In a recent interview, Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin told Reuters that the Myanmar junta is “losing strength” in the ongoing internal conflict. This was perhaps the first comment by a head of foreign government on where Myanmar’s junta stands today in the country’s crisis that was triggered by the 2021 coup.
Beginning late last year, as the anti-regime forces made military headway on the ground, the National Unity Government (NUG), the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) as well as political activists and journalists, both inside and outside Myanmar, have claimed that the days of the junta were numbered. The resistance forces even began envisioning a new political structure for the country in a post-junta scenario.
A debilitated junta?
Some recent developments have buttressed the perception that the junta is today a debilitated force. The Myanmar State Administration Council (SAC) or the junta, has lost control of military bases, outposts and townships across the country. The latest was the important border town of Myawaddy in Karen state – one of the main border crossings between Myanmar and Thailand.
On February 10, the junta revived the conscription policy and began implementing it last month. The forced conscription policy is to address the challenges of finding recruits. However, the imposition of mandatory military services has backfired as it angered the people, especially the youth.
In another desperate move, the junta tried to demonstrate that it was serious about the ethnic peace process. Last month, seven of the 10 ethnic armed organisations that signed the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement formed a new alliance to continue peace talks with the regime, apparently at the junta’s instruction. The move was also probably to keep these EAOs away from the anti-regime forces.
Challenges for the military, this time around
Against this backdrop, it may be useful to assess the junta’s strength. Historically, the junta has derived its power from three sources that it has often relied on during a crisis. The junta’s control over these has been weakening since the 2021 coup.
Myanmar’s military regime has ruled the country using institutional structures it created to serve itself. One such structure at the local level is the Department of General Administration (GAD), which successive military regimes have relied on to suppress and oppress local communities and to keep track of any threats to military rule.
Today, in several Bamar-majority regions, the GAD structures have collapsed and the resistance forces have set up their own local administration. It is unlikely the junta will regain control of the lost ground at the local level soon.
Myanmar’s military has been facing a crisis of morale following humiliating defeats on multiple fronts. Battlefield deaths, defections, desertions and low recruitment rates have been weakening the military in recent years, especially after the 2021 coup. Shortfalls in the junta combat troops and boosting confidence will remain challenges for the junta.
Despite the military’s dwindling strength, it is unlikely that the junta will be dislodged in major cities such as Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon and Mandalay primarily because the junta is still more powerful militarily and can defend these major cities.
Although there are voices against the junta within the Buddhist clergy, who played a prominent role in Burmese political history, this time around, the monks have played a peripheral role. Although the relationship between the ultra-Buddhist nationalists and the junta remains strong, it has failed to divide the unity of the resistance forces against their common enemy — the military regime.
The weakening power of the gun
Despite its losses, the junta is more powerful than its opponents in weaponry. Some observers believe that given this power equation, the junta might be willing to buy time to let the anti-regime forces run its course. The junta may look for signs of crack or weakness in the resistance forces to strike back. In such a scenario, the junta would hope to remain a key player in shaping the future of Myanmar.
Even as the anti-junta forces have begun to move into the power centres of the junta with the recent drone attacks on the country’s capital city, Nay Pyi Taw and Pyin Oo Lwin, where the Defence Services Academy is located, it is premature to suggest that the anti-regime forces’ rapid successes on the battlefields will repeat elsewhere. Hence, a scenario where one side emerges victorious on the battlefield looks doubtful as of today.
That the junta has been losing battles even with a much larger arsenal is a sign that the power of the gun may not decide the outcome of the ongoing crisis. Should some military generals conclude that the outcome of the conflict will not be decided on the battlefield and discard the idea of endless fighting, a rebellion within the junta cannot be ruled out, though there is no sign of such a possibility as yet.
As the conflict on the battlefield in Myanmar stands today, there will be no winner in the foreseeable future. The Thai Prime Minister’s suggestion that it may be the right time to enter and strike a “deal” with the junta is an option for external actors, but it is the people of Myanmar who will decide their political future. Myanmar’s leaders will have to realise sooner rather than later that further escalation of conflict will only cause more human suffering without a solution at the end of it.
The writer is a Senior Fellow and Editor at Asian Confluence, a Shillong-based public policy think tank.
