It took Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his forces four years to capture Aleppo. Between 2012 and 2016, the battle of Aleppo was an inch-by-inch slog over streets and houses that left an estimated 30,000 people dead. In contrast, during the last week of November 2024, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and allied Turkish-backed groups in the Syrian National Army and the Syrian Democratic Forces merely took from November 27 to 29 to capture most of Aleppo, amidst the collapse of pro-government forces.
The storm offensive led by HTS marks the 13-year-old civil war in Syria staging back into prominence. This article intends to flag, in particular, the factors that enabled the offensive by the rebels, and in general, how armed non-state actors have enhanced their respective capabilities to challenge the military powers of states.
As per the Middle East Eye, as the combat between the Syrian government and the rebels wages on to other areas in northwestern Syria, an advanced locally made drone, Shaheen, is being credited as a vital element behind the success of the Aleppo offensive. These drones allowed rebels to shape their offensive in a non-linear manner by targeting beyond the front firing line, rendering the Syrian government’s combat elements ineffective, through coordinated multi-point assaults.
As claimed by rebels, the Shaheen drones are capable of destroying armoured tanks, armed vehicles, and enemy fighters with less than a five per cent margin of error. The unexploded suicide drones used by Russia and Iran were retrieved and used by the rebel groups as prototypes to create Shaheen drones. The rebel leaders have denied any foreign cooperation in developing the drones in the face of Russian allegations of Ukraine’s help in manufacturing these aerial weapon platforms.
Robert Tollast of ‘The National’ has reported about modern militias harnessing 3D printing for drone construction, supplemented with commercially available parts, including guidance systems. For the rebel forces, the tactic has centred on rapid advances in lightly armoured vehicles, with infantry armed with anti-tank weapons, snipers and machine guns. They speed through enemy lines to create chaos among forces with slow-moving tanks, or those entrenched in static positions.
HTS has mixed the above-mentioned approach with drones and even a dedicated night fighting battalion to devastating impact. Drones have been a force multiplier in the battlefield by imparting the three-dimensional effect. Drone footage has shown attacks on airports, tanks, vehicles, and government forces, all in a span of two to three days. As mentioned, the simultaneity of engagements of Syrian government military forces including in the air, certainly led to a combat paralysis.
In addition to the effective employment of drones by HTS, the preparations for the offensive have been at structural levels as well. The recent Aleppo offensive highlights the significant strides HTS has made in recent years in developing their military and governance capabilities that stretch from producing drones, establishing a military academy, and setting up a rudimentary central banking entity amongst others.
As HTS evolved, it has tried to portray itself as a mainstream opposition group, endeavouring to demonstrate its governance prowess. While doing so, according to the non-profit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), HTS rebranded itself from a former transnational Jihadi group to a more localised Islamist group. As per ‘The Syria Report’ which traces economic and political developments informed by data analysis, in late 2017, HTS established the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) as its civilian administration arm, with the aim of enhancing governance in the regions under its control.
‘The Syria report’ mentions the enhanced military capabilities of HTS, notably through the acquisition and deployment of advanced weaponry such as drones, and the strengthening and unification of its command structure including the establishment of a military academy in October 2021. Such capability enhancement has been instrumental in a coordinated battle waged by HTS with several rebel groups under its umbrella.
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The preparations of HTS for the offensive launched in November last week were reported by local media months ago. In September, ‘Independent Arabia’ reported training preparations and structural consolidation of HTS in units and brigades, with particular emphasis on special forces, communications, and drone command. Similar preparations towards organisational orientation for combat were also reported. HTS through its SSG has enunciated measures towards governing the captured areas and has also spelt out post-offensive plans that include steps like media management, currency policy, communication arrangements, addressing issues concerning minority populations, etc.
To conclude, the above facets are not exclusive to HTS but also relate to the evolving capabilities of other non-state actors Hezbollah, the Houthis, etc. Once thought of as lightly armed and vulnerable to air power and tanks, jihadis of terror outfits in the Middle East have proven capable of closing down international shipping lanes and firing ballistic missiles and drones with ranges of several thousands of kilometres. Insurgents – often lightly armed rebels – defeating better-armed state forces is an established story in the compartmentalised battlefield of counter-insurgency – the US in Vietnam, France in Algeria, coalition forces in Afghanistan, etc. However, niche technology that is affordable could accelerate the trend in favour of terror groups. The rising trend of diminishing asymmetries in asymmetric wars shall have to be taken note of by state actors.
The writer is an Indian Army veteran and currently teaches at OP Jindal Global University, Sonepat, Haryana
