The agreement to resume patrolling along the earlier perceived Line of Actual Control between India and China in 2020 is a welcome step. This means that the Indian troops will be able to patrol up to places they used to before the 2020 stand-off.
The agreement reportedly talks about a move towards disengagement in two major remaining friction points of Depsang Plains and Demchok, which the Chinese side had even refused to discuss. However, it is difficult to judge the full significance of the agreements in the absence of more detail.
Many places in Eastern Ladakh became disputed over time as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intruded into areas claimed by India or vice versa. While the LAC is not well defined, out of the total 65 defined patrolling points (PPs), about 11 have been disputed since May 2020.
In Sirijap range on the north bank of Pangong, the disengagement agreement had been reached in February 2021, and the status quo ante of April 20, 2020 was restored. Similarly, after the Indian Army thwarted the PLA’s provocative move to capture the Kailash Heights in September 2020, peace was restored after both sides agreed to disengage/de-escalate from the north and south of the Pangong Tso-Chushul area in February 2021.
PLA’s intrusions in Galwan Valley, Changlung Nalla, Hot Springs, and Kongrung Nalla of Changchenmo Valley, where it had created an area-denial for Indian troops have been relatively peaceful after both sides agreed to disengage in June 2020.
The situation remained stalemated in the Depsang and Demchok areas despite 21 rounds of Corps Commander-level meetings. The friction points in Depsang pre-dated the 2020 stand-off. PLA has been making offensive moves from Track Junction Nallah to the south at Burtse/Depsang Plains since 2009 and built a 30 km road from Raki Nallah in 2011 to cut into the Depsang Plains.
The new agreement suggests that the PLA will not block Indian troops from the bottleneck and they can now patrol up to PPs 10 to 13, which is quite unlikely given the PLA, in the last four years, has built a huge infrastructure in the Depsang plains. Recent high-resolution satellite imagery shows a colossal amount of new settlements in the Pangong area. It is unlikely that the Chinese will dismantle their defensive/offensive positions set up after 2020.
In Demchok, the PLA has been violating LAC at the Charding-Nilung Nalla (CNN) junction, where it has pitched two tents since 2018, obstructing Indian patrolling to that point. The dispute is stalemated. It is difficult to figure out what kind of caveats have been added in the new patrolling agreement and whether Indian troops will now patrol Charding La Pass as was done before 2020. It must be about setting some symbolic adjustment in patrolling or an understanding that both sides will not patrol the CNN points.
Importantly, in the absence of proper disengagement, any form of patrolling will be difficult. Patrolling is aggressive in its form. It’s about gaining area dominance and unless complete disengagement and de-escalations take place, peace and tranquillity along the LAC will remain tentative.
Given the kind of intensive militarisation and infrastructure built up on both sides over the last four years, a complete military rollback in Ladakh will remain elusive. India, too, has shored up its defences in forward areas.
These cannot be demobilised without a clear strategic understanding. The 260 km long Shayok-DBO road has given Indian troops a major advantage in terms of domination of Depsang Plains, and distant areas, boosting their morale to operate in this extremely difficult area. Our aviation infrastructure has also been equally upgraded in the DBO and Nyoma sectors. This is one of the key reasons that may have forced China now to react differently.
In all, one cannot deny that the Indian military responses have denied China a strategic victory since 2020. Beijing has been made to realise the cost of engaging in misadventures. It is, however, difficult to term it as a breakthrough. The Chinese claims in this area are strategic as they would continue to move incrementally and tactically on the ground. They are unlikely to roll back their land grab so easily.
We do not know what is in store. Patrolling without disengagement is a difficult proposition. Details can be expected only after the potential Modi-Xi bilateral meeting in Russia. Essentially, it is about creating the basis for returning to peace and tranquillity along the border that existed before 2020.
A move towards de-escalation and de-militarisation will be contingent on the overall improvement in bilateral relations. In 2017, the Doklam standoff was resolved ahead of the BRICS summit. The Galwan standoff was resolved during the SCO summit in 2022. The announcement this time, too, appeared more of an optics ahead of the BRICS Summit to prepare the ground for a meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping in Kazan.
There is no question about achieving a breakthrough or trust between India and China. The issue is about each other’s interests. The Chinese may have achieved some strategic and military successes through the boundary standoffs in Ladakh but New Delhi has shown it can deal with the situation through its diplomatic fortitude and maturity. Given that each country has other geopolitical and economic issues to deal with, India and China have tried to find an honourable exit and reset ties.
The new agreement on patrolling rights appears to be about modifying the norms and orders, adding some new protocols, scheduling, patrolling troop strength, frequency, and coordination between military commanders.
In any case, patrolling along the LAC will come to a halt once winter sets in. The deployment of troops will also be thinned down. Hopefully, there will be a better chance to work on complete disengagement during this period.
Both sides should grasp fresh opportunities to revive the stalled process of strategic dialogue at the Summit level. Until then, the areas along the LAC will remain tense.
The writer is a former diplomat and senior fellow at the Delhi Policy Group
