Bangladesh should choose whether it is the Russia of 1917 or 1991.
Soon after the Russian Revolution in 1917, the purge logic had begun to set in. First, the liberals were excluded from power, followed by the socialists and eventually the communists who differed even minimally. The collapse of the Soviet Union offers an opposite case—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was banned, but the founding of a Communist Party of the Russian Federation was later allowed. It even came back to power for a brief period through an electoral route. Interestingly, the CPSU was banned for its 1991 coup attempt and not for the crimes it committed between 1917 and 1990.
Story continues below this ad
The burning question in Bangladeshi politics now is the future of the Awami League. It seems that even the ruling dispensation is divided over it. While Muhammad Yunus, the Chief Adviser of the Interim Government of Bangladesh, is apparently against a blanket ban, others have reservations.
The legitimacy of democratic elections lies in fair competition, which requires a solid opposition. Mahfuz Alam — the “main brain of the Anti-Discrimination Movement”, in Yunus’s own words — recently called for the exclusion of the Awami League from future elections in the country. His logic is that the Awami League is not a “pro-Bangladesh group”.
Alam has elsewhere spoken about the “Jamaat-e-Islami and other ‘pro-Bangladesh’ groups”. If Jamaat-e-Islami is pro-Bangladesh, then any and every Bangladeshi is. Well, it is for the people of Bangladesh to decide whether the Awami League is pro-Bangladesh or not. It cannot be preemptively decided by the current rulers of the country. Terming an established party anti-national to exclude it from the democratic process, if we go by the experience of many developing countries, does not augur well. This is something Bangladeshis can intimately verify from Pakistan’s history.
Story continues below this ad
Crime and Punishment
Supposing the Hasina government really was a ‘fascist’ one, as claimed by the budding leaders of the July uprising, there can only be a call for the prosecution of perpetrators of ‘illegitimate violence’ committed under the Hasina government. This is a herculean legal task and if proven, there is still a chain of exceptions to be dealt with—can the entire government be held responsible for the crimes of the Prime Minister? Can the ruling party be held responsible for the excesses of the government? Can an entire party be blamed for geographically specific bouts of violence? Can every member be assigned an equal share of the responsibility?
If the answer to every question turns out to be a yes, there is perhaps a case to be made for an Awami League-mukt Bangladesh. Even if banned, one cannot expect the Awami League to disappear into thin air. It is uncharacteristic for modern political parties to be liquidated easily, and without bloodshed. Even in the most adverse situations, they reemerge with cosmetic changes.
Some argue that the Awami League should be banned exactly like how Jamaat-e-Islami was banned earlier. The interim government reversed the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami, so if the Jamaat-e-Islami ban was unjustified, it would not be prudent for the new leadership of Bangladesh to repeat the same mistake as their predecessors. But in any case, the two bans are qualitatively different—we have ample evidence to say that Jamaat-e-Islami worked against the formation of Bangladesh. On the other hand, the case so far against the Awami League is coram non judice: in the absence of a judge.
The new regime is keen on building a new republic—this self-assigned importance of its project means that it cannot afford to misstep on its originary gestures. The ban on the Awami League would not only incite tensions among its cadres but also set a precedent for a Soviet-style purge mentality.
Above all, the Awami League has a vacant place to occupy in the political configuration in the country—now that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party has, according to Bangladeshi media reports, committed itself to Sharia rule in its meeting with the Islami Andolan Bangladesh, the original Mujibist spirit of ‘secular nationalism’ rests only with the Awami League.
A Mujibist Return for Awami League
The Awami League, despite its chequered history, can meaningfully contribute to the making of a democratic polity in Bangladesh. It once courageously disowned its mother organisation, the Muslim League. It may have to again courageously disown what went wrong and proudly own up to what was virtuous in its history. The Awami League stands tall within the tradition of people’s parties—or, in more common parlance, populist parties—of the 20th century, which could shape and stabilise a country. ‘Awam’ means ‘people’—and it is the People who should have the final word on the party’s existence.
There can be an Awami League without the footprint of Sheikh Hasina. The repression she unleashed towards the end of her rule was a long overstep. The Awami League must and can exorcise her spectre. But it cannot exist without upholding the legacy of Mujibur Rahman. The original virtue of Bangabandhu can be reclaimed for a rechristened Awami League—a Bangabandhu Awami League. Through a bottom-up internal democratic process, the Awami League can easily come out of Hasina’s shadow.
The Awami League’s strength lies in the fact that one cannot write off Mujibur Rahman and his party from the political history of Bangladesh unless the country is radically redefined. Founding figures, be it George Washington or Atatürk, tend to have a ghostly presence. No social revolution of that calibre has taken place in the Mujibist country, in spite of Islamist pretensions otherwise. Rewritten textbooks and a few toppled statues are not enough to kill a Founding Father.
After all, Mujibism (Mujibbad) still holds water for a developing democracy like Bangladesh. The four fundamental ideas at the heart of Mujibist politics—nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism—are deeply entrenched in the political tradition, if not in the everyday social life, of the country. A radical break from this vital tradition cannot take place without political instability, even civil war.
Truth and Reconciliation
If, at all, the Awami League is to be dissipated, it has to be routed in a free and fair democratic election, without which a new ruling dispensation in Bangladesh will not have political legitimacy. Political legitimacy and stability should be the foremost priority of all stakeholders of a new Bangladesh, not the elimination of real electoral competition. The latter would lead only to what Jürgen Habermas calls a legitimation crisis—an erosion of public trust in administrative mechanisms. Stability cannot happen without political freedom for the Awami League. “Freedom is always freedom of the dissenter”, as Rosa Luxembourg put it.
A real face-saver for Awami League would be to boycott future elections, keeping with the Bangladeshi opposition’s habits, over allegations of unfair practices. Ensuring proper elections can stop the Awami League from hiding behind such an alibi. The party should ideally exclude the tainted leaders.
most read
Bangladesh needs a political tradeoff, if one may term it as such, that ensures political freedom for a revamped Awami League, and, thereby, prosperity and political stability for the country in the long run. A transitional polity like Bangladesh, whose future hangs on attracting foreign capital, must heed Edmund Burke’s insightful framing: “All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter.”
The most sensible outcome would be for both sides to concede some ground in Burkean fashion—the interim government helps to re-legitimise a self-critical Awami League, and the League gives promises to keep away its tainted leaders. Such a deal must be brokered in the spirit of the Truth and Reconciliation process that post-apartheid South Africa adopted. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party, with its experiential wisdom, has already hinted at such a reconciliation.
Kuriakose Mathew teaches politics and international relations at P P Savani University, Surat. His research focuses on democratic forces in transitional polities. Arjun Ramachandran is a research scholar at the Department of Communication, University of Hyderabad
