisation imperative under the “aatmanirbharata” banner and the restructuring of defence PSUs, encouraging the private sector with an emphasis on MSMEs and enabling academia to undertake research projects are all commendable steps. However, their gestation period is long, progress is often uneven and the results will not be apparent in the near future. In essence, India will remain dependent on imported military inventory in the main — thereby diluting its quest for strategic autonomy.
The material state of the military remains opaque and the thumbnail summary is that all three armed forces are in dire need of modernisation and acquisition to make up for large gaps in the inventory. This issue is often glossed over and merits candid internal review. Did the JCC address this elephant?
The last comprehensive review of the military was done in 2018 when the Standing Committee on Defence cautioned that a modern armed force should have one-third of its equipment in the vintage category, one-third in the current category and one-third in the state-of-the-art category. The report noted that the Indian Army had 68 per cent of its equipment in the first, 24 per cent in the second, and 8 per cent in the third. The Committee found that adequate attention has been lacking with respect to both policy and budget for modernising the ageing arsenal.
The Navy and the Air Force are also grappling with a shortfall in major platforms. The Air Force, which is authorised 42 fighter squadrons, is down to 32; while the Navy is operating its aircraft carriers with below-optimum fighter aircraft and grappling with other platform deficiencies. Capital expenditure funds are shrinking, for the rupee has declined in value over the last decade. It was pegged to the US dollar at Rs 62.33 in 2014 and is now hovering at 83.47. This reduces the buying capacity from foreign suppliers. It is a major issue that rarely finds mention in any conference. The standard refrain is that all is well with the Indian fauj and that it will deliver when required — as it did in Kargil in 1999.
Manpower shortage continues to persist and in 2023, the government stated there was an overall deficiency of around 1.55 lakh personnel within the three armed forces with the Army accounting for the maximum — 1.36 lakh vacancies. The hastily implemented Agnipath scheme has aggravated the induction pattern and it is understood that a macro review of this scheme is on the anvil.
It is expected that the PM will address the CCC in the course of the year and hopefully, the composite inventory profile of the military will be reviewed objectively. It would be desirable to institute a template wherein each armed force submits the material and HR status to a parliamentary committee annually.
The Galwan setback of 2020 and the surge in cross-border terrorism ought to serve as a reminder that peace on the borders cannot be taken for granted. Being prepared for war in a credible manner is imperative and mere optics will not suffice.
The writer is director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi
