How to deal with terrorism in Jammu

First, nothing new ever happens in J&K. Things are mostly a repetition of previous operational concepts adopted by the sponsors of terror whose institutional memory brings back old strategies at appropriate moments. I can recount year-to-year how this has changed in J&K in a dynamic way: From the direct contacts sought by groups of terrorists, to the period of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to the so-called Fedayeen (suicide attacks), the ambushes and sniping on convoys, BAT actions on the LoC and stone-throwing to try and psychologically stymie security forces (SF).

All this, even as counters were being continuously developed by our forces. We have invariably adopted effective strategies after initially suffering setbacks. One of the reasons is that institutional memory perhaps needs a higher degree of continuity and we need to sufficiently document lessons, and “pass them on”. Most senior commanders of today may not be sufficiently aware of events of, say, 2001-3 when terror was at its peak.

Take what the Kargil episode did to the counter-terrorism grid in J&K. While we rallied to succeed in Kargil by dint of some great junior leadership and the performance of our frontline units, we scarcely looked to what happened in Kashmir, and it will be a fallacy to think very little happened. The 8 Mountain Division, which had arrived from Kohima in 1991, had finally settled at Sharifabad and was effectively controlling the operations in North Kashmir. Once the Kargil intrusions came to light, the Division moved for the assault, leaving voids in its wake. To the credit of the senior leadership, efforts were made to fill up some of these by moving troops from Eastern Command but they proved insufficient.

Sensing this, Pakistan exploited the opportunity by inducting seasoned terrorists along with serving soldiers and officers to provide the middle to junior leadership. With no LoC fence in place in those days, the Lipa, Keran and Tangdhar routes were exploited for induction through infiltration into the infamous Rajwar, Hafruda and Rafiabad forests.

The infiltrated Pakistani element initially played havoc as it operated in large groups, thus sometimes even outgunning our smaller subunits which came in contact. The only occasion that terrorists could decamp with a medium machine gun of the Indian Army was at this time. Four years later, we found ourselves saddled with Hilkaka, a mountain hamlet of a few “dhoks” (graziers’ huts), used by terrorists as a base high up in the mountains above Surankot. It was a safe location to which terrorists gravitated, because sustained operations by the Army at those heights were difficult without a major logistics effort.

Routine operations, followed by a logistics pause thereafter, were no good in such an environment: The terrorists had their caches and mountain hideouts to fall back upon. It took the arrival of a bold commander in Romeo Force to tackle Hilkaka with adequate tactical stops on the Valley side. It resulted in a large number of terrorists killed. Lt Gen Hardev Lidder (then a Major-General) came straight from Washington where he was the Defence Attache. A veteran of the Sri Lanka deployment and a Special Forces man, he remembered lessons from Operation Pawan. He first constructed Mi-17 helipads at higher altitude locations, dumped logistics there by helicopter and secured them. He could then ensure continuity in operations, a strategy we also successfully followed in Hafruda jungles in 2011. The moment you can outlast the hidden terrorist in his own lair, you have him on the run. Only rapid turnover of troops or effective logistics management ensures this — in the latter, exhaustion levels are high and one may not be in the best physical shape when a contact develops.

The above is exactly what has happened in Jammu division. Voids were created over a period of time as focus prevailed on another sub-conflict zone, in this case, Kashmir. What is more relevant now is the speed at which control, equilibrium and stability are achieved. One of the most important aspects is an effective unified command which dwells jointly on intelligence, operations and outreach to the population. With the Kashmir experience and the same in Jammu some years ago, this should not be difficult.

Technical intelligence will be required in such operations which are tactical in nature, but the human element is even more important. There are rumours of a large number of Pakistani regulars operating in the Jammu region and some in Kashmir too. We have seen this happen earlier. It was largely handled by the Army’s Rashtriya Rifles (RR), a resource now stretched because moving units from the Valley is not recommended. It calls for greater synergy between the Army and the CAPFs as the latter’s resources will be more energetically involved than before, and rightly so. There are far too many presumptions in the air about the Gujjar community’s relative antipathy. We have to reach out as effectively as we have done in the Valley and win over their loyalty.

The old Village Defence Guards need to be refurbished with better weapons and some training. Their presence is a force multiplier as they also operate as guides and prevent the freedom of movement of terrorists. Lastly, the system followed in 1999 of getting a large body of troops to search and churn the jungle areas to destroy hideouts and logistics is recommended. It prevents terrorists from taking refuge in the higher reaches, forcing them to the villages where they remain vulnerable to intelligence sources.

The writer is a former corps commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps