PM Modi’s swearing-in ceremony: Signals to India’s neighbourhood and Indian Ocean region

First, it underlines India’s expanding vision of the idea of region. Second, it lays bare the strategic hooks significant from the perspective of India’s maritime security architecture — and thus underlines a strategy to counterbalance China’s aggressive footprints in the region. Third, it is a reiteration of the contours of subregional diplomacy that speak of both strategic pragmatism and moral exceptionalism. Against this backdrop: What insights do we discern from the standpoint of India’s neighbourhood first policy, with a focus on Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles? How do we unpack this analysis? Where is the location of this thinking in the foreign policy apparatus of Modi 3.0, and why? While this is no doubt a strategic move, will the translation of this be impinged by the challenges of coalition politics, and the fact that Modi 3.0 is supported by two regional coalition partners — TDP and JDU?

Engagement with island nations

The composition and select group of heads of states no doubt speaks to the expanding vision of India’s idea of region. A close reading of India’s Neighbourhood First policy, and SAGAR doctrine, clearly underlines that India is no longer bound by the template of territorial boundaries of South Asia. India’s global ambitions cannot, of course, be buttressed without due engagement with its neighbours in South Asia. However, India, since 2014, has expanded the idea of the region, through its focus on the value of “India cares, but not at the cost of its own interest” to include particularly Central and South East Asia in its fold. So for instance, India’s Act East policy, or renewed engagement with BIMSTEC, or the focus on sub regional grouping like BBIN, or bilateral engagement with countries in Central Asia, all mark the scripting of an idea of the region beyond the territorial confines of South Asia.

It is important to underline that in this marking there is renewed focus on India’s maritime vision and security architecture, for instance in the Bay of Bengal region, the Indian Ocean region, or its Indo-Pacific vision. The oceans have added a renewed vigour and urgency, against the backdrop of renewed emphasis on connectivity, trade and transit networks, growing Chinese footprint, and its aggressive tendencies for expansionism. It is here that we need to locate the renewed engagement with Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles.

India-Maldives relationship

The past year has been marked by ups and downs in India’s relationship with Maldives, specifically after the election of President Mohamed Muizzu. It is important to underline that President Muizzu’s electoral campaign focused on the narrative of “India out”. Maldives is India’s key maritime neighbour in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and occupies a special place in its initiatives like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and the Neighbourhood First Policy of Narendra Modi. The Maldives’ proximity to India, barely 70 nautical miles from the island of Minicoy in Lakshadweep and 300 nautical miles from the mainland’s western coast, and its location at the hub of commercial sea lanes running through the Indian Ocean give it significant strategic importance.

India operates and maintains radars, helicopters, and aircraft in the Maldives, some of which are used for medical evacuations. The Indian Navy also patrols Indian Ocean waters. But the past year has been marked by a pro-China tilt in President Muizzu policy moves, and one of his first decisions was to ask India to withdraw its military personnel from the island nation. It should be underlined that India has acted with caution and restraint in its engagement with Maldives, well aware that its ambitions to be the key security provider in the region rest also on the goodwill of the small island states. Maldives, particularly, remains a key strategic hook in India’s vision of its maritime security architecture. So the move to invite President Muizzu is strategic, more so as this will be the first visit of President Muizzu to India.

Mauritius and Seychelles

While India has shown strategic restraint in terms of its response to Maldives, it has also very strategically crafted its engagement with Mauritius and Seychelles. Foreign policy, irrespective of regime changes, is marked by a degree of continuity. But it is still important to see some new or changing markers. To my mind, Mauritius and Seychelles would be points for strategic but quiet and careful diplomacy for India. I say quiet and careful as all these three contexts, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius are prone to deploying India for populist politics and electoral gains domestically.

Mauritius has been on the canvas of renewed diplomatic engagement, particularly Agalega island, a far-flung part of the country more than 1,100km (684 miles) from the main island. India’s role in the development of the upgraded airstrip on the Agalega island is well marked, and it allows the Indian Navy to operate P-8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft, which is a significant strategic hook for not just India’s access to the key maritime base, but also a strategic move to counter China, in the wake of its aggressive maritime strategy. China’s free trade agreement with Mauritius in early 2021 was swiftly followed by the announcement of India’s comprehensive economic partnership with Mauritius.

However, this strategy would gain further ground, if India succeeds in drawing in Seychelles on a strategic understanding on Assumption Island. But the project has been subject to varying degrees of scepticism in the domestic politics of Seychelles, one on environmental concerns, and the second on the possibility of India using Assumption Island as a military base. The GoI has officially declined military objectives, but it goes without saying that Seychelles and Assumption Island remain central to the realisation of India’s maritime vision and SAGAR doctrine.

Pulls of a coalition

Against this backdrop, how should we view the first steps, in terms of PM Modi inviting the heads of state of Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles. Of course in terms of the Neighbourhood First policy, this is a well-crafted strategic move on three counts: India’s engagement with each of the island states, along with Sri Lanka, marks the scripting of its own pearl of string strategy. Further bilateral engagement also gives it better leverage and helps counterbalance pro-China moves by any one of the maritime partners. Second, it helps diversify the canvas of engagement for India especially in the Indian ocean region, and reaffirms its role as a net security provider. Though this needs to be viewed with caution, as contesting populist visions, can be deployed by each of these island nations to politicise India for domestic electoral mobilisation. President Muizzu’s “India out” campaign was not the first instance of politicisation of relations withIndia in Maldives. And in Seychelles even the Assumption Island project is contentious domestically.

What needs to be carefully watched is how Modi 3.0, will translate these foreign policy goals given this time he is heading a coalition government, with crucial support from two key regional partners Nitish Kumar(JDU), and Chandrababu Naidu(TDP). While the maritime security architecture might not see much action from the regional alliance partners, India’s engagement with border states like Nepal would surely be under scrutiny by alliance partners like Nitish Kumar. This is particularly in the context of the short commission Agniveer scheme, and also in terms of Saptakoshi dam, and its links to floods in Bihar. How patterns in foreign policy analysis unfolds in Modi 3.0, would thus be interesting to watch in the wake of coalition politics, and the push for India’s regional and global ambitions.

The writer is associate professor, Department of International Relations, South Asian University