Maharashtra, Jharkhand election results: How BJP regained the upper hand

Three issues might be taken into account in order to understand the outcome in Maharashtra and Jharkhand and connect it to Haryana (and even to the Jammu region of J&K). Following the setback in the Lok Sabha election, the BJP seems to have made a conscious effort to insulate Prime Minister Narendra Modi from defeats. While Modi remains the mascot, the emphasis on his rallies is carefully reduced now. Rather than a shrill vote getter, his paternal role as PM is projected more prominently. Whether it was in Haryana or in Maharashtra, the PM inaugurated a number of projects. This ensured that he is seen as the benefactor. The murky polemic was unleashed not by Modi but by others in the party. This nuanced transformation of Modi’s role in the BJP’s latest electoral wars is a significant fallout of the Lok Sabha election. This strategy means that the BJP wants to protect Brand Modi from failures, although his hold on the party will continue smoothly. In other words, victory will always be attributed to Modi but he can be saved from the embarrassment of owning up to defeats.

This is a different Modi from the one we have seen since 2014. Even a cursory glance at the full-page advertisements splashed by the BJP would show that Modi is still the overarching image. His itineraries before the announcement of election show that he steers the “development” plank. But during the campaign, he shares the honours with more specifically assigned rabble rousers from the party. While getting swayed by the likes of Yogi Adityanath and Himanta Biswa Sarma, a significant proportion of voters in both Maharashtra and Jharkhand would still have thought of Modi in making their choices.

The second issue is the various schemes promised, launched and implemented by contesting parties in both states. Indeed, flagship schemes have always helped parties — incumbents in particular — to acquire an edge among the electorate. We have seen this since the launch of the employment scheme of the UPA — MNREGA. Evidence on whether such schemes, and direct transfers in particular, win elections by themselves or whether they only add to the trend that picks up in an election, is still somewhat mixed. There is no doubt that the slew of schemes implemented by state governments, with particular emphasis on direct transfers, both in Maharashtra and Jharkhand, would have helped the winning coalitions. An immediate and temporary solution to the vast economic distress seems to be the only solution that India’s political class can offer voters. Yet, it would be a big leap to argue that such direct transfers alone shape electoral outcomes. They help mainly in combination with other factors. Such schemes also allow many to convince themselves that the BJP’s successes are more about economy/governance rather than Hindutva.

Hence, the third issue that warrants attention is the determined effort by the BJP to bring shrill Hindutva to the centre stage. This is not new. But following its less-than-satisfactory performance in April-May, the party has chosen to emphasise the Hindutva message with more vigour. It is interesting to see the differential manner in which this agenda is implemented in different states. When the BJP won Haryana, much was said about its clever management of caste-based fault lines. Likewise, it will be said that in Maharashtra too, it ensured through micro-management that the deep fissures on the question of Maratha reservation did not hurt it. However, this success can be understood only if we take into account its Hindutva rhetoric.

Appending “jihad” to anything that the majority may be excited about seems to be the path adopted. Following the Lok Sabha election, “vote jihad” was projected as the next level of Muslim conspiracy to overturn the Hindus. More specifically, the BJP sought to generate a deep suspicion and hatred of the Muslim community. In Maharashtra, this was done on a sustained basis over the past few years; in Jammu, this was done using historical distance between communities; in Haryana, it was done through the electoral campaign and in Jharkhand, this was attempted through the issue of infiltration of Bangladeshis.

Maharashtra or Jharkhand are not exactly traditional bastions of Hindutva. But the party chose to focus on a negative campaign in both states based on anti-Muslim Hindutva rhetoric. This appeal had limited success in Jharkhand; it hasn’t worked much among the Adivasis, something that saved the JMM and the INDIA bloc. In contrast, the appeal to unite in order to be safe (Ek hain toh safe hain) seems to have practically swept Maharashtrian voters off their feet. For the BJP, this is one-and-a-half steps towards Hindutva.

In 2014, the BJP had already made inroads in Haryana and Maharashtra. But that success was more about Modi. This time, the BJP’s electoral sweep goes beyond Modi’s persona, signifying a deeper tendency that will be difficult to shrug off — a massive turn toward an aggressive and vicious Hindutva. This success, therefore, portends similar and more assertive Hindutva as the basis of the BJP’s future electoral campaigns. Thus, the Hindutva factor assumes significance in the larger context of how the BJP keeps building its electoral and ideological dominance.