On India-China ties, Delhi takes one step forward, two steps back

In its statement on the latest meeting, the Indian side specifically referenced the “frictions (that) had emerged… in 2020” and appeared keen to underline the decisions of the new patrolling arrangement and conclusion of the disengagement process as well as separate developments such as the “resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, data sharing on trans-border rivers and border trade”. The Chinese too, noted the latter point but otherwise merely “positively evaluated the solutions reached by the two countries on border-related issues”.

While the latest Indian statement stressed the need “to use, coordinate and guide the relevant diplomatic and military mechanisms” to “maintain peace and tranquillity on the border and advance effective border management”, there was no talk any longer about specifically “promot(ing) exchanges and communication between the border personnel”, reflecting perhaps, the desire to reduce direct contacts between the actual troops on the ground as well as the reality of no-patrolling buffer zones in some areas along the LAC.

As in 2021, so also in their latest statement, the Chinese described a six-point consensus that the Indians did not acknowledge as such. While past Indian statements have described talks as “constructive and forward-looking” the latest talked instead about “resolv(ing) to inject more vitality into this process”.

Oddly, however, the Indian SR statement talks about “seeking a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable framework for the settlement of the boundary question” even though such a framework already exists in the form of bilateral treaties, particularly, the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. The Chinese references to the 2005 Agreement in its latest statement as well as in the last one obviously do not hold much weight given how they have repeatedly violated it. India, by contrast, has displayed a reluctance to refer directly to extant legal agreements and has — like the Chinese — preferred to reference instead the “guidance”, “directions” or “decision” of meetings between Modi and Xi.

The danger now exists — as was the case post-Doklam in 2017 — that the Indian government could once again take its foot off the gas pedal of sustained political, diplomatic, military and economic pressure on China in order to achieve short-term interests. While another round of “informal summits” is hopefully out of the question, formal exchanges also need to be carefully calibrated in terms of their frequency, scope and deliverables.

Consider “the imperative of a diplomatic effort to defuse these heightened tensions and restore peace and tranquillity” that External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in his statement to Parliament earlier this month said was his government’s effort following the 2020 transgressions. Why defusing tensions and the need to restore peace is always an Indian “imperative” but not a Chinese one is a question the Indian government has yet to answer. Instead, Indian diplomacy on China has for some time swung between extremes – either pomp and ceremony signifying little or a rather masochistic thrill in simply undergoing the ragda (Hindi slang for pointless grind, often as punishment) of endless talks as a way of proving one’s diplomatic chops rather than actually focusing on the actual outcome and its longer-term implications.

And the outcome — even as many on the Indian side crow about strategic patience and resolve having paid dividends in the form of the disengagement process underway in eastern Ladakh — is simply that the Chinese have driven down Indian expectations of a peaceful boundary resolution to an all-time low given that the problem of de-escalation has to be dealt with first. In essence, then, it is the Chinese that have shown strategic patience and resolve having forced the Indians to back down from strong positions, even if these were morally and politically justifiable ones. It is quite likely that de-escalation will now proceed even more slowly than disengagement did, if it proceeds at all.

Given that India’s lack of proactive, like-for-like responses to China’s 2020 violations of bilateral agreements on the LAC is now clear, Beijing can perhaps breathe a little easier that the front with India is not likely to pose a major threat if China were to concentrate on its other fronts with active territorial disputes. For China then, its 2020 action and the current disengagement process is effectively a case of two steps forward, one step back, and one step gained.

This reality might draw even more pressure from the Americans under Donald Trump – now stronger and more determined to follow through with his threats to adversaries and friends alike – for New Delhi to get with the larger American approach to China instead. It also risks confirming for India’s other partners similarly involved in long-standing tensions with China that New Delhi cannot be expected to intervene usefully in order to reduce Chinese pressure on them.

The writer is associate professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, and director, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR