For 24 days between October 1 and 25, West Asia waited for Israel’s inevitable retaliation to Iran’s ballistic missile barrage which itself was a response to Israel’s assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon (followed by the start of the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) ongoing invasion of South Lebanon). When it came, in three waves before dawn broke in Tehran, it brought with it some markers of change.
In its attack, Israel struck key air defence systems around Iranian energy sites such as those in Abadan, Bandar Imam Khomeini, and Tang-e-Bijar. Notwithstanding attacks on Iranian missile production sites such as the complexes in Parchin and Parand, Israel effectively held back from attacking what these air defence sites were guarding.
This is the first time the IDF announced the conduct and completion of an operation in Iran in real time, breaking the traditional pattern of Israeli responsibility being inferred rather than expressly claimed. The IDF’s target profile of military installations in Iran was also proportionate to Iran’s own target selection in Israel; in April, Israel’s response to Iran’s cruise missile/drone barrage was an unclaimed strike on a single Iranian air defence facility. Both aspects mark a moment (even if fleeting) in West Asia, where Iran and Israel have engaged symmetrically — conducting direct strikes on each other’s territory, downplaying their impact, and asking the other side to walk away and de-escalate. Given the military advantage that Israel holds over Iran, this exchange showed Tehran’s ability to leverage regional and global geopolitics to limit Tel Aviv’s hand.
Three crucial factors enabled this.
First, compared to Israel’s other military choices in Gaza, West Bank and Lebanon where the IDF has acted with near impunity, Washington has been relatively successful in influencing Israel’s tactical choices vis-à-vis Iran. In April, Tehran relied on the Oman-facilitated backchannel to telegraph its upcoming attack, complemented by the slow conduct of its attack, announcements in Iranian media, and broadcasts on social media — all of which made it more theatre-to-preserve-deterrence than an attack. Its advance announcement also allowed Israeli and western combined air defence to be more effective. In October, Iran used the same means to a slightly different end.
With its ballistic missile attack being more effective and without the de-escalating characteristics of April, Tehran invested heavily in increasing costs — not for Israel — but for its Arab partners and the United States (US) after its attack. Having established new red lines (nuclear installations and oil and gas fields), Iran credibly raised the spectre of attacking Arab oil fields if this red line was breached; turning the Gulf States into more active lobbyists to push Washington to stay Israel’s hand. In any case, the Houthis have a proven ability to hit Saudi and Emirati refineries. Notwithstanding murmurs of an Iranian underground nuclear test, the Biden administration secured assurances from Prime Minister Netanyahu against hitting oil and nuclear sites at least 10 days before the Israeli attack, proving the seriousness with which the US sought Israeli restraint in the face of Iran potentially burning the house down.
Second, West Asia’s geopolitical landscape has shifted tremendously since April. Just as Arab States’ aid to Israel in intercepting Iranian projectiles reflected their concerns vis-à-vis Iranian capabilities then, their refusal to grant Israel use of their airspace to attack Iran in October shows their blanket desire to stay out of any escalation. Just two days after the Iranian attack on October 1, the Gulf States had reassured Iran about their neutrality, while Iran and Saudi Arabia had engaged in dedicated bilateral talks to “boost ties and resolve differences”. While the Gulf interest in expanding ties with Israel remains, Arab States are cognisant and wary of Iran’s disruptive abilities just as they are of the open-ended nature of Israel’s ongoing and expanding military campaigns in Lebanon and Palestine, which has killed over 50,000.
Third, Iran’s objective was not to prevent an Israeli attack but to anticipate and limit its scope and scale. Having leveraged US and Arab interests, Tehran’s success would lie in preventing Israel from unleashing a decapitating strike on its critical infrastructure and ending the immediate crisis loop after absorbing a limited response. For instance, while Khamenei cautioned that the Israeli attack should neither be downplayed nor exaggerated, his senior adviser told the Financial Times a day later that Iran is open to engaging the West if it respects Iranian sovereignty. Iran’s statements reiterating that it does not seek war, while promising an “appropriate response” reflects Iran’s desire to hedge and dilute any perceived immediacy.
Iran’s rhetorical response has evolved between October 25th and today. Khamenei himself, along with other senior leaders such as Mohammadi Golpayegani (Khamenei’s chief of staff), Hossein Salami (chief of the Revolutionary Guards) threatened a “crushing response” to Israel, in the days leading up to the US elections. It is crucial to note that Iran’s attack options are not restricted to the Iran-Israel frontier. Key groups of the Iran backed Iraqi Resistance, such as the Kataib Hezbollah, have proven their ability to strike Israel.
Hence, Tehran has sufficient means to stay out of fresh direct commitment traps while Iran-backed forces elsewhere continue to bog down Israeli military and economic resources despite loss of leadership, even as a pro-engagement president (with Khamenei’s blessing) frequently asserts Iran’s desire to improve ties with the West. For instance, while the Israeli port of Eilat has reportedly already declared bankruptcy due to the Houthi-led disruption, Israel’s credit ratings have taken significant hits across the year as its war has expanded in Lebanon.
As global criticism of Israel increases, internal criticism has also become increasingly vociferous with defence minister Yoav Gallant calling Netanyahu’s war “directionless” and without a post-war plan. Consequently, as the US elections unfold, Iran retains the option to strike Israel directly again but Tehran has carved out enough space for itself to revert to strategic patience in its long-term fight against Israel and the West.
Bashir Ali Abbas is a research associate at the Council for Strategic andDefence Research, New Delhi.The views expressed are personal
