The hijacking of the Jaffar Express by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) on March 11 was a major escalation in the Baloch independence struggle. Despite the crisis having ended, as expected, in a bloody shoot-out, the audacious capture of a train would pass into the folklore of the Baloch struggle.
This struggle has been going on, in one form or another, since 1948, when Pakistan forcibly annexed the then princely state of Kalat (as most of Balochistan was called). The current phase of the independence movement began in 2004 and has sustained itself for the past 20 years despite all that the Pakistani army has thrown against it.
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As I wrote in my 2019 book Pakistan: The Balochistan Conundrum, the roots of Baloch alienation are deeply rooted and encompass issues that impinge on Baloch identity and consciousness — on what it means to be a Baloch. These range from historical memories of the forcible accession of Kalat in 1948 and the 2006 killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti to the building of mega projects like Gwadar and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor without taking the Baloch people into confidence, along with administrative and political marginalisation. Topping it all are the brutal tactics of enforced disappearance and especially the wanton “kill and dump” policy adopted by the army. The weight of such past and present injustices cannot be lightly brushed under the carpet by talking about development goals.
The nature of the insurgency in Balochistan has evolved. In the 1960s and 1970s, the insurgency was tribal-based. Now, however, in the last decade or so, there has been a greater political awareness among the nascent middle class about their exploitation. Hence, there has been greater political mobilisation. Consequently, it is not limited to a handful of sardars fighting to preserve their sardari nizam. Instead, the insurgency has developed into a nationalist one.
The state, led by the army, sees the insurgency as a law and order problem that needs to be tackled militarily. It just cannot or does not want to understand the import and depth of Baloch nationalism and alienation. The army does not see that the insurgency is not the real problem but is the result of a problem, and the problem is political. It goes to the heart of what kind of state Pakistan is and whether minority nationalities like the Baloch can be accommodated equitably or will have to live subserviently under the dominant Punjabis. The army, being overwhelmingly Punjabi, is also part of the problem. In Punjab, the army is seen as a friend, but in Balochistan, or Sindh for that matter, the army is not a friend but a force of oppression.
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The results of tackling a political problem militarily are there for all to see. The International Crisis Group (ICG) perhaps summed it up best when it noted in its report titled Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, September 2006, “The military can retain control over Balochistan’s territory through sheer force, but it cannot defeat an insurgency that has local support … its policy directions will likely undermine the remaining vestiges of state legitimacy in the troubled province… The insurgency is not likely to recede, nor will Islamabad manage to dampen the Baloch.”
A basic flaw in Pakistan’s make-up is its failure to acknowledge, let alone accommodate, its ethnic diversity and the economic disparities among the provinces. Pakistan has tried to construct a national ideology based on religious homogeneity. By ignoring the diversity of its people and the interests of ethnic and regional groups, Pakistan splintered in 1971 despite a common religion. The remainder of Pakistan is marred by ethnic and sectarian conflicts, terrorism, and economic inequality.
As the situation exists today, the needs and interests of the state and the Baloch are diametrically opposed to one another. The Baloch are fighting for their identity, their cultural, historical, geographical, and economic rights. The state, including the army, is concerned with making an artificial Islamic nation, politically marginalising the Baloch, and ruthlessly exploiting their resources.
The moot question is whether the situation in Balochistan is irretrievable for Pakistan. Will the insurgency dissipate with economic development and improvement in social indicators? Will the state put an end to the policy of “kill and dump” and release those in illegal captivity? Given its mindset, the army is unlikely to reverse course in Balochistan. For most of the Baloch themselves, the struggle seems to have gone beyond economics. Pushed to the wall, facing marginalisation and subjugation, an increasing number of Baloch are now picking up the gun for the sake of preserving the Baloch identity.
At present levels, the conflict is unlikely to threaten the integrity of the state. Pakistan’s military is large, with well-trained troops and sophisticated weapons, making it capable of holding the country. The Pakistan Army will manage to outfight the Baloch fighters. However, it is unlikely that it will manage to outlast a people who are fighting to protect their identity and their homeland. What is likely is that protracted violence will continue to afflict Balochistan. Unless resolved, the insurgency in Balochistan, even at current levels, will eat away at the innards of Pakistan.
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Hence, military force alone will not break Baloch resistance. Pakistan will have to be prepared for a long haul unless there is a radical change in the way the army decides to deal with the Baloch.
In the long run, the Pakistani state will have to find a compromise with the Baloch. Continuing to seek a military solution to a political problem may make sense tactically in softening the opposition. But it can never be the long-term solution. One of the key factors for the future development of Pakistan will be a just solution to the Balochistan conundrum, a solution that puts the Baloch and their identity at the centre rather than the resources of the province. Failure to do so will slowly but inexorably exacerbate the crisis in Balochistan till it explodes with dire consequences for Pakistan.
Tilak Devasher is an author and Member, National Security Advisory Board. Views are personal
