As the US goes to polls, the outcome will be closely watched by the world. To what extent does it matter for India who makes it to the White House?
Commentary about the US elections and India has largely stressed that the outcome does not matter, or that, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump wins, the situation will be the same for India. Delhi is probably less worried about the outcome — and might be less directly affected by it — than several other countries, especially American allies. However, who is sitting in the White House will shape the global and regional situation in which India is operating, the emphases in US policy towards India, the options available to Delhi, and the approach it will need to take.
For all the noise surrounding India-US relations, the signal has been clear over the last quarter century. America has become an increasingly “indispensable” partner, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi put it, for achieving India’s goals. It is crucial to the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, a key military, defence, industrial and technology partner, a major trading partner and investor, a source of oil, gas and coal, a clean energy partner, a significant source of education, skilling, jobs and remittances, the home to over a million Indian citizens, and a partner on the global stage.
This is why the last few Indian prime ministers, despite certain differences with America, have invested in ties with the US. And this is why South Block will watch the election outcome closely.
A US administration’s approach to India does not come down to the oft-discussed “is the president or particular cabinet member pro- or anti-India?” It is a blend of several interacting elements. These include the principal, and the prism through which he or she views the world. That shapes the personnel they appoint, the priorities the administration pursues, and the policies that materialise.
The election outcome matters because the nature and blend of those elements that emerge will be different. Structural factors are no doubt significant, and a Kamala Harris or a Donald Trump administration might even share some top-line ideas. But their specific bilateral, regional and global approaches will differ in ways that affect India. For instance, even if great power rivalry persists, Harris and Trump will not have the same approach to allies and partners, or view of China-Russia ties. Or, even if de-risking persists, the mix of reshoring, nearshoring and friendshoring will be dissimilar.
A big question for Delhi with either candidate will be how much of the Biden administration’s worldview and approach they will maintain, particularly vis-à-vis China and the Indo-Pacific. The Biden years have been transformational for the India-US relationship, especially in the defence, economic security and technology domains. And Delhi will want to see that continue.
That is related to an overarching point: While Indian policymakers will care about Harris or Trump’s approach toward bilateral ties and minilateralism (especially the Quad), the next administration’s China policy might be of even greater weight in their calculations. Why? Because of India’s own rivalry with China and the extent to which strategic convergence has driven India-US cooperation and incentivised both to manage differences.
With a potential Harris administration, questions will revolve around the extent of policy continuity or change from the Biden administration, especially given the likely change in senior personnel. Issues of interest to India will be whether and how she prioritises the Indo-Pacific; to what extent her approach to China remains competitive; the willingness to deepen cooperation with India in key domains and geographies (including West Asia and Africa); her approach to the Russia-Ukraine war; the way differences, for example on Bangladesh, are handled; and how much a Harris administration will focus on the values-pillar of the relationship. The latter had also been an Indian concern about an incoming Biden administration four years ago.
With a potential Trump administration, Delhi will hope it will take a competitive approach to China as it did after summer 2017 and continue with related Biden initiatives (even if they are renamed). It also likely believes that Trump would bring the Russia-Ukraine war to a quicker end, and hopes that he won’t focus on the state of Indian democracy and human rights (even if his evangelical Christian voters care about religious freedom in India).
Delhi, however, will be concerned about his volatility and transactionalism. Questions will particularly revolve around whether Trump will seek a deal with Xi Jinping due to his own or his business backers’ preferences, and the extent of his commitment to ensuring a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and competing with China on the global stage. Additionally, India will have to grapple with potential tariffs, emphasis on reshoring rather than friendshoring, uncertain fate of G2G clean-energy cooperation, and the possible reluctance vis-à-vis or higher price for technology cooperation. Tougher immigration policies related to high-skilled visas, international student work permits, or the undocumented Indian migrants will also be of concern.
Any particular Indian policymakers’ preference for one or the other outcome will depend on their own priority issue. But the type of result will affect the approach India takes — and the adjustments it will need to make — not just towards the president and various American stakeholders, but other powers as well.
The writer is Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
