As the NDA government settles down, should we be expecting a departure from the past decade of acrimony and a one-sided show of strength? The more balanced composition of the Lok Sabha encourages that expectation. On the other hand, the dramatis personae remain the same. And ironically, despite his “third term”, the Prime Minister will be the most uncomfortable person in the new Lok Sabha because of the triple shackles — the party’s minority, demands of his allies and an Opposition that is nearly as numerous as his own party. He will need to be modest and moderate in comparison to his carefully cultivated larger-than-life image — a tall order.
Thus, post-elections, the key factors that have shaped politics for some time would remain unchanged — a party with hegemonic ambition despite truncated dominance, an Opposition clueless about politics of culture and a social sphere marked by emotional ruptures. So, we can expect only small
compromises and big confrontations in the political arena.
To be sure, there will be some formal bonhomie. There will also be formal assurances of accommodation and cooperation, hopes of working together to make India great, pleasantries about federalism and of course, emotional eulogies to the Constitution. Virtues of coalition will be listed too. The Opposition may get more time and visibility, both in the House and in the media, without necessarily being able to strengthen the traditions of deliberation. But, in the realm of actual policies and use of state power, a substantive change is unlikely.
If anything, there will be more direct confrontation between the main ruling party and the Opposition because the BJP would be licking its wounds, seeking opportunities to delegitimise the Opposition and the Opposition would be eager to flex its muscles because of its belief that the people have rejected the BJP. One dimension of these confrontations will be the silent decimation of the BJP’s allies and the steady defections or splits in Opposition ranks as also the disunity within the INDIA bloc.
Initial optics notwithstanding, the Modi regime will soon return to its core features: Weaponisation of state power to suppress dissent, coupled with intolerance of routine opposition; delegitimisation of all institutions through their political capture and a well-defined majoritarian politics that encourages the societal sphere to stigmatise the minorities.
Therefore, current social and economic fault lines are most likely to produce confrontations between the government and various sections of the population. The first, and most immediate challenge will be to handle questions of unemployment and frustrations of the youth. Long-term policies of skill enhancement and glib talk of the future will not suffice. Another arena of confrontation will be that of Centre-state relations, producing sharper regional identities and regionalist demands. Third, mainly because of the success that Congress and the Samajwadi Party have tasted, questions of caste census and reservation will haunt politics. Fourth, it is entirely uncertain how the continued victimisation and marginalisation of the Muslim community will play out. But in the social arena, vigilante adventurism against the Muslims will continue with the state as a passive onlooker.
One could add more such instances of popular unrest resulting from pre-existing social issues, strengthening the opposition. Predictably, the government’s response to the many confrontations will be a combination of high-handed treatment, emotional appeals deflecting the issues and setting one section of society against the other. This assessment is predicated on the assumption that having ushered in a new regime after 2014, the BJP will be unwilling to cede space to others. It will be equally unwilling to bow to democratic pressures. Not only does the leader of this government believe in fulfilling a mission, the main ruling party itself has, over the past decade, imagined that it is changing the destiny of this country. In part, this imagination received its electoral strength from the results of 2014 and 2019. In part, it could be said that this millennial and draconian self-image has always been Hindutva’s view of its historical role assigned by destiny. But in the realm of competitive politics, now the BJP too has begun taking an exaggerated view of itself since 2014.
Elections are a mechanism through which rulers are assigned a limited responsibility and legitimacy, temporarily. But the lure of an electoral majority is such that rulers are tempted to expand the meaning of electoral outcomes and attempt to authenticate their inflated and egotistical ideas of what the people have said through an election. This over-reading allows the ruler and his supporters to shift the meaning of competitive politics from being merely a choice-mechanism to authorisation for setting up a new regime, ostensibly for a state-enforced transformation in ideas and social relations. The BJP’s many face-offs with sections of society, its unbelievable confidence in the correctness of its policies, its sub-democratic governance model practised over the past decade, disdain for dissent and anxiety over electoral setbacks are all part of this dual syndrome of attaching larger meanings to electoral victories and a deep-rooted ambition to change the character of India.
Since 2014, the BJP expanded the meaning of electoral outcome in order to convince its cadres and the general public of the larger national, if not outright divine purpose that lay at the root of why it was put in power. This may be called the superimposition of a mandate over an electoral victory. A disappointed electorate voted the opposition party to power in 2014. But the BJP instilled multiple texts into that victory, mostly retrospectively — Hindutva, national rejuvenation, the idea of new India. This time around, the BJP lost the majority, but being convinced of its historical burden, it is unprepared to concede that this was a warning against its bad governance, neglect of basic questions of livelihood and the arrogance of taking Hindu voters for granted. Therefore, it emphasises continuity and seeks to posit the argument that the outcome of 2024 has “mandated” a third term for Narendra Modi.
There is an unavoidable awkwardness to this claim in view of the coalition BJP is forced to live with. That awkwardness will produce moments of farcical surrealism but also many tensions and distortions. An unfounded reading of the outcome will allow the BJP to continue with the three core features listed above and bring itself into confrontation with not only its allies and the Opposition but also with segments of the population.
In its eagerness to argue victory in the face of defeat, the BJP needs to remember that high nationalism and dreams of economic power may function as temporary painkillers, but its regime-level ambitions will only make politics more shrill, abusive and unproductive.
The writer, based in Pune, taught Political Science
