A case of multiple failures, at too many checkpoints

Anjuli Bhargava

In yet another instance that raises more questions than it answers, the director general of civil aviation (DGCA) transferred the director in the directorate of flying training (DFT) to drone operations with no explanation or reasons. The director had taken charge of flying training only in August 2024, but he was transferred on January 30, well before his three-year term was over.

Nobody barring a few might know the actual reason, but here’s what the industry has surmised. A complaint letter by the president of the association of flight training organisations (FTOs) sent on January 21 to the head of flight safety raises a red flag with regard to the training operations of a Kanpur FTO. The FTO in question was using its aircraft to train students and violating a few civil aviation requirements in the process.

Three primary violations were brought to the attention of the authorities: One, the aircraft of the flying school were not equipped with transponders, an electronic device that sends and receives signals with air traffic control (ATC) and other aircraft. Transponders are essential for safe and efficient flight operations and a civil aviation requirement (CAR) was issued over two decades ago in 2003 that all aircraft must be fitted with these. Two, the FTO’s aircraft were flying at times when the visibility was below the required level, stoking possibility of collision with both India Air Force’s fighter aircraft and civil flights operating from Kanpur. The aircraft of the FTO operated on a different VHF band from the IAF fighters and commercial jets, which meant aircraft within its vicinity would not even be able to hear them. What is also of concern is that trainee pilots typically start flying solo with as little as 25-30 hours of experience, as per the DGCA and international norms — probably safer when done in low traffic environments.

Low visibility, aircrafts operating on different frequencies and no transponders on some aircrafts are a recipe for disaster and could lead to a serious incident or even accident, according to experts in the sector. Equipment and machines can only enhance safety to a degree and cannot substitute self-discipline and internal checks by those conducting operations. While the letter from the association head refers to and tries to establish collusion between DGCA officials and the violating FTO, I will stay off this subject as the bigger concern is with systemic flaws and failings rather than individuals in question.

Ever since the complaint was filed and the matter came to the attention of the DGCA, ministry of civil aviation and the IAF, many actions have followed, including the transfer of the director of flying training. But many questions remain, which I will raise here .

Why was the FTO operating in visibility conditions that are less than optimal for safe flying in the prescribed airfield? What is the desperation and why can’t this training be carried out during better visibility? Is it worth risking the lives of your instructor, students and the lives of the occupants of other aircraft in the vicinity, be it a commercial aircraft full of passengers or a fighter aircraft? If an incident or accident were to occur, would it not mar the credibility, or even mean the end, of the FTO in question? Many global airline accidents with fatalities have marked the end of the business in the past. Seen against these, the FTO’s actions defy logic.

But a lot of things in India are left to fate and defy logic. So, I will ask this: Why were the aircraft of the said FTO not meeting the most basic requirement of being equipped with transponders? This CAR, after all, has been around for so long that no FTO can claim ignorance or unfamiliarity with it.

But, in India, special exemptions are always possible, even the norm in certain cases. It appears that some of the FTOs in India who did not want to bear the extra cost or pull aircraft out (thus foregoing revenue) to get these retrofitted with transponders had sought special exemptions from the authorities, which sounds penny-wise and pound-foolish. Also, as someone flying such an aircraft on a daily or weekly basis to train students, why would a commander or instructor not insist on something that makes his own situation safer?

Further, why would the air traffic personnel involved or functioning in the area not be vigilant to this? Would they not be held accountable if some mishap took place involving two aircraft? How could this have happened under the very nose of the IAF, known for its adept management of almost all things under its ambit? And what do the commercial airlines operating in the area think of this if they were aware?

Last, but not least: Is the DGCA seized of this case? What actions have been taken against the FTO that violated the CARs? Has the regulator examined how many other such cases there are, operating flouting the rules across airfields and in the airspace of our vast country? Are people only to be transferred or held accountable when an infraction comes to light or enters the public domain? In general, are passengers supposed to fly on a wing and collective prayers? I’ll end here with this series of questions in the hope of some answers.

Anjuli Bhargava writes about governance, infrastructure and the social sector. The views expressed are personal