Recent incidents in the Baltic Sea have thrust submarine cable security into the spotlight. Two undersea fibre-optic cables — one linking Finland to Germany and another connecting Lithuania to Sweden — were severed a few days ago, causing significant communication disruptions. Finland and Germany, in a joint statement, acknowledged the incidents and hinted at the possibility of sabotage. Speculation intensified with reports that the ship suspected of damaging the Finland-Germany cable was of Chinese origin, adding an element of intrigue to the unfolding narrative. This development comes a few days after a Russian intelligence vessel was spotted near critical subsea cables and pipelines in the Irish Sea, heightening concerns of deliberate hybrid attacks. Amid Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and escalating geopolitical tensions, observers say a spectre of State-sponsored sabotage looms ominously over Europe’s critical maritime infrastructure.
The trans-Atlantic strategic community’s concern is justified. Undersea cables are the unseen lifelines of global communications, carrying over 99% of international data traffic and enabling vital financial transactions and secure communications. These cables form the backbone of the internet, yet despite their critical importance, they remain largely unprotected and vulnerable to both accidental damage and intentional sabotage. The Baltic incidents serve as a stark reminder of their fragility, underscoring the growing risks to essential public infrastructure in an era of geopolitical contestation.
Even so, the suspicion that these incidents might form part of a broader hybrid warfare strategy by malicious actors warrants closer scrutiny. Severing a submarine cable is far from a simple endeavour. In shallow waters, cables are buried beneath the seabed to shield them from accidental damage, while in deeper waters, their inaccessibility is in itself a significant deterrent. Deliberately cutting a cable demands specialised equipment, precise knowledge of cable routes, and the capability to operate in the extreme conditions of the deep sea. This means navigating immense pressure and complete darkness — an undertaking that requires advanced and expensive technology. While State actors like Russia and China possess the expertise and resources to execute such operations, they are unlikely to resort to such measures unless faced with a significant provocation and assured of a clear strategic payoff.
The possibility of cable sabotage by a State actor is often overstated because the potential rewards are all too ambiguous, particularly when the affected states are not belligerent. Severing undersea cables is a high-stakes operation carrying significant risks, including exposure and retaliation. The repercussions of being implicated in such an act — ranging from diplomatic fallout to sanctions or even escalatory responses — frequently outweigh the potential benefits. Moreover, disrupting communication networks in non-belligerent States risks destabilising global economic systems, potentially harming the saboteur’s own interests, given the interconnected nature of global communications infrastructure.
Not surprisingly, the most common causes of submarine cable disruptions in recent years have been dragging anchors and fishing activity. In March this year, an incident in the Red Sea initially blamed on Yemeni Houthis turned out to have been caused by an anchor dragged during an attack on a commercial ship. Crucially, with most seemingly deliberate cable-cutting incidents, the challenge lies in establishing intent. Unlike accidental damage, sabotage leaves few definitive traces, making attribution difficult without direct evidence. That is not to discount the possibility of sabotage but to merely emphasise the importance of careful investigation before drawing definitive conclusions.
For India, the Baltic incidents carry crucial lessons. With its vast coastline and strategic position in the Indian Ocean, India is heavily reliant on undersea cables for connectivity. However, the country’s approach to safeguarding these assets remains worryingly lax. Legal and regulatory gaps, coupled with jurisdictional ambiguities, have left submarine cables in India’s surrounding seas vulnerable. Despite a recommendation by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India in June 2023, undersea cables have yet to be officially designated as critical infrastructure, and enforcement mechanisms in India’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone remain weak.
India is not alone in its reluctance to assume responsibility for cable protection. Many littoral States in Asia and Africa adopt a similar laissez-faire approach to securing submarine cables. This attitude often stems from systemic issues, as regional governments tend to avoid the cost and complexity of safeguarding critical undersea infrastructure, leaving security and maintenance to private consortiums. Such a hands-off approach, however, is short-sighted. The loss of a major cable could severely disrupt internet services, financial systems, and even military communications.
The geopolitical dynamics in India’s neighbourhood further amplify the urgency of addressing these vulnerabilities. As China expands its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean and probes critical infrastructure, India cannot afford complacency. The increasing activity of Chinese naval and maritime assets, including its fleet of research and survey vessels, mirrors patterns observed in European waters. These vessels, often portrayed as tools for scientific exploration, are widely suspected of mapping critical infrastructure and potentially preparing for disruptions. The parallels with incidents in Europe’s seas are too striking to overlook.
Finally, securing submarine cables demands a multi-pronged approach that combines legal reforms, technological investment, and international cooperation. Beyond formally recognising submarine cables as critical infrastructure, India must update domestic legislation to align with international standards. It should also invest in advanced surveillance and monitoring systems and leverage partner States’ capabilities to detect unusual activities near cable routes.
For New Delhi, the stakes could not be higher. As India aspires to establish itself as a digital and maritime power, protecting the arteries of global communication must be treated as a national priority. The question is not whether another cable will be severed, but whether we will be prepared when it happens — sabotage or not.
Abhijit Singh is head of the Maritime Policy Initiative at ORF, New Delhi.The views expressed are personal
