Predictably, external affairs minister S Jaishankar had declared before he visited Islamabad for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting that since this was a multilateral event, he would not be discussing bilateral ties with Pakistan. In his opening address at the meeting, Jaishankar enumerated the key challenges that the SCO was committed to combating: “One, terrorism; two, separatism; and three, extremism,” a list that has a direct bearing on the dismal state of the India-Pakistan relationship. Complete stasis has prevailed in bilateral relations since the failed 2015 attempt to restart a “comprehensive bilateral dialogue”. In the aftermath of the 2019 Pulwama attack and reorganisation of the erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir state, India and Pakistan snapped trade ties and travel links and recalled their respective high commissioners.
The uneventful completion of the first visit by an Indian foreign minister to Pakistan after a prolonged hiatus has been viewed as a positive step in New Delhi, which has also noted Pakistan Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif’s forbearance in not raising bilateral issues in his remarks as the SCO summit host. The elder Sharif sibling (and three times PM) has also made some conciliatory noises regarding Indo-Pak relations. While it would be naïve to read too much from these scanty “tea leaves”, it is, perhaps, time to start thinking about initiating a thaw in the deep-frozen Indo-Pak relationship.
If one were to take a huge leap of faith and look beyond the current state of historical rancour, political hostility, and military confrontation, is it possible to imagine a situation in which India and Pakistan find a modus vivendi of living peacefully like any two normal neighbours? And if so, what would be the gains?
The resumption of Indo-Pak diplomatic relations and people-to-people contacts would reduce tensions and the risk of conflict, thereby contributing to regional stability. Restoration of trade would bring significant economic benefits for both countries in terms of job creation in manufacturing and services. The 77-year-long quarrel with its western neighbour has been an albatross around India’s neck, impacting its international standing and prestige. The normalisation of Indo-Pak bilateral ties would immensely enhance India’s image as vishwaguru/vishwamitra and lend impetus to its quest for global power status.
In the national security context, normal relations could lead to reduced military deployments and lower defence spending. But this is secondary to a key security issue; the threat of a two-front war; a Damocles sword that hangs over our defence planners. The frequent warnings sounded by our military leadership in this regard are rooted in history, which shows that rarely has a nation successfully defended itself against adversaries attacking on two distinct fronts. Given the geographic separation between our western and northern/northeastern borders, collusive military action by the China-Pakistan axis would pose a huge challenge to the Indian military.
However, the harsh reality is that, so far, every single effort at normalisation of Indo-Pak relations has been systematically sabotaged by Pakistan’s deep State, comprising its army and the Inter-Services Intelligence, because any signs of normalcy in Indo-Pak relations threaten its very raison d’etre. The two most egregious examples of its machinations were the 1999 Kargil infiltration after the Vajpayee/Sharif Lahore Declaration and the 2016 Pathankot terror strike, which followed PM Modi’s impromptu visit to Lahore. The recent Ganderbal terror attack is a pointer to the deep State’s worry, post the assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir.
Knowing that it cannot win a direct military confrontation, the Pakistani army has nurtured dozens of Islamic militant groups to deploy against India. In fact, starting with the mobilisation of tribal lashkars for its 1947 invasion of Kashmir, it has formalised a strategy of proxy war to be waged by jihadi organisations using hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. Pakistan’s subsequent nuclearisation was dovetailed into this strategy to provide an umbrella for a continuation of this proxy war against India.
When considering Pakistan’s deceitful campaign aimed at bleeding India through a “war of a thousand cuts”, it is important to note the motivations that underpin the country’s revisionist approach. Firstly, Pakistan’s State ideology is based on Islam and the two-nation theory with the army as its avowed guarantor. Secondly, there is a pervasive belief that “Hindu India” is opposed to the two-nation theory and wishes to undo it. Thirdly, Pakistan considers Kashmir an unfinished agenda of the Indo-Pak partition, and having lost all the wars initiated against India, it has taken recourse to a campaign of cross-border terrorism. Finally, since hostility against India provides the lifeblood that sustains the Pakistani deep State, it fiercely opposes all attempts at rapprochement.
In India, on the other hand, there is righteous outrage against Pakistan for its unrelenting hostility, manifested in sustained jihadist terrorism as well as in support rendered to separatist entities like pro-Khalistan groups. Consequently, New Delhi has stood firm against offering any trade or diplomatic concessions to Pakistan unless it renounces its hostile approach. While this stance is unexceptionable, should it preclude the initiation of bilateral dialogue and an endeavour to knock sense into the deep State? Here, we may take a cue from a policy dubbed Talk-Fight adopted by North Vietnam during its prolonged conflict with the United States (US). Even as bitter fighting went on, regular “unofficial” talks between North Vietnamese and US diplomats were held in Paris over five years resulting in a negotiated peace agreement, signed in 1973.
Today, Pakistan faces a dire financial situation, which is aggravated by the halting progress of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and mounting indebtedness to China. Grave domestic instability is being aggravated by Baloch separatism and civil-military political tensions. In such a scenario, the initiation of a diplomatic dialogue between India and Pakistan would be a welcome development. If signs of a nascent Indo-Pak rapprochement serve to drive a wedge between China and Pakistan, or between Pakistan’s civil and military establishments, so much the better.
Ergo, while maintaining its alert military posture on the Line of Control and the western border, should India not try out a talk-fight policy with Pakistan?
Arun Prakash is a former chief of Naval Staff of India. The views expressed are personal
