When United States (US) President Joe Biden welcomed the Prime Ministers (PM) of India, Australia, and Japan to his hometown of Wilmington for the fourth in-person Quad Leaders’ Summit last week, the mood was one of high optimism. The summit marked a farewell for both Biden and Japan’s PM Fumio Kishida, and President Biden seemed eager to make it count. Two years after Quad’s formalisation, the commitment to regional cooperation was unmistakable, and Biden was determined to build on the momentum.
The gathering hit all the right notes on Indo-Pacific security, with leaders voicing concerns about the “militarisation” of contested territories and “coercive and intimidating manoeuvres” in the South China Sea. Though China wasn’t mentioned by name, the references were clear.
The summit’s declaration was detailed and comprehensive, listing a wide range of cooperation initiatives, including a cancer moonshot, the maritime training initiative in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission, a Quad Indo-Pacific logistics network, an expanded infrastructure initiative, and the Quad Bio-Explore project. It gave the impression of a united grouping moving in strategic unison.
Yet, if one were looking for clarity on Quad’s specific trajectory and tangible outcomes from its initiatives, one is likely to be disappointed. Despite the rhetoric, much of Quad’s military objectives remain vague. Take the Quad Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative. While it has found some success in the Pacific, practical achievements, especially in the Indian Ocean, have been minimal. Countries in the region, particularly in South Asia, remain hesitant to share sensitive information, largely due to concerns over foreign commercial satellite services, which they fear may infringe on their national sovereignty. Differing legal frameworks, limited technological infrastructure, and the absence of clear protocols for accessing satellite data continue to hinder practical cooperation.
While Quad did subtly criticise Chinese violations of international law and unilateral actions in the East and South China Seas, it failed to address the larger issue of US distraction. With the US deeply involved in Ukraine, it has limited resources left to confront China. Though Washington acknowledges Beijing as a threat to Taiwan and a growing concern in both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, it is far from prepared to challenge China, especially in the latter region, where no clear US maritime strategy exists.
Increasingly, Quad’s declarations seem out of touch with operational realities. Many of its security initiatives appear more politically driven than designed for practical execution. The need for Quad to project unity in countering China is understandable, but it frequently overshadows the development of concrete, actionable plans. A case in point is the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission. Coastguards, primarily tasked with law enforcement and humanitarian missions within their exclusive economic zones (EEZ), require less integration than naval forces, where cooperation is more combat-oriented. Though coastguard collaboration is valuable in addressing maritime crime, such cooperation is already well-established. It’s unlikely, for example, that an Indian ship-rider aboard a US Coast Guard vessel would gain new insights into addressing crime in Indian waters, and vice versa.
This is not to downplay the relevance of coastguard collaboration but rather to underscore the absence of a clear strategic direction in Quad’s security initiatives. It’s worth pointing out that existing mechanisms like the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) already facilitate information sharing, making the need for additional measures like the ship-observer mission difficult to justify.
Similarly, Quad’s cooperation on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and the “logistics network” remains vague. Though Quad navies are already collaborating in these areas, significant challenges persist.
The main issue is the lack of a unified command or coordination framework. With each country operating under its own disaster response protocols, coordinating efforts on a multilateral level is complex, especially in the absence of a dedicated structure for decision-making and resource allocation. Without clear coordination mechanisms, response protocols, or timelines, it’s hard to see how this new network will improve upon existing frameworks like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response.
Interoperability issues further highlight the disconnect between intent and execution. While interoperability is crucial for naval forces, it is far less pressing for coastguards, who primarily handle law enforcement and search and rescue (SAR) missions within their respective waters. The emphasis on shared intent without the mechanisms to operationalise it raises doubts about the long-term effectiveness of these Quad proposals.
This is not to imply that Quad serves no useful military purpose. Its initiatives, even if underdeveloped, serve a purpose beyond immediate practicality. They act as significant political signals of commitment and unity in the face of external pressures, particularly China’s growing maritime ambitions. Some initiatives may lack clear modalities now but could develop over time as discussions and multilateral mechanisms evolve.
Yet, maritime analysts would be wise not to get caught up in the hype surrounding these initiatives, recognising the gap between political signalling and practical implementation. While Quad’s intent is clear, the path forward remains more uncertain than many imagine.
Abhijit Singh is head of the Maritime Policy Initiative at ORF, New Delhi.The views expressed are personal
