“In olden times when the Panchayat system was the basic unit of society, these forest-dwellers had an honoured place in it. We find it mentioned… even as early as during the reign of Sri Rama.” — M S Golwalkar
“What is a village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness, caste and communalism?” — B R Ambedkar
It is easy, in the simplest sense of things, to conflate and confuse the RSS with conservative political movements, particularly in the West. It is easier still, in the current moment of its political dominance, to imagine that the power its electoral wing enjoys is a function of a fundamental evolution in the Hindutva ideology. Both assumptions, however, belie a reality that is simultaneously more simple and complex. Sarsanghchalak Mohan Bhagwat’s annual Vijayadashami speech made it clear that the much-touted “outreach” by the Sangh is not a shift in ideology or strategy. Rather, it is in service of the idea of the Indian nation (a far cry from the constitutional notion of the Indian state) as a territorial, religious entity.
Even a cursory reading of Bunch of Thoughts by the second Sarsanghchalak — and arguably the most significant “thought leader” of the RSS — M S Golwalkar will have the reader see a pattern that is all too familiar. There are invocations of “One Nation, One… (fill in the blank)”. The running theme is one of Hindu victimhood and persecution. And, perhaps most significantly, the idea of a glorious past and dominant future is scuppered only by enemies. These enemies, in “Guruji” Golwalkar’s worldview, are Western liberal ideas and people, minorities (specifically Christians and Muslims) and Communists.
Are Bhagwat’s views more evolved than Golwalkar’s? There are changes, though minimal, in terminology, but the import is the same. There is the unnamed but easily identified spectre of the foreign hand — “countries that claim to be democratic” but will “only let Bharat grow up to a certain limit”. The crisis in Bangladesh is framed largely as an assault by foreign powers, the political crisis as an attack on Hindus. This notion of “Hindus in danger” is a question of politics, not religion. Why not, for example, are Awami League supporters in danger? Or even anti-BNP forces besieged in Bangladesh? When political ideology is clouded by the hammer of religion and insecurity, every issue is the nail of persecution.
The real significance of Bhagwat’s speech (like Golwalkar’s ideology) — and its revanchism — lies not in geopolitics but in manufactured insecurity around ideas which are far from politically dominant in mainstream politics. The internal threat for Golwalkar, Communists of the old variety, have been replaced by “wokeism” and “cultural Marxists” today. “A complete destruction of values considered virtuous,” according to Bhagwat, “is the modus operandi of this group”. Woke culture, in terms of both number and political influence, is insignificant in India. But perhaps that is an underestimation based on a myopic political view. The RSS, after all, is a “cultural organisation”. Its obsession with curricula and universities — the best example is the outsize importance of JNU in the national conversation — reflects, in fact, a deeper understanding and a long-term goal.
In the words of Golwalkar, “Right from its inception, the Sangh has clearly marked out as its goal the moulding of the whole of society, and not merely any one part of it, into an organised entity.” The Sangh’s aim is not merely political power but “moulding men”. This explains why “wokeism” and “cultural Marxists”, fringe ideas even in Indian universities, whose aim is “to is to bring the mind-shaping systems and institutions of the society under one’s influence… the education system and educational institutions, media”, are mentioned by Bhagwat while the Congress party is not. The latter is a mass party, trying to figure out what the people want. For the RSS, then and now, the challenge is ideologies that transcend the hurly-burly of electoral politics.
The greatest testament to the fact that the RSS today is merely the old Hindutva with better tactics lies in its engagement with caste. For, it is in this arena of political and social life that the Sangh and BJP have shown the greatest evolution. From the celebration of Dalit, Adivasi and OBC icons — notably the attempts to appropriate the legacy of Ambedkar and Birsa Munda, among others — to the manner in which the BJP has distributed tickets, selected chief ministers and Union ministers it has shown that it is willing to include the historically marginalised.
Does the seeming “inclusion” and expansion project an ideological shift?
Throughout his speech, Bhagwat focussed on “harmony”. In the context of a caste-based agrarian economy and patriarchal family, “harmony” has always signalled the defence of a status quo. It is the refrain of the father-in-law, the upper-caste village elder, the Great Leader when he is faced with assertions of those who should “obey” him. After all, the silent obedience of the oppressed is the utopia of the oppressor. Any genuine change is viewed as an “erosion of values”. For Bhagwat, this bogey can be found in mobile phones and OTT platforms; for Golwalkar, the threat was the “permissiveness” of Western society. For both, the inclusion of the marginalised is a matter of maintaining harmony, not equality.
None of this is to say that there is no difference between the Sangh, then and now. In Golwalkar’s time, the organised Hindu Right was away from state power and its cries of victimhood — while still incredulous — were still a weapon of the relatively (politically, not socially) weak. Today, as the BJP’s dominance continues under the leadership of one of its own, the RSS’s protestations seem like even more of a champagne problem.
aakash.joshi@expressindia.com
