The intense Israel-Palestine conflict is entering its second year. At this moment, there seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel and none of the antagonists can claim to have met their objectives.
The Hamas attack on October 7 last year revived focus on the Palestine issue, traumatised Israeli society and exposed the complacency of its intelligence and army. It also thwarted, for now, the Saudi-Israel rapprochement following the Abraham Accords of 2020. However, the devastation that Gaza has witnessed since October 7 will raise questions about the ability or acceptance of Hamas as an effective military or governance entity, even if an alternative is not yet in sight.
Nearly all of Gaza’s 2 million people have been subjected to multiple displacements. More than 40,000 have been killed. Housing, hospitals, schools, and other property and infrastructure have suffered extensive damage. There is no indication of where funds would come from, especially if Israel is not seen as accommodating some of Palestinian aspirations. Despite the horrors of Gaza, the global community has not been able to bring the violence to an end. South Africa has argued for a case of genocide, and the prosecutor at the International Criminal Court has initiated arrest warrants for Israel’s prime minister and defence minister. These are political messages with no immediate impact. Frustration in Arab governments and anger in their populations have prompted US and Western activity for ceasefire and humanitarian assistance. Israel has been able to sidestep such pressure. Israel, which had withdrawn from inside Gaza in 2005, has reestablished its presence, including along the Philadelphi Corridor separating it from Egypt, citing the existence of tunnel networks connecting it with Sinai.
Israeli society, intelligence, army and government were traumatised by the events on October 7: Nearly 1,200 were killed and 300 taken hostage. The “Never Again” principle — not allowing another Holocaust on the Jewish people — was seen as challenged. Israeli policymakers also believe that they live in a “dangerous neighbourhood” and that any sign of weakness will be exploited.
Initially, the declared objective was to restore deterrence and eliminate the military and governance capability of Hamas. A year later, with many Hamas fighters and leaders killed, a ceasefire is not yet in sight. Around 100 hostages are still not released.
There is no visible move towards a non-Hamas governance structure. Israel has not indicated acceptance of a revived Palestinian Authority, an idea mooted by the West. Hardline elements in the government have seized this moment of turmoil to expand Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and security forces have looked the other way as settlers have harassed and displaced Palestinians. All this will complicate any progress towards a two-state solution.
Hezbollah had built up its strength as “resistance” to Israel since the latter’s occupation of southern Lebanon between 1982-2000, when it successfully managed to have the PLO leadership, including Yasser Arafat, relocated to Libya. An intense 34-day conflict in 2006, following the killing of eight and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers, had led to the destruction of a large part of its stockpile and the killing of 1,100 people in Lebanon.
Israel has been smarting since then with Hezbollah having strengthened itself significantly with Iran’s supplies and support. The sustained Hezbollah firing into northern Israel since October 7 has led to the displacement of 70,000 people from that area. Once Israel was able to move some troops from Gaza, it took the battle to Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, up to Beirut, leading to the displacement of nearly 1.2 million, and the killing of many Hezbollah top leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, who had led the organisation since 1992. Israel’s long-term security, however, will depend on whether Lebanon’s state institutions, including the army, are able now to assert themselves.
Since the US removed Saddam Hussein from power in 2003, Iran has expanded its presence and influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It has supported the Houthis in Yemen. It is the most hardline in its approach to Israel and does not formally recognise its “right to exist”. Israel sees Iran as the only country in the region capable of challenging it militarily. The April 2024 Iranian drone, cruise and ballistic missile attack on Israel was the first time that a state actor had challenged Israel directly since 1973. Israel had responded then, displaying its capacity to penetrate Iranian air defence. The October 1 Iranian ballistic missile attack has been seen as more effective, having hit at or near an airbase and headquarters of Israeli intelligence. Israel will now feel the need to establish escalation dominance. Its strategy for nearly two decades to advocate a convergence of interests with Arab countries in the face of the Iranian challenge is facing the headwind of Arab efforts to reconcile with Iran. Egypt, Iran, UAE and Saudi Arabia are now joining BRICS.
The US has so far deterred large-scale regional conflagration by establishing a major naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and working with several of its European and Arab partners to thwart some of the Iranian missiles on both occasions. However, it has been unable to moderate Israeli actions, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pursuing his agenda, mindful of the political compulsions of the US president to be seen as supporting Israel. More questions will be raised about the US’s ability to deal with three theatres simultaneously: Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific where China has been challenging Japanese and Philippines maritime claims.
The next phase of the conflict will, therefore, depend on Israel’s ability to sustain its present course, the balance of deterrence between Iran and Israel, and the outcome of the US elections. Even as Israel has pursued its military aims, its economy is under stress. Donald Trump was entirely supportive of Israel in his first term. Kamala Harris can be expected to be more mindful of human rights and international humanitarian law concerns, unconstrained by the compulsions of an imminent election.
The writer is a former Indian ambassador to US, France and Israel.
