It was the Iranian and Russian interventions that helped Assad stay in power at enormous cost to the Syrian people.
Dec 10, 2024 05:10 IST First published on: Dec 10, 2024 at 05:05 IST
Few in the world, barring the ruling circles in Tehran and Moscow, will shed a tear for the fall of the Assad dynasty that has ruled Syria with an iron fist for more than half a century. Under Hafez and Bashar al Assad, Syria, one of the ancient and vibrant societies of the Levant, was turned into a brutal police-state run by a small clique. Bashar’s collapse on Sunday — it took an 11-day offensive by rebel groups — is a reminder that rule by dictators is “very strong”, until it is not. Back in 2011, amid the Arab Spring, Bashar al Assad crushed the peaceful protests for change. Since then, his rule had been under great stress.
Even as the world celebrates the fall of a tyrant, it is important to remember that it does not take long for good news from the Middle East to turn bad. Everyone has their fingers crossed on whether the new rulers in Damascus can keep their word on developing a more pluralistic framework in Syria that respects minority rights and the enormous diversity of the nation. That the leader of the rebels who led the charge to Damascus, Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, was a former al Qaeda operative raises questions about whether Syria might move from the tyrannical “secularism” of the Assads to an intolerant Islamist authoritarianism. Nor is it clear if the different factions of the rebel groups that have taken over Damascus will hang together in building a stable system of governance.
Adding to the massive domestic challenges is the role of external powers. It was the Iranian and Russian interventions that helped Assad stay in power at enormous cost to the Syrian people. Over the last few days, Tehran and Moscow, distracted by battles elsewhere, gave up on the dictator. Having been the biggest supporter of the Assad regime, Iran is undoubtedly the biggest loser. The loss of Syria punctures a big hole in the “axis of resistance” that Tehran had constructed against Israel. With a new regime in Damascus, Tehran loses its access to Syria and Lebanon. It is not clear if Russia can retain the air and naval bases it had acquired in Syria under the new regime; but unlike Tehran, Moscow retains some diplomatic leverage as a permanent member of the UNSC. Turkey is a major winner, having backed the rebel forces, and has ambitions to expand its influence in Syria and the broader Levant region. Although Israel is pleased to see Assad go, it would be wary of Syria falling into the hands of the extremist groups that could target Tel Aviv with renewed vigour. The moderate Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would not want to see radical Islamic groups destabilising the region. In Delhi, there is a lingering attachment to the Assad dynasty that had backed Delhi in its disputes with Islamabad over the decades. But the bells have tolled for the Assad dynasty. Delhi, whose stakes in the region are growing by the day, has no time to waste on sentimentalism; it must think of the post-Assad Middle East in broader strategic terms rather than the distorting prism of the competition with Pakistan.
