HT Interview: ‘Musharraf was a good commando but a bad strategist’, says General Ved Prakash Malik

How do you look back on the Kargil war after 25 years?

It was a very challenging event. It had a lot of surprise in it. Even during the war, the then Prime Minister (Atal Bihari Vajpayee) was quite shaken up. He kept sending his interlocutor, RK Mishra, to Pakistan till the middle of June to figure out why this had happened after the Lahore declaration barely three months earlier. The military was also taken by surprise because there were no intelligence reports with us, either from the Intelligence Bureau or from RAW (Research & Analysis Wing). In fact, they had negated the likelihood of any aggression or war to be initiated by Pakistan.

We were also weak in our surveillance along the Line of Control. The gaps between our posts were anything between 9 km and 40km. In the peak of winter, patrolling gets affected in that area. Back then, we didn’t have the gadgetry that we have today, no surveillance drones, no satellite imagery, no radar and not even night-vision devices. So, it came as a big surprise and a challenge.

When exactly did you grasp the intent and scale of Pakistan’s Kargil operation?

In the May of 1999, I was on an official visit to Poland and the Czech Republic. Towards the end of it, in the Czech Republic, we were having breakfast with the ambassador and he told to me that newspapers in Pakistan are reporting that they have captured part of the Line of Control in Kargil area. Immediately, I rang up the army headquarters in Delhi. Everyone, from the top to the corps commander in the Kargil area, took it as an intrusion by the jihadis (terrorists) in black salwar-kameez, and not by the Pakistan Army.

Even after I returned, my first briefing was that these were terrorists who will be flushed out. The defence minister had gone into that area. He was also told not to worry. It was a good deception plan on the part of Pakistan.

When I went to the ground soon after returning to India, I asked my people, ‘look, terrorists never behave in a manner in which we see here. They don’t hold ground. We have different rules of engagement for them; we have been dealing with them for years. We can’t use heavy weapons against them.’ By that time, we had reports of people holding ground over a stretch of 100km along the LoC. On May 21, I briefed the cabinet committee on security that the situation is far more serious than everybody had been thinking.

How did Pakistan spring such a nasty surprise that in a way highlighted India’s intelligence failure?

First, we must understand why they (Pakistan) did it. Pervez Musharraf was a brigadier in the 1980s when he tried to recapture some of our posts in the Siachen sector, but failed miserably. So, as a brigadier he was hurt that he had failed and he lost a number of people. Then at one stage when he became major general or lieutenant general, he had spoken to then Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto about carrying out an attack in these areas. She literally told him not to be a fool.

In October 1998, the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appointed him as Pakistan’s army chief when he was number three in the pecking order. Once appointed chief, he thought now was the time to prove himself and ensure they get back Siachen and some of these posts.

Having been in their military operations directorate, he knew the area quite well. He found this was the easiest place to carry out an intrusion. They started patrolling our area during the peak of winter and set up patrol bases in February 1999, but suffered casualties because of heavy storms and avalanches. Subsequently, they tried to brief the then Prime Minister (Sharif) and told him this will help him in negotiations with India.

Musharraf was in China in May-end when he had a telephonic conversation (with Sharif) that we were able to intercept. Nawaz Sharif being a political man didn’t quite understand the implications. The Pakistan army had not adequately briefed him.

What was the degree of difficulty in fighting back the intruders holding ground on the Indian side of the LoC?

The difficulty was tremendous at an altitude of 14,000 to 20,000 feet. You require acclimatisation. At that time, this area was not covered as a high-altitude terrain. For whatever reasons, the government was not accepting to give the same kind of concessions and equipment as we had in Siachen. We were short of winter clothing and did not have adequate weapons and equipment. A few years earlier, the army was forced to go under 70% of equipment, what we call the bottom line. The government had indicated that it did not have adequate money for import. Manmohan Singh was the finance minister when he told the then chief that don’t ask for anything for 2-3 years and subsequently, we will provide you with what you need. But that never happened.

In the meantime, the army headquarters raised 30 Rashtriya Rifle battalions without equipment because that sanction was not there. So, regular battalions had to feed them with their weapons and equipment. What we had got further thinned.

At that time, there were sanctions on us because of the nuclear weapons test that we had done at Pokhran in May 1998. So, all these countries, they were not on talking terms with us, literally. Even orders (from international markets) for major repairs didn’t come. Once war starts, you can’t wait for something to come to you. At a press conference in Delhi, when I was asked about lack of weapons and equipment, I had said: We shall fight with whatever we have.

What was the turning point of the war?

Initially, we were using the rules of engagement against the terrorists and the brigade commander would send troops to the top of Tololing and other peaks. Soldiers had no information and we suffered casualties. It’s only when our attack failed at Tololing that we had to pump in more troops. By this time, I had already ordered one division to move from the Kashmir valley to this area. The 8th Mountain Division had taken control. I told the new GOC (general officer commanding), take your time but don’t go unprepared. We should be fully prepared. Till the middle of June, we suffered casualties. It’s only after we captured Tololing and the Three Pimple ridge line, it gave me confidence that our boys will do what’s required. After that there was no stopping us.

As the only limited conventional war in the last quarter century, how has Kargil reshaped India’s defence doctrine?

Till the time of General K Sundarji and K Subrahmanyam, one of our foremost strategists, the thought process was that two nuclear nations won’t go to war. That was certainly happening in Europe. But Kargil proved that below the nuclear threshold, we could have a limited war. So, now people have started thinking about limited or border or hybrid wars. One of the reasons Pakistan took this plunge was that they thought now we are two nuclear nations and the Indian Army can’t react. But that thinking was disproved.

There were questions on a high toll of 527 men that the Indian army suffered to regain its own territory.

That’s a fact. In actual war, because of bullets and shelling, we suffered 468 casualties. But there were casualties on account of other factors like the high altitude and accidents. Whoever died in that area for whatever reason was given full benefit. Had we been permitted to go across the LoC, the casualties would have been higher. Towards the end when I was not agreeing to a ceasefire, the PM (Vajpayee) was insisting, ‘why not?’

It was July 11 or 12, we had three meetings that day, just three of us, including (then national security adviser) Brajesh Mishra.PM said they (Pakistan) are begging. By that time, Sharif was back from the US. I said so many of our men have got killed.If I agree, my own people will question me. Toward the end of the second meeting, he told me that right now, the international community is on our side and we have achieved our aim. In the third meeting, he reminded there would be more casualties if we continue and escalate. I couldn’t deny that. It was an interim government and elections were to be held.

Ultimately, I agreed but with the condition that Pakistan will withdraw the way we tell them to. By this time, we had recaptured almost 90% of the area.

What were Pakistan’s tactical and strategic objectives behind the Kargil gambit? It did succeed in putting Kashmir in an international spotlight.

Tactically, I would say, they did well. They are good soldiers. They came the way they were told, suffered the winter, had casualties. Musharraf was a good commando but a bad strategist. Kashmir was in the spotlight, that’s right. But by this time, the international community, including China (though not openly), was supporting us. Sharif signed an agreement with then US President Bill Clinton on July 4, accepting they will withdraw from the other side of the LoC. The world community started thinking that the LoC is as good as a border. It’s a de facto border. That notion got strengthened.

You admitted intelligence failure. What were the deficiencies in the military infrastructure?

The joint intelligence committee (JIC) chairman gets inputs from representatives of all intelligence committees. There was no input to the military intelligence from the JIC. Both RAW and the IB inputs negated the possibility of a war. The army’s capability is primarily what we gather while patrolling the LoC. Patrolling was restricted at that time and helicopters used to fly over the area, but they couldn’t make out from that height as everything was covered with snow.The thinking was that Pakistan may do small mischief but can’t bring large forces through the area. But there were a few cases of poor coordination within the division in that area which came to my notice later. The IB has been challenging my statement that we had no intelligence. They talk about a letter of June 2, 1998, signed by then IB director Shyamal Datta to the PM’s secretariat, the home and defence ministries that there’s a collection of terrorists 50-60km on the other side opposite Kargil.

I’ll give you reasons why I’m saying there was no intelligence.

First, the Kargil review committee report categorically said nobody knew about what’s happening on the other side. No institution, no individual. Second, I got hold of the minutes of a meeting conducted by a senior Pakistan army commander to brief US people in which he says there were no terrorists in the area. Third, they are talking about a letter of June 2, 1998, while Musharraf took over Pakistan army in October ’98. How did IB know that after he takes over, he would do this? Lastly, in his book With Four Prime Ministers, Jarnail Singh, the joint secretary to the PM at that time, has written that Brajesh Mishra asked him to find the letter from intelligence agencies, but he but couldn’t find any such letter. There’s no point if I can’t speak the truth 25 years after the war.

What went into India’s game plan to not cross the LoC and avoid an escalation? In hindsight, was it a prudent decision?

Wars take place because of political reasons. If we had escalated, which we were prepared for, we would have had more casualties and probably would have captured some areas. We (India) were seen as not the ones to take aggressive action, more reactive than proactive. I’m not saying yes or no. There are pros and cons either way.

How is India better prepared now?

Your war capabilities are based on your economy and technology. Today, vis-a-vis Pakistan, we are a 10 times bigger economy and way ahead technology wise. Secondly, today we have better weapons and equipment, including surveillance devices. But when it comes to China, we are still behind. We are working on that in terms of building infrastructure and communication. More importantly, we have started manufacturing things ourselves. Earlier, we were totally dependent on others.The political thinking has also changed. We have become proactive.

What has changed in the geostrategic calculus since India adopted a muscular offensive defence by undertaking surgical strikes and the Balakot bombing?

Military wise, a strategy is complete only if you look at both the offensive and defensive parts. Political thinking must be there. It’s not that we did not have any surgical strikes earlier. In my time, we have done it so many times. I have awarded people for covert operations. But we did not tell the political authorities because then they would start asking questions. As a military man, you can’t really tie my hands. We have to be aggressive.

Pakistan-backed terror has now found a new theatre in the Jammu region, south of Pir Panjal?They (Pakistan) won’t wage a war against us. But they will continue with this kind of terrorism. For them, it’s a cheap option. They don’t get killed. So, the thinking that we will stop it (terrorism) completely may not be practical. They will shift places depending on where they think there is a weak area. Kashmir is becoming difficult for them to operate so they are trying to spread out in the Jammu region. We will have to continue to undertake counter-terrorism measures. I don’t see that stopping for the next so many years.

What are the key lessons from the Kargil war?

Strategically, we have to be always prepared for war. You can’t be surprised the way we were. We were lucky and a lot of credit goes to our youngsters who fought that war. You can’t say I will give you weapons at the time of the war. It’s of no use then. Secondly, you can’t be only reactive. You have to be proactive and show your aggressiveness.

The Kargil Review Committee made a raft of recommendations. Were they implemented?

It recommended the chief of defence staff (CDS) but that was accepted by the present government after 20 years. Some reorganisation was carried out in the defence ministry, but two things have not happened yet. One is the synergy expected between the military and the bureaucracy has still not happened. They have differences, we can see sitting outside. The synergy we expected after the CDS about the theatre command, it’s yet to be achieved. We’ve been slow in implementation. There should be a unified command. That’s the best way to fight.

War can take place suddenly so keep the military top leadership in the loop on decision-making on national security issues. You can’t say now here is a crisis, let’s call them in. We all have to work with forward thinking and prepare our contingency plans.

After Kargil, you often rued the lack of strategic culture in the country. What has changed?

t’s changing but our handicap is that none of our present leadership or bureaucracy, the decision-makers, have gone anywhere near a war. They don’t know what’s required or how the army functions.

Do we need a national security policy?

We need it because your defence policy will flow out of the national security policy. We have tried to have one here, I was a member of the national security advisory board after retirement. But for some reason they are not making it public. It should be made public so that everybody knows about its role to some extent. For example, we can’t have an ad-hoc decision that we will go and help Sri Lanka or Maldives or Mauritius. It must be in the public mind that this area is strategically important and we have to dominate it. It shouldn’t come as a surprise.

India and China are engaged in a tense stand-off in eastern Ladakh for four years. What are the chances of India facing a two-front war?

That probability exists. Pakistan is already getting weapons and full intelligence from China which supporting Islamabad’s strategy of terrorism. A number of times we wanted them to vote against these jihadi leaders at the United Nations but China came in the way. Ultimately the decision on how much the two sides get involved will be taken by the Chinese and not by the Pakistanis. There are certain areas…Kashmir is one because the border is not resolved. Siachen Glacier is where both the countries meet; so the probability of a two-front war can’t be ruled out. We have to be prepared.

It’s been two years since the Agnipath scheme was launched. What is your take on it?

Four years in service may be too short a time. The 31-week training is fine but four years to indoctrinate a person with the kind of ethos we have in the armed forces is less, particularly for training in technical arms. Today, there’s so much sophistication in weapons and equipment that this period is not sufficient. First, four-year service needs to be extended. Second, the 25% (absorption in the forces) is too less. This should be increased to 50% retention. For technical units, we may increase it further.Third, the government must ensure and make it mandatory that 75% who come out get jobs.

What’s the most searing memory of Kargil that you still carry?

A day before we went to capture Three Pimples, I spoke with commanding officer of the attack party and wished him good luck. The next morning I got to know that we had lost three officers Major P Acharya (Maha Vir Chakra), Capt N Kenguruse (Maha Vir Chakra) and Capt Vijayant Thapar (Vir Chakra) besides 15-20 men in that attack. That was probably the worst moment.