The statement made by Union External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar on December 3, 2024 was his first substantive statement in Parliament on developments in India-China relations since the Chinese intrusions in Eastern Ladakh in the summer of 2020. His remarks offer clarity on some issues, but many questions remain unanswered.
The Minister’s statement
There are several takeaways from the Minister’s statement.
First, the Minister recalled the amassing of troops by China, India’s forceful counter deployment, and protracted negotiations, resulting in a disengagement of forces. However, the statement is economical in giving details of the arrangements for disengagement from “friction points” (a recent and inapt coinage in India-China border negotiations to describe areas of Chinese transgressions across the Line of Actual Control, or LAC). Without using the term “buffer zones”, the Minister alluded to the construct when he remarked that in a few places where “friction” occurred in 2020, “steps of a temporary and limited nature were worked out, based on local conditions, to obviate the possibility of further friction”. He said, “This … applies to both sides and can be revisited as the situation demands.” He flagged disengagement of troops as “an immediate priority”, but no such urgency has been attached to the termination of “steps of a temporary and limited nature”.
Second, even while stating that the immediate priority of disengagement has been achieved, he made it clear that more work remains to be done on “de-escalation as well as effective management of our activities in the border areas”. He reiterated India’s consistent position that “the maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas is a pre-requisite for the development of our ties”, a critical linkage China has sought to disavow in recent years. Mr. Jaishankar did not suggest that the border areas have returned to a state of normalcy. That cannot be the case when there is continued large-scale deployment of troops of both countries for the fifth consecutive winter season in forbidding terrain.
Third, he did not suggest a major forward movement in overall relations, indicating instead that recent developments have set our ties in the direction of “some improvement” and adding that the conclusion of the disengagement phase “allows us to consider other aspects of our bilateral engagement in a calibrated manner, keeping our national security interests first and foremost”. The Minister has done well to pour cold water on the suggestion from certain quarters about a “reset” in India-China relations. It is naive to think of any major improvement in bilateral ties as long as the borders remain abnormal and a host of structural challenges in the relationship persist. It is intriguing that even some senior government functionaries are proposing integration with Chinese supply chains, disregarding the imperative of economic security vis-à-vis a country with a track-record of weaponising economic dependencies, which unfortunately abound in India’s engagement with China.
Key questions
The statement in Parliament leaves several core questions unanswered.
First, while disengagement is pronounced as completed, India does not have any definitive information on the terms of this exercise. The statement mentions that the “resumption of patrolling to the traditional areas is underway” in Depsang and Demchok. Will this involve Indian troops getting unhindered access to five traditional patrolling points beyond Y-Junction in Depsang Plains? In Demchok, will they be able to resume patrolling to Charding La and Charding Nala – Nilung Nala (CNN) junction which they were visiting earlier? How deep on the Indian our side of the LAC will the Chinese patrols be allowed to come?
There is talk of “coordinated patrolling”, which is a new and undefined concept in India-China border management. Will there be restrictions on the size and frequency of India’s patrols? What are “steps of a temporary and limited nature” agreed to elsewhere, in the Galwan Valley, Hot Spring, Gogra and the Pangong Lake area? How many of India’s traditional patrolling points are no longer accessible to its troops (and grazing grounds to Indians graziers) because of these “temporary steps”? These are legitimate questions awaiting answer.
Second, the Minister has underlined that the Indian side “would not countenance any attempts to change the status quo unilaterally”. However, has not the status quo along the borders been changed by China since April 2020? In the absence of facts being shared in the public domain, we can only speculate. This writer’s discussions with retired senior military officials who have served in Eastern Ladakh suggest that there is denial of access to several traditional patrolling points under new arrangements.
The statement referred to earlier governments having agreed to several steps to defuse situations, including offers to create demilitarised zones (DMZ), limited non-patrolling zones, and so on. The point to note is that the way India and China look at the LAC has changed. Under President Xi Jinping, China considers the LAC within the construct of sovereignty and the mindset of not losing an inch of territory, though the concept of the LAC was agreed to without prejudice to the respective positions of India and China on the boundary question.
Unfortunately, this alteration of the LAC by China or through “temporary steps” has territorial implications for India. We will, therefore, be well-advised to terminate the so-called “buffer zones” at the earliest and keep insisting on the restoration of status quo ante in patrolling and grazing activities as a matter of high priority.
Besides, there was no understanding on establishing a DMZ either in Barahoti or in Sumdorong Chu Valley as suggested elsewhere. This writer was the Indian lead in the Diplomatic and Military Experts Group which negotiated the disengagement in Sumdorong Chu Valley in 1995. We did not agree to any DMZ or restrictions on Indian patrolling. Earlier, on Barahoti, the two sides could not agree on the extent of the area where a DMZ was proposed by China in 1956.
Third, there are reports in credible media outlets (including The Hindu) about Chinese troops being allowed to patrol Yangtse in Arunachal Pradesh. Earlier reports had cited “government sources” as saying that the Chinese demands for patrolling Yangtse were “unreasonable” and “devoid of logic”. Chinese troops have repeatedly attempted to access the Yangtse area but their efforts have been foiled by Indian forces, the last reported instance being in December 2022. If there is no quid pro quo in the Eastern Sector, it must be denied authoritatively.
Fourth, the Chief of Army Staff has reiterated even after the announcement of the understanding on disengagement in Depsang and Demchok on October 21 that “we want to go back to status quo of April 2020”. However, the Ministry of External Affairs no longer refers to the restoration of the status quo ante. If we acquiesce in facts on the ground changed to the advantage of China, this will be another example of a successful deployment of the Chinese playbook of grey zone operations which involves making incremental gains while staying under the threshold of an outright military conflict.
Bridge the political divide
Greater transparency on the part of the government on the one hand and the need for the Opposition resisting the temptation to score points on a sensitive issue affecting our core interests on the other will leave us in a better place in India’s border negotiations with China. This writer recalls that after India had completed negotiations on the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field (November 1996) and the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question (April 2005), he was instructed to brief key Opposition leaders in confidence. Not only was the confidence thus reposed not breached by those leaders, but they also appreciated the government’s gesture, understood the rationale of those sensitive agreements and supported them after they were signed.
Can we make an honest attempt to pivot towards a broad consensus on India’s China challenge, even while leaving room for articulation of differences?
Ashok K. Kantha is a former Ambassador of India to China, now associated with think-tanks
Published – December 09, 2024 12:16 am IST
