European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. (Source: Reuters)
Feb 26, 2025 12:38 IST First published on: Feb 26, 2025 at 12:32 IST
The president of the European Commission is set to visit India on February 27-28 with her College of Commissioners. This will be the first time that the College of Commissioners visit India together. With the unraveling of the transatlantic alliance — given that Europe was not involved in the Riyadh talks to end the Ukraine war — Brussels has every reason to be unsure of US security guarantees. A strategy to upgrade and expand the European defence ecosystem may be in the helm already, reflected in the spike in defence spending. While deliberations are expected to lay the foundation for upcoming FTA (free trade agreement) talks in March, its scope is much larger than just mutual economic reassurances.
Europe may see India as a befitting partner in the Indo-Pacific with respect to the regional balance of power. Rather than keeping it transactional, the EU could be eyeing a deeper subliminal relationship with India as one of its key pillars of Indo-Pacific engagements. Even as New Delhi may be tempted to use this opportunity for negotiating better trade terms, it may adopt a calibrated approach instead, focusing more on fostering synergy with a formidable global player to tackle ongoing shifts within the international order.
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Europe’s defence production capacities have reduced drastically since the end of the Cold War due to low demand. The most prominent arms manufacturing countries include France, the UK, Sweden, Germany, Italy and Spain, while Poland and Romania are keen on developing their internal capacities. Since it was expected that a technological edge will make up for lower quantities of equipment, the quality of defence items in Europe remains at par with global standards. Hence, the challenge lies in scale, as lack of long-term government orders and the fragmented nature of the defence industry hold back large-scale output, which is necessary to support Ukraine and fulfill domestic stockpile requirements. This can be achieved with cross-border collaboration and reliable supply chains for defence production.
India has also sought to radically increase its defence manufacturing, primarily driven by self-reliance in security. Its defence production increased 16.7 percent to more than $14.5 billion in 2023-24 from the previous year, showing a promising trend. A rise in share of domestic production to 65 per cent, with private entities making up 21 per cent of this share, indicates a robust defence supply chain network and growing private interest. An increase in exports to worth $2.4 billion in 2023-24 is testament to the quality of Indian defence products.
While the combined EU defence industry turnover and exports are astronomically higher, exceeding $166 billion and $60 billion in 2023 respectively, India’s capacity to aid in defence production cannot be discounted. A collaboration of EU entities involved in defence manufacturing with their Indian counterparts can be mutually beneficial. The FDI policy in India’s defence, ranging from up to 74 per cent via automatic route and 100 percent via government route, is crucial for the success of these kinds of partnerships.
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The US is already shifting its focus towards the Indo-Pacific, which is likely to be the theatre of great power competition due to its resource wealth, strategic geography and large markets. With the “EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”, launched in 2021, Brussels has emphasised increasing engagements in the region with the Indian Ocean as a gateway. As the EU seeks to amplify its presence in the ensuing power rivalry, to compete or hedge between large powers, it will need close partners in the region.
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An increased EU involvement in the Indo-Pacific also presents a meaningful choice to its member-states for a security and economic partner other than Russia, China and the US. By investing in major Indo-Pacific countries like India, which is dependent on Russian military hardware presently, the EU can help strengthen its strategic autonomy, thereby bolstering the regional security architecture.
India and the EU already have a strong partnership across several facets including foreign policy, defence, technology and connectivity. India is placed uniquely in the Indo-Pacific theatre with considerable influence in the Indian Ocean, large number of armed forces, and most particularly, a shared objective to maintain rules-based order in the region. Given its regional aspirations and projection as a “preferred security partner”, New Delhi shall be able to broker security and diplomatic relationships between the EU and other Indo-Pacific nations. Amidst scepticism over Europe turning towards China, or Beijing filling the void left by USAID in Asia, this visit will be one of the determinants of EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy in the coming time.
The author is an analyst in Indo-Pacific geopolitics and Southeast Asian studies. He leads an independent policy and strategy consulting practice from New Delhi
