Nov 27, 2024 07:01 PM IST
India and China agreed on LAC patrolling arrangements after high-level talks, but underlying tensions and military strategies remain unresolved.
On October 21, India’s foreign secretary announced that diplomatic and military talks had resulted in an agreement on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in 2020. This was followed by a series of high-level engagements over the last month between Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the foreign and defence ministers of India and China.
Despite the steps towards normalising ties, the reasons behind China’s incursions along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh in 2020 remain unclear. Various explanations have been offered. Some attribute the actions to China’s concerns over India’s accelerated infrastructure development near the border. Others suggest that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exploited the unsettled nature of the LAC to enforce its territorial claims. Some experts view the incursions as a signal from Beijing to New Delhi to avoid aligning too closely with the United States in its China-containment agenda. China’s actions are also seen as an attempt to assert regional dominance and challenge India’s growing influence.
The easing of tensions along the LAC has done little to address the underlying issues that led to the crisis. Infrastructure development will continue, the LAC will remain a contested and unsettled boundary, and the broader strategic rivalry between the two nations is unlikely to abate. Even as diplomacy now takes centre stage, the military lessons from the four-year standoff must inform India’s strategy for managing the LAC, an area where China could employ military coercion in the future.
The first lesson is to improve the capability of intelligence analysis significantly. In January 2020, the Global Times reported that the PLA had started major military exercises in Tibet. There were media reports that Indian intelligence officials had informed the Army about hundreds of Chinese military vehicles moving northward from areas opposite Demchok in mid-April. Despite this information, the PLA achieved a strategic surprise.
It is important to understand the difference between information and intelligence. Information is raw data that could enhance general awareness but lacks context or relevance. On the other hand, intelligence is analysed and interpreted insights that give a clear picture of the intentions. India must work to strengthen its intelligence analysis capability by enhancing data quality, leveraging advanced tools, and fostering a culture of collaboration between different agencies.
The second lesson is that the military must prepare a series of contingencies to deal with the PLA’s actions at the LAC. These contingencies could range from localised incidents involving small numbers of troops to multiple incursions like the one that occurred in 2020. They must cover both defensive and offensive actions.
In response to Chinese actions, India’s occupation of the Kailash range in August 2020 was the trigger that forced China to come to the negotiating table and led to the withdrawal of their troops from the North Bank of Pangong Tso. Interviews of senior Indian Army officers indicate that planning for the Kailash operation commenced after the Galwan incident of June 2020. If contingency plans had already been in place, a quid pro quo operation could have been quickly mounted, and perhaps, there would not have been a need for the somewhat ad-hoc response at Galwan.
The third lesson is that the Indian military should review some of the pre-2020 assumptions about the comparative warfighting capabilities of the two sides in case of a conflict along the LAC. For example, two assumptions were that the Indian Air Force had a significant edge over the PLA air force in air operations over Tibet and that the PLA army lacked experience in fighting in high-altitude areas.
An analysis of Chinese infrastructure development along the LAC highlights a significant emphasis on strengthening air combat capabilities. New runways have been constructed, hardened shelters have been built, and air defence systems have been deployed extensively. Over the past five years, the PLA has gained valuable experience in high-altitude operations through the continuous deployment of regular troops and the induction of modern equipment like Type 15 light tanks, PL-181 self-propelled howitzers, and Z-10 attack helicopters. These steps will address some of its existing military vulnerabilities.
The final lesson is that India must work towards rebuilding deterrence against China’s military coercion along the LAC. I mention the word “rebuild” because the PLA’s actions in 2020 exposed a weakening of India’s deterrent posture, creating conditions that emboldened China to consider using military force.
A successful deterrence strategy rests on three critical pillars, often called the 3Cs — capability, communication, and credibility. While enhancing military capabilities is vital, it is equally essential for India to clearly define and effectively communicate its red lines to China’s leadership. To establish credibility, India must consistently demonstrate its commitment and resolve, ensuring that any breach of these red lines is met with a decisive and visible response.
Lieutenant General (retired) Deependra Singh Hooda is the co-founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research and a senior fellow at the Delhi Policy Group. The views expressed are personal
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