An image of late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi who was killed along with other officials in a helicopter crash, is displayed on a hoarding in Beirut suburbs, Lebanon. (Reuters)
The death of Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter accident on May 20 has added another layer of uncertainty in a region already wracked by political tensions and war. What would this mean for India? It is unlikely that there will be any significant shift in Iran’s domestic or external policies since it is the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who will continue to exercise overall authority in the country.
In recent years, India-Iran relations have been marked by a certain wariness and even distance. Iran has been disappointed by India’s unwillingness to risk its strategic and economic interests with the US and the West in general while pursuing closer relations with Iran. It has watched with concern the extraordinary expansion of India-Israel relations under the Narendra Modi government and the parallel intimacy pursued with the most influential Gulf kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The process was helped by the Abraham Accords of 2020, which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and later Sudan. This was managed through a major and sustained US diplomatic effort. There was a credible expectation that Saudi Arabia would soon follow suit. It is in this context that India became part of the I2U2 grouping in 2021, bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the US, a quadrilateral in the West to match the quadrilateral (Quad), in the East.
In promoting formal relations between Israel and the key Arab countries, the US intended to create a coalition that could constitute a regional security architecture in West Asia and the Gulf, targeting Iran as the main adversary. The US would remain as a guarantor, but in the background, and retain its formidable military presence in the region. I2U2 was regarded by the US as a component of this strategy and India could not have been unaware of this. Implicit in the US plan was the assumption that the Palestinian issue was no longer a live one and had to be managed rather than resolved. Iranian unhappiness over these developments did impact India’s relations with Iran.
India’s alignment with this overall US strategy also became evident when, at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, the much-publicised India-Middle-East Economic Corridor (IMEC) project was announced. This would include a shipping link between India and the ports of West Asia from where a rail link was envisaged all the way to Haifa port in Israel. The MoU for the project was supported by the US and European Union. That it was also signed by Saudi Arabia was as remarkable as Israel’s participation in it. This, too, seemed to indicate that a normalisation of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was imminent.
Iran will be bypassed by IMEC and Indian interest in the longstanding but much delayed Chabahar project, which would connect the Iranian port with Afghanistan and beyond to Central Asia, would seem to have mostly evaporated.
Against this background, why has the Chabahar project been revived with apparently equal enthusiasm by India and Iran? What explains the difference in the US reaction to the latest agreement, which has been sharp and even threatening, in comparison to its more accommodating posture in 2016, when the two countries and Afghanistan had concluded a 10-year tripartite agreement to develop and use the port and link it to Afghanistan? The latest agreement will hand over one section of the port and its terminals to an Indian entity to manage for the next 10 years. Earlier, the use of the port was subject to short-term contractual agreements.
The ongoing Israel-Hamas war has brought the Palestinian issue front and centre in West Asian politics. The brutality of Israel’s military invasion of Gaza in retaliation for Hamas’ terrorist attack on Israel on October 7 last year has brought it widespread criticism. The Modi government has been sparse and muted in its commentary on the horrors being perpetrated by Israeli forces in Gaza. The government’s decision to facilitate the export of Indian labour to Israel to serve in positions earlier occupied by Palestinians had all the wrong optics. There has been a pressing need to shift the balance in the direction of India’s traditional support for the Palestinian cause. Statements in support of a two-state solution are part of this. The revival and public avowal of the Chabahar agreement on Monday, May 13 is another. Both Iran and India decided to give it prominence. The Indian Union Minister for Shipping, Ports and Waterways, Sarbananda Sonowal travelled to Iran and witnessed the signing of the agreement. The Iranian Minister for Roads and Urban Development, Mehrdad Bazrpash was by his side.
The revival of the Chabahar project should also be seen against the backdrop of the stalling of IMEC in the changed politics of the region. Would Saudi Arabia, one of the key sources of funding, be willing to pursue the project? Would Israeli participation be possible? The Chabahar project keeps India in play in the region’s connectivity plans.
The agreement in 2016 was a tripartite one among India, Iran and Afghanistan, then ruled by the US-supported Ghani regime. Chabahar provided connectivity with Afghanistan, a critical partner for India in Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan, through which a more direct transit was possible but denied by the latter. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the Taliban have unexpectedly soured. India has not yet accorded diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government but has maintained and recently expanded its presence in the country and delivered much-needed humanitarian assistance.
Chabahar assumes importance just as it had when the Ghani government was in power in Kabul. Perhaps even more because now the Taliban regime has become hostile to Pakistan. In 2016, the US government had a keen interest in shoring up the Ghani regime. India was, therefore, able to obtain waivers from US sanctions in so far as these related to materials and financing of the Chabahar project. The US has withdrawn from Afghanistan and has no interest in supporting and aiding the Taliban regime. It has, therefore, reacted differently this time by announcing that the latest agreement would not be exempt from US sanctions on Iran.
Will India be able to persuade the US to be as accommodative this time round as before? Perhaps, given the density of India-US relations currently. India’s implicitly supportive posture towards Israel may also count for something. But this is an election year and Joe Biden wants to be seen as being tough on Iran even as he tries to restrain Israel. The challenge for India is greater this time particularly since this is a time of change and uncertainty in Iran due to the unexpected death of its president.
The writer is a former Foreign Secretary
