Is Bangladesh turning against Bangla nationalism?

Naturally, most of the focus in the media has gone to secularism, as its removal is a confirmation of the religious direction that Bangladesh is taking. It should, however, concern us more that “nationalism” is being deleted — this means a repudiation of the idea on which Bangladesh was founded, an idea that India rightly supported at the time through its military intervention.

Secularism and socialism haven’t been in operation in Bangladeshi society for decades now. Their deletion is, at most, only an acknowledgement of reality. The country has been officially Islamic since 1988, and Sheikh Hasina herself expressed doubts about socialism. South Asia’s easternmost outpost, to put it mildly, has long been swayed by the ascendancy of global Islam and global capital.

The Commission apparently also recommends adding the line “Bangladesh is a pluralistic, multi-nation, multi-religion, multi-language, and multi-cultural country where the coexistence and proper dignity of all communities will be ensured” [sic] in the Constitution. This is the ostensible justification for the removal of “nationalism”. Ali Riaz, the head of the commission, affirmed this logic in an interview he gave a few weeks before the recommendations, saying, it is pluralism of communities that should be protected at all costs.

Ironically, Bangladesh is among the most mono-ethnic countries in the world. There is scarcely any country in the world that doesn’t house more than one nationality or ethnicity. It may be possible for a few tribes to reject outside contact in the modern world — the Sentinelese in the Andamans come to mind — but no nation can afford to remain pure. What Ali Riaz stated is true of all nations, but he seemed to place this simple fact against nationalism. Why?

Bangladesh was not born as “Independent East Pakistan”. It took birth as something irreconcilable with a pure Islamic polity — as a nation, particularly as a Bangla nation — Bangladesh. There is a temptation to see the recent events in Bangladesh as a return to its earlier status as East Pakistan. But this is not a surrender of Bangladeshi independence, but its baptismal reformation as a new Islamic polity.

Bangladeshi nationalism is the fundamental principle that distinguishes Bangla-speaking East Pakistan from West Pakistan and the idea of Pakistan or the “Holy Land”. Nationalism is everywhere an impediment to Islamism, as the latter assigns earthly sovereignty to the Ummah. This principle is embodied mostly in the Islamic State; other organisations like Hamas and the Nation of Islam have a more pragmatic relationship with nationalism.

On the other hand, the idea of “multi” on many counts comes easily to Islamic societies. It is the ranking between the constituent parts which poses the problem. In the most extreme cases, Dhimmitude becomes the defining relation between Muslims and minorities. The assurance of pluralism is to ensure that the “believers” in Bangladesh can coexist with the “unbelievers”, in the former’s terms. This cannot happen under peaceful conditions or democratic principles.

The recommendations were supposedly made after long consultations with various experts and representatives of the people. But, notably, none of the major parties have commented on the recommendations. Some of the small left-wing parties have condemned the proposal, but they gave some status-quoist statements about the importance of defending secularism and socialism — relevant in pre-2024 Bangladesh. One gets the sense that the larger, smarter parties are testing the political vibes before deciding what position to take.

The likely impetus for the change is thus not a positive project but a recognition of the falling out of grace of the three principles. Despite clothing themselves in nationalist rhetoric, one part of the July uprising seemed to have understood that the nationalist sentiment had run out of steam in Bangladesh. They sensed that society minds religion more than the nation now.

The Islamist wing would be delighted at this development, whereas the middle-class wing might be keen to downplay or explain it away.

There are two other strange aspects to this episode. Firstly, there is no significant debate about it in Bangladeshi print media. Imagine secularism being deleted from the Indian constitution—and no newspaper questions it. The very suggestion provoked heated responses from various quarters in the recent past.

This curious silence of Bangladeshi public intellectuals can be chalked to a key feature of the Islamic public sphere. Within this space, moderate Muslims tend to talk to and think of fellow Muslims only in the most benevolent terms, consistently countering allegations of extremism against them. If any Islamic group does something indefensible, then their response is to denounce that group on behalf of the rest of the Muslim community.

Their attitude is one of complicity by silence and distraction. It is possible that they genuinely are unable to comprehend the problems of Islamic majoritarianism, but in any case, they represent the same majoritarianism.

But this does not explain the second feature that Riaz is an expert on Islamism, secularism and nationalism. It is inconceivable that he has missed the significance of dropping the principle of nationalism. His personal trajectory from a scholar of Islamism to a rubber stamp for Islamists is indeed surprising, and we might know more about how it happened only as pertinent details slowly emerge.

But Mohammed Yunus, in particular, is unlikely to be an Islamist because of his professional background — he thrives on the credit industry, a typically haram profession in most doctrinaire versions of Islam. To become an Islamist, he would likely have to repudiate his entire career, at least in front of his new comrades. It would also be deeply ironic if Yunus ends up paving the path for an Islamist government that could deem the microfinance sector in Bangladesh as un-Islamic. Yunus tried to downplay the communal attacks in Bangladesh. It will be interesting to see how he negotiates this new hurdle without hurting his own standing.

Arjun Ramachandran is a research scholar at the Department of Communication, University of Hyderabad

Kuriakose Mathew teaches politics and international relations at P P Savani University, Surat