As the NDA government settles down to govern in the third term of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, five new themes will shape its engagement with the world. Delhi now faces an international context that is quite different from 2014 or 2019. Deep structural changes are unfolding in the international system that demand major adjustments in India’s worldview and adaptations to its domestic policies. The five imperatives outlined below are by no means the only challenges that will confront the new government, but they are among the main geopolitical imperatives.
The first is the return of great-power rivalry that demands an approach driven by interest rather than ideology. The renewed conflict between the West on the one hand and China and Russia on the other has begun to produce a very different set of external conditions for the conduct of India’s international relations than the one it had to deal with in 1991. At the end of the Cold War marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Delhi had the room to engage with all the great powers without looking over its shoulder.
It was widely presumed that India can replace its policy of “non-alignment” between competing powers with the idea of “multi-alignment” — of cooperating with all the great powers. However, several trends make the idea of “multi-alignment” problematic. So long as the major powers got along well with each other, it did not matter what you called your policy. The conflict between the great powers has intensified since 2019, when Modi’s second term began. The freedom to do what you want with each one of them without incurring costs with the other has begun to reduce.
Multi-alignment also gives a false sense of symmetry in the relations with the major powers. In the real world, though, there is considerable variation in the current economic and security salience of these relations and their future possibilities. For example, the trade and technology relationship with the US and Europe far outweighs that with Russia. While Moscow was a major defence partner in the past, Delhi’s security ties are far more diverse now. India’s large trade relationship with China is marred by massive deficits and security challenges. Equally important is the logic of geography: Unlike in the Cold War, when the great powers were some distance away, today the second-most important power, China, is India’s neighbour. And to make matters worse, Delhi is locked in a wide-ranging conflict with Beijing that is at odds with Washington and getting closer to Moscow.
The expansion of India’s own weight in the international system has certainly given some space to Delhi in navigating the new great-power rivalry. But that space is limited and is shrinking. This means India will have to make choices on the issues at hand in the unfolding great-power contestation. Ducking can’t be a permanent strategy. These choices on each issue will have to be based on a cold calculation of material interests and not slogans like “multi-alignment” and “multipolarity”.
Second is the changing structure of the global economy that demands more reform at home. If India adapted to the logic of economic globalisation at the turn of the 1990s, it must now deal with the impact of geopolitics on the global economy. To be sure, the Modi government has broken away from the faith in economic globalisation since it walked out of the Asia-wide free trade negotiations (RCEP) in 2019. And the efforts of major Western economies to reduce the dependence on China have opened new opportunities for India to enhance its geoeconomic position.
However, Delhi is some distance away from seizing those possibilities. Delhi does chant the mantra of trusted geographies, resilient supply chains, and freer trade with strategic partners. But it is yet to translate those slogans into concrete outcomes for trade cooperation. Meanwhile, there is concern that the government’s capacity for much-needed reforms to cope with the new global dynamic is constrained by the outcome of the 2024 election. Dispelling the fears about the government’s will and capacity to pursue domestic economic transformation will be a major task for the new government.
Three, the unfolding technological revolution promises to redistribute global power and is now an integral part of great-power competition. This again has opened the door for accelerated advanced technological development in India. The initiative on critical and emerging technologies (iCET) with the US, which was reviewed by the national security advisors of the two countries this week in Delhi, points to that. To take full advantage of the new possibilities, though, India will need a modernisation of the advanced S&T sector that has been under the domination of state monopolies.
Four, Delhi must adapt to the rise of new regions that break down old regional categories. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific over the last decade cutting across many traditionally defined regions such as South Asia and Southeast Asia is one example. The financial power of the Arab Gulf, Africa’s rapid economic growth, and Europe’s southern outreach point to the exciting new opportunities for India to the west of the Subcontinent. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is just one sign of the things to come. Delhi must now invest more resources — diplomatic, political, economic, and security — in engaging with Africa, Southern Europe, and the Middle East and erase the old mental maps that saw these regions as separate entities.
Five, Delhi needs to tone down its expansive rhetoric on India’s rise. There is no doubt that India, well on its way to becoming the third-largest economy, is climbing up the global hierarchy. But its aggregate GDP of nearly $4 trillion should not obscure the fact that India’s per capita GDP is barely $2,800. If India’s developmental challenges are huge, so is the problem of dealing with growing inequality within. India’s growing global influence must, in essence, be about leveraging the world for the rapid expansion of domestic prosperity and equity.
Delhi must also remember that world history is littered with rising powers that crashed on their way up the global order. While its newfound self-assurance is welcome, Delhi should avoid the evident dangers of overreach. Overestimating India’s strength and underestimating the challenges at hand lead to geopolitical hubris and complacency in policymaking that could cost Delhi dearly.
The writer is visiting professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express
