As we enter the new year, India and China are poised at an ambiguous juncture in their relations. There has been a thaw after an extended period of turbulence since the summer of 2020, but its structural impediments persist. Disengagement of Indian and Chinese troops in eastern Ladakh has been achieved, but military deployment in abnormally high numbers continues for the fifth successive winter; the process of de-escalation has not commenced yet. The paradigm governing the relationship for over three decades, already enfeebled, broke down in 2020, and the quest for a new equilibrium has an uncertain prognosis, with no agreed road map available.
There was a flurry of meaningful high-level meetings in the last quarter of 2024, including between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at Kazan on October 23, between the external affairs minister (EAM) S Jaishankar and foreign minister Wang Yi at Rio de Janeiro on November 18, and the resumption of the dialogue between the special representatives (SRs) after five years with national security adviser Ajit Doval meeting his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Beijing on December 18. Relations have stabilised but are still not normal.
In his statement in Lok Sabha on December 3, the EAM was correct in not suggesting a major forward movement in India-China relations, indicating instead that recent developments have set bilateral ties in the direction of “some improvement” and adding that the conclusion of the disengagement phase “allows us to consider other aspects of our bilateral engagement in a calibrated manner, keeping our national security interests first and foremost”. He was right in not encouraging the suggestion coming from certain quarters about a “reset” in India-China relations.
Where do we go from here?
The first priority must be dealing with the unfinished agenda of a substantive restoration of the status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as of April 2020, publicly advocated by the Chief of Army Staff. While our negotiators deserve credit for showing patience in difficult negotiations and being able to persuade China to agree to the resumption of patrolling by Indian troops to their “traditional patrolling points” in Depsang and Demchok, an issue that the Chinese side was not prepared to discuss earlier, there is continued denial of access for our troops and graziers to several traditional patrolling points and pastures as a result of the so-called “buffer zones” (described by Jaishankar as “steps of temporary and limited nature”) agreed to in the Galwan Valley, Hot Spring, Gogra and the Pangong Lake area. These “temporary steps” must not be allowed to become even quasi-permanent. Greater clarity on the terms of disengagement is also warranted. If we acquiesce in facts on the ground changed to the advantage of China, this will be another example of a successful deployment of the Chinese playbook of grey zone operations, which seeks incremental gains while staying under the threshold of an outright military conflict.
Second, upcoming negotiations on the de-escalation of troops along the LAC will be tricky. It will be worthwhile to bear in mind the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the LAC of November 1996, which had stipulated at our insistence that any ceilings on military forces and armaments must take into account “parameters such as the nature of the terrain, road communication and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/de-induct troops and armaments”. We have a disadvantage vis-à-vis China in these domains, and therefore, any numerical equivalence or withdrawal by an equal distance would not work for us.
Third, it cannot be business as usual with China (the Chinese preference) when overall relations and the situation along the borders remain fraught. Arguments are being advanced in some quarters in India that closer economic engagement with China delinked from the larger relationship, greater integration with Chinese supply chains and investment inflows from that country will address many of our economic challenges. Such arguments fail to recognise the complex dynamics of India-China relations as also the China factor in India’s economic security, including dependencies on imports from China in critical sectors that create vulnerabilities.
Fourth, we must engage intensively with China on structural problems in the relationship, ranging from divergent world views, suspicions about each other’s strategic intent, renewed centrality of the unsettled boundary and unclarified LAC, friction in the shared periphery, to the world’s largest hydropower project coming up at a location in Tibet just over 20km from the India-China borders. An important task performed by the SRs and foreign ministers has been to engage in strategic consultations on regional and global trends as well as future directions of India–China relations. We can explore whether India-China relations can be managed in a less confrontational manner and without lowering the bar to seek an elusive détente.
Fifth, the key to dealing with China militarily is investment in our asymmetrical deterrence capabilities and preparedness for multi-domain warfare. Though the risk of a full-fledged armed conflict is relatively low at present, Chinese probing along the LAC and pressures elsewhere will continue. Can we ignore the inconvenient fact that in recent years, the central government’s expenditure on defence has decreased as a share of its total expenditure (from 17.8% in 2016-17 to 12.9% in 2024-25, according to PRS Legislative Research)? Can we deal with a two-front situation involving China and Pakistan, a live land border with our largest neighbour, and its rapidly expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean Region with such constrained defence allocations and armed forces progressively manned by Agniveers?
Sixth, while relying primarily on our own deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis China, external balancing working with the United States (US), Japan, Australia and others is a useful supplement. However, mutual expectations in potential conflict situations must be carefully managed, focusing more on building up each other’s competencies, working together to develop advanced technologies, promoting more diversified and resilient regional and global value chains not excessively dependent on one country, enhancing the combined deterrence to discourage China from opting for disruptive behaviour and seeking a more equitable order.
Seventh, the strategic community in India must make its own assessments of the internal and external dynamics of China, its principal strategic challenge, rather than depending overly on western assessments, which have often proved wrong. India shouldn’t fall for narratives like “peak China”: its working hypothesis should be that the Chinese economy will continue its growth path, albeit at a slower rate. The state of China studies in India are far from satisfactory. Both the government and the private sector must step in with more funding. Restrictions on scholarly exchanges with China should be reviewed.
Finally, there is today possibly greater tactical readiness in both India and China to engage with each other. Faced with economic headwinds and geopolitical pushback, China has shown tactical flexibility in its dealings with the US-led West since the middle of 2023, without revising its strategic ambitions. India was an outlier in this process but that has changed to an extent of late, as the Chinese strategic community assesses some erosion in strategic convergence between India and the US and the unpredictability of the upcoming Trump administration generates anxieties in China (and to a lesser extent, in India). The Chinese leadership is not comfortable when it cannot game out its rivals, but China will play the long game and ride out the Trump years. India, too, must show strategic patience in its dealings with China, keeping in mind the larger geopolitical picture (where a degree of stability in relations with China gives it more elbow room) and seek cooperation wherever possible and desirable, without harbouring any unrealistic expectations.
Ashok K Kantha was formerly India’s ambassador to China. The views expressed are personal
