Though the Maharashtra elections were widely expected to be closely contested, they turned out to be far from that. The reasons behind the thumping victory of the Mahayuti — the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Shiv Sena, and the Nationalist Congress Party’s (NCP) alliance — have been widely discussed. But we also need to examine the possible reasons for the failure of the Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA) that comprised the Congress, the NCP (Sharadchandra Pawar), and Shiv Sena (Uddhav Balasaheb Thackeray).
Traditionally, Maharashtra has been seen as a progressive, assimilative state, with Hindutva politics having limited appeal. However, in the run-up to the assembly polls, the BJP and the Shinde-led Shiv Sena strategically appealed to Hindus to unite, to deflect caste- and class-based attempts at social engineering that are usual in state polls. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) ran an aggressive campaign online and offline to unify Hindus in favour of the Mahayuti.
The Shinde-led Shiv Sena vernacularised the Hindutva narrative by invoking Maratha ruler Shivaji and the legacy of Balasaheb Thackeray (the “Hindu hriday samrat”), alleging that the Shiv Sena (UBT) had forgotten its Hindutva roots.
Among the MVA allies, the Congress and the NCP (Sharad Pawar) found it difficult to resist this narrative due to their ideological compulsions. Similarly, Shiv Sena (UBT) could not successfully differentiate its Hindutva from that of the RSS/BJP. Political workers on the ground said that the MVA grossly underestimated the rising space and appeal for Hindutva, especially among young voters hooked to the narrative through social media. There were also conscious attempts to rope in temple trusts and religious bodies in the Mahayuti’s campaign, something that was well beyond the MVA’s control.
A significant blow to the MVA has been its diminished grip on Maharashtra’s political economy over the last five years, mainly caused by the defection of Shinde and Ajit Pawar, who were instrumental in managing extensive patronage networks and resource allocation within their parent parties. As deputy chief minister (CM) and finance minister, Ajit Pawar wielded significant influence over the state’s financial and cooperative sectors, including the powerful sugar lobby. Meanwhile, Shinde, as the CM and urban development minister, controlled vital brokerage networks across major cities. Their entry into the BJP-led Mahayuti not only strengthened the alliance’s administrative and electoral machinery but also facilitated a strategic transfer of crucial networks — spanning businesses, cooperatives, and grassroots organisations — into the BJP’s fold. Ajit Pawar reportedly aligned the sugar lobby with the BJP, ensuring policy support and financial stability, while Shinde’s grassroots appeal and organisational acumen consolidated support across constituencies.
The Congress, despite its status as a national party with a pan-Maharashtra presence, failed to energise its organisation or take on a leadership role within the MVA. Similarly, the limitations of the Shiv Sena (UBT) and Sharad Pawar’s faction of the NCP, which traditionally relied on strong grassroots cadres but struggled to rebuild their organisational networks after internal splits, were underlined again. Shinde and Ajit Pawar breaking away not only cost their parent outfits influential leaders but also siphoned off significant portions of their bottom-rung leadership.
While Uddhav Thackeray and Sharad Pawar relied heavily on their personal appeal, there was little effort to systematically cultivate second- and third-rung leadership and expand organisational reach. Thackeray’s closed, “boardroom-like” style of functioning alienated shakha-level workers and leaders, fuelling dissatisfaction and defections. Despite this, there was no change in their work, thus alienating a significant portion of the cadre. Similarly, within the NCP, Sharad Pawar’s central role overshadowed any attempts to decentralise leadership, with internal family dynamics further complicating efforts to build a cohesive, statewide organisational network.
The MVA’s lack of internal cohesion was reflected in its failure to announce its chief ministerial face, even as the Shiv Sena (UBT) hoped that Uddhav Thackeray as the potential CM would help the alliance immensely. Similarly, many leaders of the MVA supported independent candidates contesting against official MVA candidates. While the Mahayuti, too, had several internal disagreements and skirmishes, these were effectively nipped. The Mahayuti put out an elaborate agenda — a mix of populist appeals, welfare measures, and capital-intensive development projects — while the MVA banked too much on the “gaddar” narrative and sympathy.
The MVA had a tough contest with the incumbent coalition, which had significant political and economic clout and resources. But, for the three parties in the MVA, the elections were as much about their relevance in state politics as they were about a moral and political victory — something they seem to have missed.
Sanjay Patil is a Mumbai-based researcher working on Maharashtra politics and urban informality. The views expressed are personal
