Former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina during a MOU sign at Hyderabad House in New Delhi. (Express Archive)
On August 5, the streets of Dhaka filled with crowds, as thousands stormed and ransacked the official residence of the prime minister, Sheikh Hasina. Initially sparked by opposition to a job-quota system, the protests quickly shifted to demands for Hasina’s resignation. Launched in July by students predominantly from the left-wing and liberal student groups, the protests were also supported by the country’s main opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which had boycotted the recent elections citing undemocratic practices. Violent clashes led to a large number of casualties. With Hasina resigning and leaving the country, an interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, has been established.
In Bangladesh, there is a cyclical relationship between inter-party conflict, political violence, and inter-party enmity. This perpetuates a toxic political environment where disputes escalate to violence, further deepening animosity. The apparent immediate causes often mask underlying ideological, political, religious, and institutional rifts. Protests are a feature of Bangladesh’s polity, reflecting its historical dynamics and confrontational political landscape. From the language movement of 1952 to now, they have played a crucial role in shaping the nation’s contested identity. Another feature is the army whose interventions since 1975 have been marked by human rights abuses and repressive policies, impacting the democratic ethos and damaging the social fabric of the country. Following the 1971 liberation of Bangladesh, the lack of institutional frameworks led to several crises, which developed into a deep-seated rivalry between the two major political parties in Bangladesh, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.
Shared values and belief systems shape the political behaviour of a country. In Bangladesh, there has been a preference for strongman leadership and a lack of tolerance for dissent. Confrontational politics is legitimised in the form of street politics and violent protests. This is further reinforced by a polarised institutional framework and the absence of checks and balances. Therefore, the confrontational ethos in Bangladesh is less guided by the socio-economic disparities and regional inequalities, and more by ideological aspirations and party politics.
The politics of memory is entangled with the constant confrontation between these political actors. Sheikh Hasina’s reference to the protesters as “razakars” — harking back to militia groups supported by the Pakistan Armed Forces at the time of liberation — led to greater anger against her government. The social call underlying the students’ protest soon turned into a political one, demanding the resignation of the prime minister.
The question now is whether the interim government can foster an ethos of democracy and social justice in the country. Something similar was attempted in the period between 2006 and 2008. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 came the military rule of Ziaur Rahman in 1977, followed by Hussain Muhammad Ershad in 1983. A democratic movement gained momentum, leading to mass protests in the 1990s and the restoration of the parliamentary form of government. But this did not end the political unrest. The period between 1991 to 2008 saw frequent strikes and protests by the Awami League, Bangladesh Nationalist Party and other forces, which led to a state of emergency and intervention by the military during the crisis of 2006 to 2008. The deployment of the army to combat internal violence in Bangladesh initially seemed like a promising solution to the escalating unrest. The move was met with public approval, seen as a decisive step towards restoring peace. However, the extensive role of the military in the caretaker government led to concerns about civil-military relations and the potential for future military intervention in politics. The postponement of elections originally scheduled for January 2007 led to increased political tension and violence, undermining the caretaker government’s credibility. There were several cases of torture, extra-judicial killings, and arbitrary arrests. High-profile anti-corruption drives targeted prominent political figures, which were seen as politically-motivated. This normalisation of violence influenced the new generation of party loyalists, who became socialised into a culture where violence was seen as an acceptable political tool.
The biggest challenge that the country currently faces will be that of employment and economic rectification. As the current phase of protest first started as a student movement demanding changes in the quota system, will the new caretaker government be able to remedy these constraints? The aim must be to stabilise the economy, along with preparation for free, fair and meaningful elections. Moreover, the involvement of opposing forces like the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami in the interim government will be pivotal. Their roles could shape policy direction, influence governance strategies, and impact political stability. Understanding their positions and negotiating power is essential for assessing the interim government’s effectiveness and representational balance.
India’s relations with Bangladesh is embedded in complex socio-economic interdependence and geo-political positioning, and coordination between West Bengal and the central government is essential in promoting national interests without conflicting messages. Any confrontational politics and political instability in neighbouring Bangladesh invites a number of threats: Rise of religious extremism, insurgency and migration. To tackle these issues, India pursues three broader policy objectives vis-a-vis Bangladesh: Security (internal and external), economic development and political stability. For this, India has been supporting secular-liberal-democratic forces against religious and left extremists in Bangladesh.
As the Awami League came to power for a fourth consecutive term, Sheikh Hasina’s quest for development and engagement with the rising Indian economy led to several connectivity and developmental projects, giving India a number of transit points. In fact, both countries agree that weak security arrangements, politics of protest, intolerance and hate-mongering sabotage developmental partnership. Political instability will only lead to a cycle of violence and migration to India. Which is why, the direction of the new interim government’s relationship with India becomes of vital importance.
The writer is professor, School of International Studies, JNU
