Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing was a strategic exercise to secure sustained support from China amid its ongoing conflict with Ukraine. China’s backing is critical to Putin’s goals of keeping the Russian economy afloat, saving Russia from political isolation and projecting a joint front against the West. Putin returned home reassured that his bosom friend Xi Jinping would remain steadfast and offer unwavering support to Moscow.
At a macro level, the Moscow-Beijing partnership has become a decisive factor in international politics, whose implications are neither entirely understood or appreciated. It is moving towards a formidable alignment to shield itself from the looming Western menace, to challenge the overbearing dominance of the US, and to expand its influence worldwide. The relationship spans from extensive commercial exchanges to strong defence ties and intimate collaboration in multilateral institutions. In the hierarchical structure of the international order, this partnership has emerged as the second most powerful entity, positioned just below the Western alliances. Its influence is burgeoning swiftly in the Global South as countries seek an alternative to the traditional dominion of the West. The Joe Biden administration’s short-sighted strategy of provoking both Russia and China simultaneously has contributed directly to an “alignment of the aggrieved”.
President Putin and President Xi accord high priority to this partnership. The absence of leadership change on either side ensured a consistent and stable relationship — a privilege typically reserved for authoritarian regimes. Xi and Putin have met more than 40 times in the last two decades and often chose each other’s country as their first destination abroad after re-election. Xi Jinping’s first foreign visit after assuming the highest office in China was to Moscow in 2012. Again, after his re-election in March 2023, he visited Russia on his first trip abroad. Similarly, Putin visited Beijing in May 2024 on his first trip abroad after assuming office for his fifth term. These gestures might appear symbolic but they are not devoid of substance.
China became a lifeline for Russia in the wake of Western sanctions following the Ukraine crisis. Russia’s economy would have collapsed had China backed out and joined the sanctions. Russia’s biggest trade partner for the last 13 years has been China. It accounted for roughly 30 per cent of its total global trade in 2023, a sharp rise from merely 11 per cent in 2013. In an unprecedented growth, their trade reached $240 billion in 2023, overshooting the target of $200 billion set for 2024. According to some estimates, Beijing supplies 70 per cent of Russia’s semiconductors and other critical technology. Therefore, the economic dependence of Russia on China can hardly be overstated.
A growing asymmetry in their economies has led some Western analysts to contend that the power equation has inverted and Russia has become a “junior partner”. They argue that Russia’s economy is one-tenth the size of China’s. It was $1.8 trillion in 2021-2022, while the Chinese economy was approximately $18 trillion. However, calling Russia “junior partner” would be a premature assessment. Moscow is conscious of its great-power past, and its elites resent the idea of subordination. West’s policy to subordinate Russia in the 1990s failed miserably. The war in Ukraine would not have happened had Russia consented to becoming a junior partner of the West. Therefore, Russia will not readily submit to a secondary status to an Asian power.
In this context, one is reminded of what Fyodor Dostoyevsky wrote in 1876, “in Europe, we were hangers-on and slaves, while in Asia we shall be the masters. In Europe we were Tatars, while in Asia we too are Europeans”. Russia invariably turns to the East when the West spurns it. Gone are the days of Russia being “masters” in Asia, but Putin can certainly expect equality and solidarity from many Asian states.
Besides commercial ties, Russia and China have solid military cooperation. It began with confidence-building measures in the 1990s, and their most significant achievement was resolving the 4,300-km border dispute. There is supreme cooperation in the field of aircraft engines and anti-aircraft missiles. Over time, they have signed several joint projects concerning space, shipbuilding, rocket engines, military helicopters, production of aircraft, and the S-400 missile defence system. Russia’s arms exports to China reduced drastically after 2007, but the latter still relies on the former for critical weapons such as the S-400 and the fifth-generation aircraft.
Further, joint military exercises have become a regular feature of their defence cooperation. The Joint Sea Exercise of 2015 in the Mediterranean raised concerns at the NATO headquarters. They participated in Zapad exercises in 2021, conducted a joint bomber patrol and used each other’s airfields in 2022, did Vostok exercises with all three military branches in 2022, and executed joint air and sea drills in the Sea of Japan in 2023. Regular exercises mean some degree of interoperability and the possibility of integrated command if required. However, they have not become a formal “military alliance” yet. In fact, China is not even supplying weapons to Russia during its war in Ukraine.
Moscow and Beijing are taking pre-emptive measures to safeguard their interests without becoming alliance partners. A formal alliance is cumbersome, and states refrain from being part of an alliance. It entails what is referred to as the “fear of entrapment” in other’s conflict and the “fear of abandonment” when needed. Beijing would not like to get entrapped in Russia’s conflict with the West, and likewise, Moscow is wary of China’s conflict in Taiwan. Russia is also conscious that a formal alliance with China may alienate its Asian partners, such as India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Therefore, they will continue to work closely without signing a formal alliance treaty. Moreover, many informal agreements have worked better than formal ones. Some Western analysts argue that the Moscow-Beijing alignment is far more effective than the much-touted Quad coalition in the Indo-Pacific.
New Delhi is wary of the growing ties between Beijing and Moscow. However, its strategy of cultivating robust ties with Washington while maintaining a balanced relationship with Moscow has proved exceptionally effective in managing China. New Delhi’s strong ties with Russia situate it favourably in continental geopolitics. However, the balancing act will get more challenging as the tension between Russia and the West intensifies.
The writer teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
