Delhi’s relative standing in the region has risen thanks to its sustained economic growth and growing military capabilities.
The annual meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including partner countries like India, as well as the East Asia Summit, took place last week in Laos. These discussions occurred amid escalating conflicts in Europe and the Middle East and rising military tensions in Asia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, attending his 11th consecutive session at the ASEAN-driven summits, reaffirmed India’s call for military restraint and political reason, reminding world leaders that solutions to global challenges cannot be found on the battlefield. Modi’s visit also marked two significant milestones: The 30th anniversary of India’s “Look East” policy (1994) and the 10th anniversary of his refined “Act East” policy (2014). The context in Asia today, however, is vastly different. In the late 1990s, a sense of great power cooperation and the rise of economic globalisation created favourable conditions for regional institution-building and economic integration under ASEAN’s leadership. This environment also allowed for India’s reintegration with the region.
Today, however, great powers are increasingly at odds, and their rivalry is slowing — if not reversing — the trends toward globalisation. China’s regional assertiveness, especially regarding maritime disputes in the South China Sea, has left ASEAN struggling to manage Beijing’s growing military dominance. The region’s fear of China has made it hesitant to fully capitalise on the US’s determination to counter Beijing. Meanwhile, economic de-globalisation is posing new challenges for ASEAN, which has long benefited from US-China commercial cooperation. Compounding these external pressures, ASEAN faces significant internal challenges. The ongoing breakdown of internal order in Myanmar and its military junta’s refusal to engage in constructive dialogue have put the organisation in a difficult position.
Where does this leave India in relation to ASEAN? Delhi’s relative standing in the region has risen thanks to its sustained economic growth and growing military capabilities. India’s active membership of the Quad, with Australia, Japan and the US, has given a new edge to India’s regional role. Delhi kept a low profile on regional security issues in the past but is now taking a more affirmative position. PM Modi was unambiguous in opposing China’s expansionism and underlining the importance of Beijing abiding by the rules of the Law of the Sea in managing and resolving maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Over the last decade, India has also expanded bilateral military cooperation with several countries, most notably the Philippines. India’s trade policy with ASEAN, however, remains problematic — although trade has doubled over the last decade to $130 billion, the trade deficit with the region is mounting and now stands at about $44 billion. ASEAN’s economic size ($4 trillion) stands slightly larger than India’s ($3.7 trillion) and its prospects for growth and technological innovation are impressive. Outlining a strategy that focuses on removing internal obstacles and shedding old mindsets against regional trade is critical for an effective long-term Indian role in East Asia.
