For starters, the agreement needs to be implemented on the ground, with patrolling becoming normalised. (File photo)
Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s announcement of an agreement between India and China on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) indicates the beginning of a new round of high-stakes diplomacy between the two Asian giants. Addressing the media on Monday, Misri said that the agreement had led to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in 2020. He added: “We will be taking the next steps on this.” Subsequently, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar underscored the significance of the deal, stating that “we have gone back to the 2020 position” and that “disengagement with China has been completed.” While the agreement seems to be a positive outcome, details are sketchy. One must, therefore, maintain a sense of cautious optimism.
First, there has, thus far, been no comment from the Chinese side on a patrolling deal. This will come in due time, and it will be worth watching how Beijing frames the agreement. Second, it is unclear whether the current agreement implies that the buffer zones created over the past four years across several friction points will cease to exist. Some reporting has indicated that this is the logical conclusion of an agreement that restores patrolling rights. However, a formal clarification from the government would be useful in this regard. Third, there needs to be greater clarity on whether patrolling will take place based on earlier standard operating procedures or whether there is a new SOP under this agreement.
Fourth, it is important to examine Beijing’s incentives to concede on the issue of patrolling rights at this time, given that there has been little progress in talks since the last disengagement from Patrolling Point 15 in September 2022. It has been evident for some time that for all the sabre-rattling, keeping the peace with India is also in China’s interest. China faces an increasingly adverse external environment and economic uncertainty at home. However, the choice of this moment — with tensions heightened in the Taiwan Strait since the election of Lai Ching-te and the US elections around the corner — to agree on a deal is curious, to say the least. In addition, one wonders what, if any, is the quid pro quo that has been agreed upon. This was indicated in Jaishankar’s remarks about India also having blocked Chinese patrols in certain areas since 2020. In any case, the arrangements will likely become apparent in due course of time as further details of the agreement become known.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the announcement is just the first step in a long process of normalisation of the situation along the boundary areas. For starters, the agreement needs to be implemented on the ground, with patrolling becoming normalised. Thereafter, disengagement must be followed by de-induction and demobilisation of troops on both sides. There is no indication that this is imminent. Doing so will require trust-building over a period of time. Moreover, there are significant infrastructure changes that have taken place closer to the LAC over the past four years. It is highly unlikely that these will be rolled back by either side any time soon. Going ahead, it is likely that both sides are going to continue to build infrastructure and military capacity along the boundary. This, along with the use of new technological tools is reshaping the dynamics and requires a rethinking of border management protocols.
Regardless, the announcement of the agreement sets the stage for a possible meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia. If such a meeting were to take place, it would be the first formal engagement between the two leaders since October 2019. Perhaps, the meeting will yield greater clarity on how both sides are likely to move forward on the boundary issue along with providing direction for the evolution of the broader relationship. The latter requires greater imagination on both sides, placing the relationship within a larger strategic context, deepening understanding of each other’s interests and policies, clarifying red lines and cooperating where interests coincide. This will take time and patience. Moreover, given the experience of summitry with China over the past decade and the structural fault lines between the two sides, it would be prudent to keep expectations low.
Kewalramani is Fellow, China Studies and chairs the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at Takshashila Institution
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First uploaded on: 22-10-2024 at 12:58 IST
