Syria and the resilience of the Weak: How do underdogs win the wars?

The victories of weaker forces are not anomalies but reflections of a broader strategic reality. Some scholars argue that asymmetry in war compels weaker actors to adopt unconventional strategies that exploit the vulnerabilities of stronger opponents. They have emphasised the concept of strategic interaction, insurgency tactics, and the limitations of conventional military superiority in countering non-traditional warfare. In many conflicts, weaker actors adopt unconventional tactics that exploit the vulnerabilities of stronger forces. By leveraging asymmetrical strategies, rebels disrupt conventional military operations, forcing their adversaries into prolonged, exhausting engagements. This pattern underscores the limitations of brute force and emphasises the decisive roles of political resilience, external support, and psychological warfare.

The Syrian civil war exemplifies how rebel forces can gradually erode the dominance of a heavily armed state. Despite the Assad’s government receiving extensive military assistance from Russia and Iran, rebel factions persisted, employing hit-and-run tactics, urban warfare, and decentralised command structures. By avoiding direct confrontations and capitalising on localised insurgencies, the rebels stretched government forces thin, diminishing the regime’s capacity to defend contested territories.

A key factor contributing to their resilience was the support from external actors. Regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar provided essential arms, training, and logistical backing. Additionally, the Western nations facilitated intelligence sharing and sanctioned the Assad regime, weakening its economic foundation. This foreign involvement disrupted the balance of power, allowing rebel factions to sustain their operations despite facing superior firepower.

Parallel to this is the Taliban’s case. The Taliban’s use of non-conventional warfare, coupled with their deep integration within local communities, rendered conventional military strategies ineffective. Their ideological commitment and appeals to nationalism framed their struggle as resistance against foreign occupation, fostering popular support and gradually eroding the morale of Afghan forces and their allies.

Similarly, Nepal’s Maoist insurgency illustrates the potency of asymmetrical warfare. The Maoists, facing the formidable Nepalese Army, embraced protracted rural warfare, avoiding large-scale battles while building parallel governance structures in remote regions. Their narrative of social justice, land reform, and anti-monarchism galvanised the disenfranchised populations, enabling them to challenge the monarchy and ultimately compel political negotiations that redefined Nepal’s political landscape.

The Vietnam War provides perhaps the most iconic example of a weaker force overcoming a superior adversary. The Viet Cong employed guerrilla tactics, leveraging their intimate knowledge of the terrain and civilian networks to counterbalance American firepower. Prolonged engagements, such as the Tet Offensive, exposed the vulnerabilities of the US forces and undermined domestic support for the war. This erosion of political will, rather than outright battlefield defeat, led to the US withdrawal and the eventual victory of the Vietnamese forces.

In all these cases, a common theme emerges—the inability of stronger actors to sustain prolonged conflicts due to mounting political and economic costs. Weaker forces, by contrast, often demonstrate higher levels of endurance and adaptability. By transforming war into a test of political will, insurgents shift the burden onto their adversaries, compelling stronger actors to disengage over time.

The psychological dimension of these conflicts plays a pivotal role. Weaker actors frequently harness ideological narratives, framing their struggle as fights for liberation, justice, or national sovereignty. In Syria, the rebels portrayed their movement as a battle against tyranny and external domination, echoing similar narratives used by the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Maoists in Nepal. This ideological mobilisation bolsters their morale, sustains recruitment and delegitimises stronger actors in the eyes of local populations.

Moreover, these conflicts reveal the limits of military technology and conventional warfare. Advanced weaponry and superior logistics, while advantageous, are often ill-suited for countering insurgencies embedded within civilian populations. In Syria, Assad’s heavy reliance on aerial bombardment and artillery failed to dislodge rebels entrenched in urban areas, mirroring the US’s struggles against the Viet Cong’s subterranean networks and the Taliban’s guerrilla operations.

Despite the Assad regime recapturing much of Syria after 2013, the underlying conditions that allowed the rebels to thrive persisted. Syria remained economically debilitated, plagued by sanctions, and geopolitically cornered. Assad relied heavily on external allies for security: Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. However, before and during the recent offensive campaign, the situation changed. Russia was focused on Ukraine, Iran had lost several key commanders in Syria to Israeli strikes, and Hezbollah had been weakened by a year-long war with Israel. These fractures underscore the enduring instability that asymmetrical conflicts often leave in their wake.

The victories of weaker forces illustrate that military strength alone does not guarantee success. Adaptive strategies, external support, and ideological resilience often define the outcome of conflicts where power imbalances appear insurmountable. The ability of weaker actors to exploit the vulnerabilities of their opponents reshapes the dynamics of warfare, challenging traditional paradigms and emphasising the intricate interplay between politics, strategy, and endurance.