The clamour of considerable land being lost to China in eastern Ladakh is political hyperbole — an agenda-driven narrative to bolster electoral prospects on national security grounds. The issue was raised in August last year by Congress leader Rahul Gandhi but no studies or expertise are available to verify such claims.
Ladakh certainly has been and will continue to remain a serious flashpoint. There are no borders here except a 1,597 km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC), a notional demarcation separating India and China since 1962. Even the LAC is not well defined. Both countries have differing perceptions. The patrolling is done till 65 earmarked Patrol Points (PPs) stretching from Karakoram to Chumur. The recent dispute points occurred at PP9, 10, 11, 12, 12A and 13 in Depsang, PP14 in Galwan, PP15 and PP16 in Hot Springs/ Chang Chenmo, and PP17 and 17A in Gogra.
Chushul-Pangong Sector
In the Chushul-Pangong sector, the situation in the Sirijap range on the north bank of Pangong, where Finger series 1 to 8 jut out, is stable. In May 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered the Finger 3-4 area to prevent Indian troops from patrolling. After the disengagement agreement in February 2021, the status quo prior to May 2020 is being restored.
Kailash Range
In the Kailash range, the PLA’s provocative move in early September 2020 to capture Nyanlung Yokma/Gongma or the Kailash Heights, at an altitude of 15,000 feet located between Pangong Tso and Spanggur Gap, was foiled by the Indian Army in a major pre-emptive strategic manoeuvring. Peace was restored after both sides agreed to disengage from north and south Pangong Tso in February 2021.
Chang Chenmo Valley
PLA’s intrusions in Galwan Valley, Changlung Nalla, Hot Springs and Kongrung Nalla of Chang Chenmo Valley, where it had created area denial for Indian troops, are also relatively peaceful now. Both sides agreed to disengage in June 2020.
The situation in the Gogra-Hot Springs area remained volatile until September 8, 2022, when both sides agreed to disengage. There are no forward deployments in this area though a buffer zone is being created with new patrolling norms. All temporary structures have been dismantled. However, the situation in the PP15 area remains tense as China is still adamant about restoring the pre-April 2020 position.
Depsang and Demchok
Currently, only Depsang and Demchok remain points of friction, predating the 2020 stand-off. Since 2009, the PLA has frequently made offensive moves from Track Junction Nallah to the south at Burtse/Depsang Plains. In 2011, PLA built a 30 km road from Raki Nallah to cut into the Depsang Plains. In 2013, Burtse became a flashpoint when the PLA set up remote camps 18-19 km inside Indian Territory, preventing Indian patrolling from PP10, PP11, PP12 and PP13. The Shyam Saran Report of August 2013 made a chilling revelation of India having lost 640 sq km area due to “area denial” by the PLA.
Since 2019, the PLA has blocked the Bottleneck area, restricting India’s patrolling limits to PP10 and PP11. The Chinese road construction along Jeevan Nallah towards the south, adjacent to our Murgo post, could potentially cut off the Indian supply line to the DBO at Murgo, like in the case of Galwan. Experts suggest that the Chinese are in control of 600-800 sq km of the southern half of Depsang Plains. The situation here remains complicated and deadlocked. Therefore, complete disengagement has been elusive.
In Demchok, the PLA has been violating LAC at Charding-Nilung Nallah (CNN) junction since 2018, obstructing Indian patrolling to that point. The dispute is stalemated.
As for Ladakhi Changpas losing grazing ground, their movements were restricted along the LAC because of heavy militarisation by the Chinese as well as Indian armies. India has shored up its defences, inducting several reinforcements, including artillery brigades, after the 2013 Depsang episode.
Infrastructure upgrades
One cannot overlook the fact that infrastructure in eastern Ladakh has been ramped up in recent years. Earlier, the Chinese bullied and coerced India because of the latter’s lax attitude and grabbed a chunk of Ladakh territory between the 1960s and 1990s. The situation has changed now. India had stepped up construction activities under the UPA government but the projects were mired in corruption and scams. The BJP government has fast-tracked the connectivity projects, including the 260 km long Shyok-DBO road that was completed on a war footing. DBO can be reached from Dorbuk in eight hours now, which gives Indian troops a major advantage in the difficult terrain.
India’s growing dominance in far-flung areas has been one of the key factors that forced the PLA to react differently, accusing India of transgressions on the LAC and provoking the Galwan stand-off in 2020.
Our aviation infrastructure has also been upgraded after reactivating all the abandoned Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) at DBO, Fukche, and Nyoma. The Nyoma ALG is being upgraded into a full-fledged airfield capable of operating cargo as well as fighter jets. This will boost the security of eastern Ladakh apart from the economic development of the Changthang region.
Fitting response to Chinese aggression
In all, one cannot deny that the Indian forces gave a fitting response to premeditated Chinese aggression and denied China a strategic victory in 2020. Beijing has been made to realise the cost of engaging in misadventures.
Certainly, the LAC situation remains in a stalemate, although the 21st round of Corps Commander-level meetings was held in February to reduce tension in the region.
The accusation of losing massive areas, therefore, is a gross exaggeration. Technically, there has been no intrusion on our side of the LAC. The discrepancies have occurred only in the grey-zone patrolling areas due to differences in LAC perception. Both sides should grasp fresh opportunities to revive the stalled process of clarifying the LAC after the new government is formed in New Delhi.
The author is president, Ladakh International Centre, Leh
