It is quite telling that five months since the deal on disengagement, both sides are still working to pluck what are essentially low-hanging fruits. (File Photo)
Mar 10, 2025 16:41 IST First published on: Mar 10, 2025 at 13:41 IST
It’s been five months since the Kazan deal between India and China. Dialogue between the two sides has since accelerated, and the language has softened. In his press conference at the sidelines of the annual session of China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, Foreign Minister Wang Yi talked about the need for a “cooperative pas de deux of the dragon and the elephant.” Meanwhile, in his recent interaction at Chatham House, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar talked about the “very unique” relationship that the two countries share.
That said, substantive normalisation hasn’t made much headway since October 2024. Jaishankar acknowledged as much at Chatham House, saying that India and China are discussing some steps to ensure that the relationship moves in a “more predictable, stable and positive direction.” Specifically, he added: “the resumption of pilgrimage to Mount Kailash, the direct flights between the two countries, the journalists’ issues—all these are being discussed, but there are some other issues; for example, we had a mechanism about trans-border rivers…we are looking at this package…it’s hard. You know, obviously, we would like to see it done sooner rather than later. And then we will see what happens after that.”
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It is quite telling that five months since the deal on disengagement, both sides are still working to pluck what are essentially low-hanging fruits. Two fundamental factors lie at the heart of the vexed nature of the India-China relationship.
First, there is clearly a difference in how both sides view the nature of the standoff in Eastern Ladakh and the broader boundary issue. Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi’s remarks in mid-January are worth recalling. Discussing the situation in Eastern Ladakh, he said that the two sides were still dealing with a “degree of standoff”, given the changes in terrain, stocking and deployment. It was a timely reminder that the fundamental nature of the challenge along the Line of Actual Control has changed since April 2020. Moreover, the old status quo is unlikely to be restored. For India, peace and tranquility at the border remains a prerequisite for building a stable relationship. Jaishankar too was categorical about this at Chatham House. Dwivedi’s recent comment about a “two-front war threat” being a “reality” further underscores the gravity of the developments on the border with regard to China.
Beijing, meanwhile, has talked about its intent to work with India to “jointly preserve the peace and tranquillity in the border areas”. However, its officials have also said that “we should never allow bilateral relations to be defined by the boundary question, or let specific differences affect the overall picture of our bilateral ties.” Such compartmentalisation is inimical to ensuring stability and predictability in the relationship. It’s quite remarkable that this is precisely the argument that Chinese officials have been making to their American counterparts over the past few years. Even in his press conference last week, Wang Yi lashed out at the US for engaging in “two-faced acts.” So, one would assume that it should not take much reflection for Beijing to grasp New Delhi’s perspective. Just like China seeks a new balance with the US, there is also a need for a new balance between the India-China relationship too.
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This is the second factor that makes deals on evidently straight-forward issues difficult. During his interaction at Chatham House, Jaishankar outlined the challenge between India and China as two neighbours rising in parallel, resulting in the shifting of the balance between them. In such a situation, the issue is “how do you create stable equilibriums and then transition to the next set of equilibriums,” he said. The EAM added: “We want a stable relationship, but we want a relationship where our interests are respected, our sensitivities are recognised; where it works for both of us. That has really been the challenge in the relationship.”
From the Chinese perspective, Wang Yi has said that India and China must “support each other rather than undercut each other, work with each other rather than guard against each other.” They must also “be partners that contribute to each other’s success”. Yet, these words have not been accompanied by necessary actions. For instance, reports have indicated that while India has been more open to Chinese investments, Beijing has cautioned its companies from investing in India. It has also actively blocked the transfer of equipment, machinery and technical personnel to India. These actions are essentially a product of Chinese anxieties around export of production capacity along with a desire to retard the expansion of electronics, automobile and solar energy sectors in India. This underscores that China continues to view India from the prism of competition. Unless this approach shifts fundamentally, the sweet nothings about the dance of the elephant and dragon are meaningless.
The writer is chairperson, Indo-Pacific Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution
