There are signs that the Chinese military is facing significant internal strife. Recently, China’s defence ministry announced the suspension of Central Military Commission (CMC) member Admiral Miao Hua for serious disciplinary violations. This decision coincided with reports that defence minister Dong Jun may also be under investigation for corruption.
Historically, public presence has served as an indicator of an official’s safety from corruption-related allegations in China. For instance, before their dismissals, former officials like foreign minister Qin Gang and defence minister Li Shangfu had notable absences from public life, before there was confirmation of action being taken against them. Here, it is worth noting that Dong was last seen attending the Second Symposium on Security Situation in the Gulf of Guinea on December 5. Moreover, rumours of a probe against him were dismissed by foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning. Despite this, recent developments indicate a broader crisis within China’s defence apparatus.
The past two years have seen significant upheaval in the People’s Liberation Army, with numerous high-ranking officials from various branches facing investigations for misconduct. Li Shangfu’s corruption scandal was linked to his tenure as head of the Equipment Development Department (EDD). Now, it appears that factional struggles within the CMC are at play, with more dispensable officials continuing to be targeted. In China’s clientelistic Leninist Party-State system, power politics at the highest levels often takes place through the targeting of a competitor’s network of patronage, revealing hidden skeletons in their closets to either achieve acquiescence or elimination.
When Dong was promoted to the post of defence minister in December 2023, he was the first from the navy to assume the post. Dong was expected to step up to accelerate combat preparedness in hostile naval theatres. But from the perspective of the internal decision-making hierarchy, his role was primarily public-facing. This is par for the course in the Chinese system. However, Dong has not enjoyed substantive authority. Despite being in the position for a year, he has been excluded from the CMC. Both his purged predecessors, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, were members of the CMC. Dong’s exclusion is likely indicative of resistance among factional opponents up the hierarchy.
His appointment, nevertheless, was seen as an extension of Miao’s authority. Now with Miao’s suspension, Dong’s position does seem suspect.
What further adds credence to this theory of factional infighting at the highest levels is the series of actions taken against officials such as Lin Xiangyang, current Commander of the PLA Eastern Theatre Command, as well as Wang Xiubin, former Commander of the Southern Theatre Command. Miao, Dong, Lin, and Wang are all interconnected through their historical ties to Fujian province, forming what some analysts refer to as a “Fujian gang” in the military, led by CMC’s third-in-command He Weidong. This faction is countered by a “Shaanxi gang,” led by CMC second-in-command Zhang Youxia.
Given that Li Shangfu was a protégé of Zhang Youxia, he must have faced quite a setback from his purge. Now, two other critical members of the so-called “Shaanxi gang” remain in the CMC. The first, is Zhang Shengmin, a key figure who oversees anti-corruption efforts within the CMC. His background in the Rocket Force aligns him with other PLARF leaders who have faced scrutiny recently. The other is He Hongjun, who, in July 2024, became an executive deputy director of the CMC Political Work Department. His rapid promotion from major general to general, in just 11 years, reflects Zhang’s influence and suggests that if Miao were to be replaced, He could be a likely candidate. He’s appointment is also more beneficial to Xi himself, given that Miao may have been appointed to the CMC by Xi, but did not owe his rise through the ranks to the chairman. He Hongjun, on the other hand, was assigned an exclusive billet of executive deputy director by Xi.
The fall of figures like Li, Miao and potentially Dong, does not indicate weakness in Xi’s position. He continues to stay above factional struggles for the moment. But it does reveal potential instability within Xi’s inner circle. And if close confidantes like Miao, or even He Weidong and Zhang Youxia are purged, it could signify a deeper crisis affecting military cohesion and loyalty.
While Xi’s anti-corruption campaign aims to consolidate power and ensure loyalty within the PLA, it has inadvertently exposed factional divides that threaten stability. As these dynamics unfold, Xi faces challenges that extend beyond mere inefficiency or corruption.
Anushka Saxena is staff research analyst,The Takshashila Institution.The views expressed are personal
