As 2024 draws to a close, the situation at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh seems to be normalising. The disengagement process at Demchok and Depsang, which began on October 23 and was completed on October 30, has been swift and smooth.
Satellite imagery of December 12 showed Chinese troops had dismantled their positions at Rakhi Nalla, restoring the “ground situation” to pre-2020 status.
Depsang is an elevated topographical landmass where China and India have differing perceptions of the LAC. In the extreme north, the Chinese claim their LAC to be south of the Samar-Lungpa, whereas the Indian claim is north of the Lungpa.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been trespassing on the Indian territory since 2009 around the Chip-Chap River, Samar-Lungpa176 sq km, Trig Heights, Raki Nalla, Y-Junction, and Depsang Bulge 972 sq km, Hot Spring 38 sq km, Chang-lung 13 sq km.
From Chip-Chap River, they gradually moved southward to Trig Heights and named Point 5459 Manshen Hill. In 2009, the PLA built roads along the Karakoram Ranges to enter into Depsang Ridge. Over 70 intrusions were witnessed in 2009. The then Army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, insisted that the borders were “extremely safe”.
In 2011, they built a 30-km road along the LAC from the Raki Nalla to cut into the Depsang plains. Further south, they built another 20-km road along the Jeevan Nalla to reach closer to India’s Murgo post.
In April 2013, Burtse became a flashpoint after 40 PLA troops set up remote camps on the Indian side of the LAC and stayed put for 21 days. India has had to do a lot of diplomatic running around to diffuse the tension, as it lacked sufficient economic and diplomatic tools then to counter the Chinese offensive.
The new agreement restores the pre-2017 status. However, the full extent of patrolling is unclear because the Chinese have built roads since 2010. The picture is rather hazy. The temperature in Depsang is now -45 degrees. We do not know what will happen once the snow melts in spring and summer.
Who blinked first? Scores of analyses have touched on the factors that led to the climbdown, mostly attributed to China’s economic slowdown. Of course, our top defence brass believes that the Indian troops “standing firm” made China rethink. The government’s statement in Parliament has been circumspect — India’s precondition for a thaw has been met; New Delhi followed a step-by-step approach involving diplomatic, political, and military mechanisms; the next step would be on troop de-escalation and de-induction, and India will consider other aspects of bilateral engagement in a “calibrated manner”. There is no cause for optimism, no explicit guarantees, or even hopes of de-escalation. Jaishankar advised vigilance, suggesting that economic engagement will not come at the expense of strategic caution.
Trade normally contributes to the outbreak of conflicts, but India and China ironically have found a smart way to seize the moment, balancing trade demands with security imperatives – with readjustment but not a reset. Simply put, trade triumphed over rivalry.
While the Chinese may have scored some military successes, New Delhi has shown its diplomatic prowess, pursuance, and maturity. The deal is about accommodating each other’s interests. Both countries wanted an exit from the geopolitical and economic quagmire they were stuck in for four and a half years. In sum, both were losing much more than they were gaining as adversaries.
But the most chilling takeaway comes from the Western military observers who suggest that China has exploited the post-Galwan situation to conduct extensive real-world military operations and training in the area for four-and-half years against a potential enemy that involved 40,000 to 60,000 troops for the first time since 1987. It wasn’t a standalone case but was linked to China’s military mobilisation vis-a-vis Taiwan and the South China Sea. It likely gathered critical assessment of Indian military strengths and weaknesses besides insight into the scope and depth of US-Indian military intelligence cooperation.
This underscores PM Modi’s June 2020 statement, “The Chinese neither entered our territory nor any post has been taken over by them”. Jaishankar also revealed recently that “China has not occupied any of our land but deployed its troops to the upper part of the mountainous areas along the LAC.”
What next? The trust factor comes into play. For sure, China’s withdrawal is also tactical. Border tensions appear to be a symptom, not the cause. The problem is mainly intersected by the US, which continues to create India-China territorial rifts.
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National Security Advisor Ajit Doval’s recent visit to Beijing for the Special Representatives (SR) talks seems to have gone off well. Some doable, such as the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, data sharing on trans-border rivers, and border trade, were discussed. Chinese FM Wang Yi described the meeting as “hard-won and worth cherishing”, while the Ministry of External Affairs said the SRs “provided positive directions for cross-border cooperation” to seek a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable framework for settling the boundary question.
Having said that, the Chinese are unlikely to loosen their military grip so long as the Americans run a full-fledged Tibet project in the Himalayas. Without a strategic shift in thinking, and given the Sino-Russian entente, border resolution is unlikely to come by.
What must be done in Depsang? The plateau remains uninhabited. Given the lax patrolling, militarily holding the area would be tough unless local Ladakhi personnel man the posts as they did in the ’70s and ’80s. The challenge for the Ladakh UT government is to extend a semblance of governance and developmental activities in the areas. Depsang is rich in flora and fauna as well as natural resources. While it will take time for tourism to develop in Chang Chenmo, Kugrang Valley, and Gogra-Hot Springs, India should emulate China’s Mount Kunlun Global Geopark model north of Aksai Chin for developing Depsang for botanical landscaping and harnessing animal resources on our side.
The author is an expert on border affairs
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