The BJP’s challenge is that it has been very successful in normalising Hindutva to the point that it has become widespread common sense in large parts of the electorate. (Express Photo by Rohit Jain Paras)
The current general election, at least until phase one, has been characterised by an odd ennui and silence. This is partly reflected in the decreasing voter turnout. One should not over-interpret this. The BJP remains a front runner, with overwhelming odds in its favour. You could argue that the listlessness is a consequence of a foregone conclusion. But the contests in many seats are narrow. And for a party expecting 400 seats, the joyous surge is missing. Narendra Modi will, in all likelihood, win convincingly. But the sense of riding to victory on a crescendo of acclamation is not coming easy. Compare this to the mood after the pran pratishtha at Ayodhya: The sense of euphoria is missing. For the Opposition, as well, one hoping for anti-incumbency, a surge of visible anger, enthusiasm for its leaders, or uptake for its ideology, is absent. It is this mildly enigmatic silence that is giving the Opposition some slivers of hope, confusing analysts and making the ruling BJP a little more nervous than a party poised for total domination might seem.
Authoritarian regimes like to produce silence; but they also quietly fear it. This is the sound of silence that the Prime Minister’s speech in Banswara seeks to break. In some ways, there was nothing surprising about the speech. It contains the standard themes of the BJP’s view of the world: Conjuring the fear of minority appeasement, crudely associating minorities with both a demographic threat and infiltration. These themes are not strategic. They have become the DNA of the party. The only interesting question arises from the need to foreground it with a crudeness unbecoming of a Prime Minister.
The biggest challenge the BJP faces this election is not the Opposition, but the listlessness of its own support base. The mobilisation energy of the party comes from the fact that for much of the party base, the BJP is not just a political instrument: It is an identity. It is this fervour of identification that has given the BJP the edge in the last few years. But the sense of identity has been diluted for a number of reasons. First, the sheer expansion of the party, taking on board large swathes of opportunists from the Opposition parties, dilutes its sense of identity and diminishes the privilege of its base. If any newly-arrived Congressman can acquire this identity or worse, get a ticket, the status-conferring effects of an identity-based party get diluted. It is also harder to project its distinctiveness. The thick crust of opportunism becomes all too visible, when you give tickets to a significant number of recent turncoats.
Second, in states like Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, where the BJP has done well in the past, it has forgotten some of the preconditions of its own success. There is no doubt that Modi is central to the BJP’s campaign, both as a person and as an idea. But the BJP always combines it with deft local social engineering, artfully balancing local social equations. In these states, it also always had local leaders like Vasundhara Raje and Shivraj Singh Chouhan who had some identity of their own. It is also not an accident that the one state where there seems to be almost no contest is Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP has a local leader in Yogi Adityanath. The drastic changes the BJP has introduced in the leaderships in states like Rajasthan has unsettled many local caste and other equations. These unsettled equations won’t be enough to unseat the BJP, but they create enough uncertainty for the ruling party to be nervous. It is harder to be sure whether the political calls it has made are, indeed, the correct ones.
Third, in politics, never underestimate the power of boredom. There is still immense enthusiasm for Modi. But the ability of the BJP to offer anything new by way of themes and memes is drastically diminished. The BJP’s economic performance is middling: Not bad enough to generate widespread anger, not good enough to ensure that there are no significant pockets of discontent left. While Modi still seems immune to charges of corruption, the claim that India is in a less corrupt system is just that much harder to sell.
Democracy is often maintained, not by a commitment to democratic or liberal values, but by an instinctive rebellion against hubris. The conditions where “democracy is in danger” arguments have resonance simply do not exist. Most citizens are not experiencing Indian democracy in this way; the democracy-in-danger arguments usually have to piggyback on a wave of serious economic discontent; and there has to be a focal point for resistance. But the resistance to hubris is much more instinctive. The jailing of Opposition leaders, and the presumptuousness of the claim to 400 seats, reek of just such hubris.
The BJP’s challenge is that it has been very successful in normalising Hindutva to the point that it has become widespread common sense in large parts of the electorate. But then, it becomes just a matter of fact about us, not an ideological project around which you can generate passion. Even with a listless Opposition, the BJP becomes a little more unsure of exactly what will generate enthusiasm amongst the voters. It is hard to read the tepidness of this election: It may, in the end, amount to nothing. But it is exactly that hard-to-read lack of enthusiasm that may cause a sense of nervousness. The BJP’s biggest fear is that the palpable lack of national issues makes this a normal election: An amalgam of messy local equations, caste and subcaste politics, organisational rivalries, and opportunistic alliances.
The listlessness of the first phase can also have self-fulfilling effects. The very fact that there is no crescendo of triumphal enthusiasm, at best a sullen acceptance of the BJP, can open up more cracks in later phases. Hence, it is no surprise that the BJP is foregrounding its ideological project once again. The only way in which it can energise its cadres and nationalise the elections is to constantly remind voters that the Hindutva project has not won yet. While it might be fearing the possibility of an instinctive revolt against hubris, it wants to compensate for it with an instinctive strain of sympathy for communal arguments. Modi will win in the end. But only by appealing to the ugliest depths of who we are, not the best we can be.
The writer is contributing editor, The Indian Express
