The Waqf (Amendment) Bill 2024, now with the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) for further discussions and deliberation, is set to redefine the nature of political discourse in the country. The institution of waqf has long been seen by the Indian Muslim community as an internal religious matter concerning the management of religious land/property endowments (mosques, shrines, graveyards, orphanages, schools and so on). The Bill in its present form, however, can transform waqf into a national debate. There is even a strong possibility that the new waqf law could be used by some sections for further demonisation of the Muslim identity.
To understand the Bill’s possible political implications, one must carefully look at the framework employed to define waqf institutions and the problems associated with their efficient management. In this sense, the provisions of the Bill should be understood in relation to another official document, the explainer issued by the ministry of minority affairs on September 13, 2024 (tinyurl.com/epekw35y).
Written in a FAQ format, the explainer makes two broad claims. First, it argues that the origin of waqf in the Indian context is inextricably linked to Muslim rule. Hence, its presence as a legal entity is subject to review. It notes: “In India, the history of Waqf can be traced back to the early days of the Delhi Sultanate when Sultan Muizuddin Sam Ghaor dedicated two villages in favour of the Jama Masjid of Multan and handed its administration to Shaikhul Islam. As the Delhi Sultanate and later Islamic dynasties flourished in India, the number of Waqf properties kept increasing… There was a case made for the abolition of Waqfs… in the late 19th Century when a dispute over a Waqf property ended up in the Privy Council of London … The four British judges who heard the case described the Waqf as ‘a perpetuity of the worst and the most pernicious kind’ and declared Waqf to be invalid. However, the decision by the four judges was not accepted in India, and the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act of 1913 saved the Waqf … Since then, no attempt has been made to curb Waqfs.”
Secondly, the waqf institutions are also problematised on religious grounds. The explainer notes: “…Islamic Countries such as Turkey, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Iraq do not have Waqfs. However, in India, not only are Waqf Boards the largest urban landowners, but they also have an Act protecting them legally.”
A close reading of these observations suggests that the presence of waqf is officially envisaged as the direct outcome of medieval Islamic rule in India. It creates an impression that the dedication of land as waqf in the name of Allah for charitable and religious purposes was inextricably linked to the political authority and control enjoyed by the Muslim rulers. This impression destabilises the legal status of historic mosques, shrines, and other waqf properties, especially historical monuments jointly managed by the Archaeological Survey of India and the Waqf Boards.
This representation of waqf as a contested entity paves the way for three practical resolves offered by the new law – representation, Indianisation, and centralisation.
The Bill envisages the inclusion of Muslim women, Muslim Other Backward Classes and non-Muslims as a way out to make state Waqf Boards and the Central Waqf Council more diversified and representative. The representation of Muslim women and Muslim OBCs in the waqf institutions is understandable because it ensures sociological diversity and gender balance. However, the proposal to have two non-Muslim members is based on an entirely different logic. These non-Muslim members are introduced as legal stakeholders simply to transform the waqf institutions into a collectively governed national resource. In a way, it is a legal attempt to “Indianise” the waqf by restricting its exclusive Muslim character.
That is the reason why the Explainer is very critical of the waqf as a Muslim-centric law. It notes: “Waqf Act is a special Act for religious properties of only one religion of the country, when no such law exists for any other religion. In fact, a PIL has been currently filed in the Delhi High Court asking this very question. Delhi HC has issued notice to the central government on this plea regarding the constitutional validity of Waqf.” It is worth noting here that the government has also introduced the Mussalman Wakf (Repeal) Bill, 2024 to revoke the Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923, to get rid of “colonial-era legislation” and to have an “Indianised” system of law.
The centralisation is the third resolve, which is offered to make waqf institutions more controllable. The proposed Bill empowers the district collector to determine the official status of a waqf property. He/she is also given the authority to survey the waqf at the state-level. These powers make the figure of the district collector very powerful while confining the authority of Waqf Boards.
This new official framework could have two clear political manifestations. First, it will contribute to the Hindutva politics of heritage. The idea that Muslim rule must be seen as a form of political subjugation clearly substantiates the argument that waqf created by Muslims in the past for religious purposes were entirely motivated by political considerations. This line of political reasoning will make waqf properties, including those places of worship that are not at all controversial, legally as well as politically disputed.
The economic aspect of waqf underlines another political possibility. The explainer highlights the fact that the Waqf Boards are the largest landowner after the Armed Forces and the Railways. This economic comparison can also be interpreted in clear political terms. It is possible to make a provocative claim that waqf institutions (and for that matter Muslims!) unjustly occupy land despite being a minority in the country. This kind of economic argument may also be used as evidence to underline Muslim appeasement.
Hilal Ahmed is associate professor, Centre for Studies of Developing Societies (CSDS). The views expressed are personal
